Amrik Singh Sahota v Middlesex Broadcasting Corporation Ltd
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mrs Justice Steyn DBE |
| Judgment Date | 05 March 2021 |
| Neutral Citation | [2021] EWHC 504 (QB) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Docket Number | Case No: QB-2019-00261 |
| Date | 05 March 2021 |
[2021] EWHC 504 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Mrs Justice Steyn DBE
Case No: QB-2019-00261
David Mitchell (instructed by Sydney Mitchell LLP) for the Claimant
Richard Munden (instructed by CND Parker) for the Defendants
Judgment without a hearing pursuant to CPR 23.8(b)
Approved Judgment
I direct that no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
THE HONOURABLE Mrs Justice Steyn DBE
A. Introduction
This claim for defamation arises from a broadcast on Midlands Asian Television National (“MATV”) on 29 January 2018 of a programme called “Gurdwara Miri Piri” (“the Programme”). The hour-long Programme was in Punjabi. It took the form, primarily, of a live discussion between the Second and Third Defendants of matters arising from a protest that had taken place in front of the Indian Embassy a few days earlier.
According to the Amended Particulars of Claim, the Claimant, Mr Amrik Singh Sahota OBE is a successful businessman, a devout Sikh, and a prominent advocate of the rights of Sikhs in the Punjab to self-determine in an independent state of Khalistan. He has been a Council Member of the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce and has served as chair of the Birmingham Asian Business Association and of the Institute of Asian Businesses. He was appointed to the World Sikh Parliament in 2018 and, since 2002, he has served as the President of the Council of Khalistan. It is said that he is well-known in the Sikh community not only in Birmingham where he lives and works, but throughout the United Kingdom and internationally.
The First Defendant operates the television channel on which the Programme was broadcast.
The Programme was presented by the Second Defendant, Mr Jaswant Singh Bharj (aka Jaswant Singh Thekadar), with the Third Defendant, Mr Parminder Singh Bal, appearing as a guest.
The preliminary issues for determination, in accordance with the consent order approved by Master Davison, sealed on 6 November 2020 (“the consent order”), are:
“(1) The natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of:
i. Spoken by the Second Defendant;
ii. Spoken by the Third Defendant;
iii. As a whole;
(2) Whether those meanings are defamatory at common law;
(3) Which parts of those meanings are statements of fact and which are statements of opinion; and
(4) Whether, in respect of those parts which are statements of opinion, the statement indicated, whether in general or specific terms, the basis of the opinion.”
In accordance with the terms of the consent order, I have determined the preliminary issues without a hearing, based on written submissions. Save to the extent that this judgment has been handed down in accordance with the Covid-19 Protocol, I have adopted the procedure described by Nicklin J in Hewson v Times Newspapers Ltd [2019] EWHC 650 (QB) at [25].
B. The Law
Ascertainment of meaning — general principles
There was no disagreement between the parties as to the applicable principles regarding the determination of the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of. The principles are well-established. My attention was drawn to recent summaries of the principles in Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17, [2020] AC 593, per Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore JSC at [34] to [41] and Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), [2020] 4 WLR 25, per Nicklin J at [10] to [15].
The Court's task is to determine the single natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of. It is well recognised that there is an artificiality in choosing a single meaning from a series of words that individual readers may understand in different ways, but this approach is well-established and it provides a practicable, workable solution: see Stocker v Stocker at [33]–[34].
The focus is on what the ordinary reasonable viewer of the Programme would consider the words to mean. That is the touchstone. It is the “ court's duty to step aside from a lawyerly analysis”: see Stocker v Stocker at [37] to [38].
The key principles derived from the authorities were helpfully distilled and re-stated by Nicklin J in Koutsogiannis at [12] — references to “ readers” of an “ article” apply equally to “ viewers” of a “ programme”:
“i) The governing principle is reasonableness.
ii) The intention of the publisher is irrelevant.
iii) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be naïve.
iv) Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take a too literal approach to the task.
v) Consequently, a judge providing written reasons for conclusions on meaning should not fall into the trap of conducting too detailed an analysis of the various passages relied on by the respective parties.
vi) Any meaning that emerges as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected.
vii) It follows that it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense.
viii) The publication must be read as a whole, and any ‘bane and antidote’ taken together. Sometimes, the context will clothe the words in a more serious defamatory meaning (for example the classic “rogues’ gallery” case). In other cases, the context will weaken (even extinguish altogether) the defamatory meaning that the words would bear if they were read in isolation (e.g. bane and antidote cases).
ix) In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement of which the claimant complains, it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication.
x) No evidence, beyond publication complained of, is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning.
xi) The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication's readership.
xii) Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader.
xiii) In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the claimant's pleaded meaning).”
I approach the assessment of meaning on the understanding that, in relation to the distinction between the naïve and unduly suspicious reader (principle (iii)), “ modern readers should be treated as having more discriminating judgment than has often been recognised”: John v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 2751 (QB), per Tugendhat J at [19]; and Allen v Times Newspapers Ltd [2019] EWHC 1235 (QB), per Warby J at [14].
I have also borne in mind the observations of Nicklin J in Tinkler v Ferguson [2018] EWHC 3563 (QB) at [37] regarding implied or inferred expressions of opinion.
Guidance in relation to television broadcasts
Specific guidance regarding the ascertainment of the meaning of words spoken in the context of a television programme was given by Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Skuse v Granada Television Ltd [1996] EMLR 278 (which concerned Granada's television programme “ World in Action”) at 285:
“(1) The court should give to the material complained of the natural and ordinary meaning which it would have conveyed to the ordinary reasonable viewer watching the programme once in [the year in which it was broadcast].
…
(3) While limiting its attention to what the defendant has actually said or written, the court should be cautious of an over-elaborate analysis of the material in issue. …
In the present case we must remind ourselves that this was a factual programme, likely to appeal primarily to a seriously minded section of television viewers, but it was a programme which, even if watched continuously, would have been seen only once by viewers many of whom may have switched on for entertainment. Its audience would not have given it the analytical attention of a lawyer to the meaning of a document, an auditor to the interpretation of accounts, or an academic to the content of a learned article. In deciding what impression the material complained of would have been likely to have on the hypothetical reasonable viewer we are entitled (if not bound) to have regard to the impression it made on us.”
The overall, subjective impression gleaned from a television programme may be relevant to interpretation. As Eady J observed in Bond v BBC [2009] EWHC 539 (QB) at [9]:
“It is important to acknowledge that assessing the meaning(s) of an hour long television programme is to a large extent a matter of impression. Yet it is also necessary to remember that the test is objective, so that one must always have in mind how the reasonable viewer would...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mr Amrik Singh Sahota v Middlesex Broadcasting Corporation Ltd
...part. A determination of preliminary issues was made by Steyn J, on the papers, in March 2021 ( Sahota v Middlesex Broadcasting & Ors [2021] EWHC 504 (QB)). While noting the Defendants intended to reserve their position on whether the material complained of referred to Mr Sahota, she held ......