D v S (Rights of Audience)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS,LORD JUSTICE WAITE,LORD JUSTICE WALLER |
| Judgment Date | 18 December 1997 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1996] EWCA Civ J1218-15 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Docket Number | LTA 96/7379/F |
| Date | 18 December 1997 |
[1996] EWCA Civ J1218-15
The Master of the Rolls
(Lord Woolf)
Lord Justice Waite
Lord Justice Waller
LTA 96/7379/F
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE MILTON KEYNES COUNTY COURT
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE TYRER)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2
The Applicant appeared in person.
MISS P SCRIVEN QC and MR D BOYD (Instructed by Daniel & Harris, London NW6 2QN) appeared on behalf of the Respondent
I would like to deal with the application raised before us by Dr Pelling that he should be given rights of audience on this application for leave.
Dr Pelling has considerable experience of the issues that arise in cases such as this. He has put before the court a reasoned request in letter form to be granted rights of audience. He has also conducted correspondence with the Registrar to the court and has written a letter dated 23 October 1996 to me personally on the same issue. It seems to me that this case does raise a question of principle as to the appropriateness of a person in Dr Pelling's position being granted rights of audience.
Dr Pelling's position has previously been considered by this court in the case of Chauhan v Chauhan which was heard on 26 October 1994. The judgment, which was given by Neill LJ, was unfortunately not reported and therefore the contents of it may not have been drawn to the attention of courts up and down the country to the extent to which it should have been. It is a case of some significance because of the arguments advanced by Dr Pelling, which the court carefully considered in that case, that he should be granted regularly rights of audience in this area.
I am aware that yesterday another issue was considered by a different division of this court in regard to Dr Pelling's involvement with a Housing Association. I understand Dr Pelling's appeal in that case was successful, but the issues before that court were different from the issues here. I am not considering the position in relation to Housing Associations.
In the case of Chauhan v Chauhan Neill LJ considered the relevant statutory provisions under the Courts and Legal Services Act l990. He referred to Section 28 of that Act which deals with whether a person has the right to conduct litigation. The Section provides explicitly that that question has to be determined solely in accordance with the provisions of Part II of the Act. Part II of the Act begins with Section 17 which contains in subsection (2) the following provisions:
"A person shall have a right to conduct litigation in relation to any proceedings only in the following cases—
….
(c) where paragraph (a) does not apply but he has a right to conduct litigation granted by that court in relation to those proceedings."
Dr Pelling draws attention to the general nature of that provision which he submits enables a court, in the exercise of its discretion, to allow someone in his position to conduct litigation.
Neill LJ, in the course of his examination of the statutory provisions, goes on to refer to Section 18 of the Act. In relation to Section 18 he refers to subsection (2) which requires:
"A person exercising any such functions shall act in accordance with the general principle and, subject to that, shall—
(a) so far as it is possible to do so in the circumstances of the case, act to further the statutory objective; and
(b) not act in any way which would be incompatible with the statutory objective."
He then turns to the provisions of Section 17 which sets out what is the statutory objective. Neill LJ then states that in support of his application Dr Pelling had developed a number of arguments: first, that the particular litigant in that case needed skilled assistance; secondly, that the particular litigant did not wish to apply for legal aid; and, thirdly (and this may not be a matter in issue) that Dr Pelling could provide satisfactory legal services at a much cheaper rate than a solicitor. Dr Pelling had apparently drawn attention to the charges which a solicitor might make for what had been done and indicated that he could provide those services at about a tenth of those which would be charged if the person concerned had the professional help of a solicitor.
Neill LJ then goes on to say:
"That unless he is authorised by the court, Dr Pelling, cannot charge for any litigation services because, if he did attempt to do so, he would be in contravention of the Solicitors Act."
In that case, Dr Pelling drew the attention of the court to the documentation which he provides to people who are willing to take advantage of his services and to the advertising material that he provided. He said that if he was able to carry on in this way it would be for the benefit of litigation generally because it would ensure that there would be greater expedition in the conduct of litigation and that it would be more efficient. Neill LJ recalls the final submission of Dr Pelling that:
"….as the general principle is set out in Section 17, that must contemplate that there are exceptions; and, as far as advocacy is concerned, the courts do, from time to time allow advocates to appear to assist litigants in person."
It is then recorded that Dr Pelling frankly accepted that he could not comply with the requirement of Section 17(3) and:
"Furthermore he makes it clear that, if he is allowed to act in this case, he contemplates making similar applications in other cases, and, indeed, making a career of providing legal services at a fraction of the cost of a solicitor."
The judgment goes on to record that Dr Pelling also makes it clear that he is not insured, but Neill LJ said that:
"It seems to me that the duty of the court is to have regard to the guidelines which Parliament itself has laid down. I am firmly of the view at the moment, although I see the force of all that Dr Pelling has put before us, that it would not be right, in the exercise of the statutory duty imposed by section 18, to accede to this application. It may be that some time in the future there could be a change in the law and some modification in the present...
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N (A Child)
...day of the hearing before Pauffley J), nor had she given any notice of such application; secondly, and relying for this purpose on D v S (Rights of Audience) [1997] 1 FLR 724, that there were in any event no exceptional circumstances to justify Mr Holden being permitted to act in this way. ......
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Harris and Others v Society of Lloyd's
...accord that right (which would bypass the stringent requirements of the legal professional bodies) in exceptional circumstances: D. v S (Rights of Audience) [1997] 1 FLR 724, Paragon Finance Plc v Noueiri [2001] 1 W.L.R. 4 As I have already recorded, the court has already concluded that t......
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R v Bow County Court, ex parte Pelling
...Dr Pelling used to seek rights of audience before a court in family matters on behalf of litigants in person but in a judgment in the case of D v S, The Times, 1 January 1997 [1997] 1FLR 724 CA Lord Woolf MR indicated that as he was not qualified as a solicitor or as counsel it would not be......
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Noueiri v Paragon Finance Plc
...of audience in an individual case has to be made by reference to sections 17 and 18 of the 1990 Act: see D v S (rights of audience) [1997] 1 FLR 724, 725B-726G. In that case Lord Woolf MR said at pp 728C-729A that the discretion to grant rights of audience to individuals who did not meet th......