Devon County Council v DB Cars Ltd
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE LATHAM,MR JUSTICE FORBES |
| Judgment Date | 27 June 2001 |
| Neutral Citation | [2001] EWHC 521 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 27 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | NO: CO/2152/01 |
[2001] EWHC 521 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Lord Justice Latham and
Mr Justice Forbes
NO: CO/2152/01
MR D SAPIECHA (instructed by Devon County Council, Chief Executive Director, County Hall, Topsham Rd, Exeter EX2 4QD) appeared on behalf of the Claimant
The Defendant did not appear and was not represented
: I will ask Forbes J to give the first judgment.
: This is an appeal by way of case stated from the decision of the Justices for the Counties of Devon and Cornwall, sitting at the Central Devon Magistrates' Court on 19th February 2001.
On 13th October 2000 the appellant County Council preferred an information that between 14th April 2000 and 25th April 2000 the respondent did supply a Mazda 626 motor car, registration E791 HFE, in an unroadworthy condition contrary to section 75 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 as amended by section 16 of the Road Traffic Act 1991.
On 19th February 2001 the justices heard and determined a preliminary point, namely whether on the agreed facts of the case the respondent did supply the vehicle in question. The justices heard the submissions of the parties on the agreed facts and came to the conclusion that there had been no supply of the vehicle in question by the respondent. Having given that ruling, the justices adjourned the case until 6th March 2001 for the appellant Council to decide whether to make this application for a case stated.
On 6th March 2001 the appellant Council formally offered no evidence in the light of the justices' ruling of 19th February 2001. The justices then dismissed the information. This appeal by way of case stated is against the decision of the justices that, in the circumstances of the case, the respondent did not supply the car in question. The question posed for the opinion of this court is as follows:
"Does the definition of 'supply' in section 75(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (as amended) by Section 16 of the Road Traffic Act 1991 apply on the facts of this case?"
I have to say that I consider the question posed is somewhat lacking in clarity. I understand it to be asking whether, on the agreed facts of the case, the respondent did supply the car in question. I have approached the matter on that basis.
The agreed facts of the case are fully set out in paragraph 2 of the case stated as follows:
"(a) On 14 December 1999 Mr Andrew Williams (the Complainant) took his Mazda 626 motor vehicle registered number E797 HFE (the vehicle) to Exminster Garage, Exminster, Devon for an MOT. It failed on a number of points as noted on the failure certificate including, 'rust both rear strut tops within 30cm mountings.' The Complainant was quoted a repair cost of £520 which he did not wish to incur at that time, and the vehicle was taken off the road.
(b) On or about 8 April 2000 the Complainant took the vehicle to the Respondent's garage at Tedburn St Mary's, Exeter, Devon for an estimate of the cost of work necessary for the vehicle to pass an MOT examination. This garage had been recommended to the Complainant by an acquaintance.
(c) The Respondent took the vehicle to Fry's Garage, the business of Mr Geoffrey William Little, (Fry's Garage). Fry's Garage are an approved MOT testing station authorised to issue MOT certificates. Fry's Garage issued a Notification of a Refusal to issue an MOT Test Certificate dated 8th April 2000, noting the reasons for failure. These reasons did not include the failure points noted by Exminster Garage.
(d) The vehicle was returned to the Respondent for the works identified by Fry's Garage to be undertaken. After carrying out certain works the Respondent took the vehicle to Fry's Garage on 14 April 2000. The vehicle passed the MOT Test and a certificate was issued by Fry's Garage. The Respondent returned the vehicle to the Complainant on or around 17 April 2000.
(e) On or about 28 June 2000 the rear suspension of the vehicle collapsed while been driven on the A38 County Road in Devon and the Complainant referred the matter to the Applicant's Trading Standards Department."
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
So far as material section 75 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (as amended) provides as follows:
"(1) Subject to the provisions of this section no person shall supply a motor vehicle or trailer in an unroadworthy condition.
(2) In this section references to supply include-
(a) sell,
(b) offer to sell or supply, and
(c) expose for sale."
The section then defines what is meant by an unroadworthy condition. There was, and is, no dispute about that aspect of the case.
The justices have summarised the submissions of the parties in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the case stated. The main thrust of the respondent's submissions was that the appellant Council was seeking to give too wide a meaning to the word "supply" by applying it to the facts of this case. It was submitted that Parliament...
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