DPP v Christopher Heathcote
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | MR JUSTICE McCOMBE |
| Judgment Date | 05 July 2011 |
| Neutral Citation | [2011] EWHC 2536 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | CO/11613/2010 |
| Date | 05 July 2011 |
[2011] EWHC 2536 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Mr Justice Mccombe
CO/11613/2010
Mr Mark Weekes (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service) appeared on behalf of the Claimant
Ms Farrhat Arshad (instructed by Messrs Howards Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Defendant
This is an appeal by way of case stated from a decision of the Justices for Greater Manchester in respect of an adjudication made by them as a Magistrates' Court on 30th July 2010. The appeal is brought by the Director of Public Prosecutions. The respondent is Mr Christopher Heathcote.
On 19th May 2010, the respondent pleaded guilty to an offence of driving with excess alcohol contrary to section 5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.
On 30th July 2010, he was sentenced to a fine of £400 with a direction that his licence be endorsed. The precise terms in which endorsement was to be made is a matter to which we can return at the end of this judgment so far as necessary.
The Justices decided, however, that special reasons existed for not disqualifying Mr Heathcote from driving within the meaning of section 34 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.
Section 34 reads as follows:
"(1) Where a person is convicted of an offence involving obligatory disqualification, the court must order him to be disqualified for such period not less than twelve months as the court thinks fit unless the court for special reasons thinks fit to order him to be disqualified for a shorter period or not to order him to be disqualified."
In the very careful case stated by the Justices, they recite the evidence that they had heard and inform the court at paragraph 10 of the case of the following findings of fact which they have made. I paraphrase the findings, without repeating the words exactly. They found that Mr Heathcote had admitted driving his Volkswagen Caddy on 18th April 2010, having consumed alcohol above the legal prescribed limit. He had attended a pub to watch a football match earlier in the day and had consumed approximately three pints of beer or lager and then went to a friend's house with his cousin. The respondent, Mr Heathcote, telephoned his girlfriend's mother to request a lift home and asked if his cousin could stay for the night. The girlfriend's mother picked him up and took him to her house and his cousin followed on a quad bike owned by him. Mr Heathcote went back into the house to get keys so that the bike could safely be stored in the garage at the back of the property, but, while he was doing so, the quad bike was stolen before it could be moved to the garage and out of the way.
Someone in the heat of the moment said "get into the van". The Justices were unable to reach a clear conclusion as to who had made the comment, but Mr Heathcote and his cousin got into the van. Following the sound of the quad bike, they drove off to catch up with it. Mr Heathcote was the driver.
Mr Heathcote drove for about ten minutes over a distance of about one and a half miles. At that stage he approached some police officers and tried to report the theft of the bike. He was informed that he should report the theft at a police station and was asked by one of the officers whether he had consumed alcohol, to which he replied in the affirmative. He provided a positive breath test and was arrested and he was then conveyed to the police station. The Justices went on them to find, and perhaps I should quote this more fully, in subparagraph (j) of paragraph 10:
"The situation which the respondent found himself was urgent and amounted to an emergency for the following reasons.
(i) a crime had been committed,
(ii) the respondent and his cousin were in a position to quickly follow up the crime with the prospect of recovering the stolen quad bike,
(iii) there was little or no traffic or pedestrians about at the time and
(iv) the respondent did not plan to drive that evening. He had reacted instantly and he did not for one minute think that he was 'over the limit'."
I should mention that the conviction and the plea of guilty was based upon an alcohol content found to be 57 micrograms of alcohol in a hundred millilitres of blood as against the prescribed limit for driving of 35 micrograms of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.
On those facts, the Justices went on to state their conclusions in the following terms in paragraph 11 of the case:
"We were of the opinion that a sober person would, in such a position have judged the situation as urgent and an emergency. We were satisfied that the criteria set out in R v Wickins was satisfied given that a crime was in progress with a realistic prospect of recovery of the vehicle and the possibility of apprehending the perpetrator(s) of the crime. The respondent deemed the situation to be urgent and acted instinctively to the situation. There was little traffic or pedestrians about at that time of night and the respondent had not planned to drive that night as evidenced by Karen Morrison [that is the mother of the girlfriend].
We were of the opinion that a special reason existed at the time of the driving and that we ought properly to exercise our discretion not to order the respondent to be disqualified [from] holding or obtaining a driving licence."
The case of R v Wickins referred to in that citation is the case which is reported at (1958) 42 Cr.App.R at page 136.
In the light of those findings of fact and conclusions, the Justices asked the following questions for the opinion of this court in these terms:
"Was there evidence upon which the justices were entitled to conclude that special reasons existed, and,
Were the facts found by the justices capable of amounting in law to special reasons?"
Mr Weekes for the appellant, the Director, submits that the two questions posed in that passage effectively amount to one, namely, as he put it in his outline argument:
"…whether on the basis of the evidence they [that is the justices] heard they were entitled to reach the conclusion that special reasons not to disqualify existed in the respondent's case…"
It is contended on the Director's behalf that the question or the single alternative reformulation of it should be answered in each case in the negative.
For the respondent, Mr Heathcote, Ms Arshad submitted that the Justices properly directed themselves as to the law, they considered all relevant matters and reached a decision that was not perverse. Accordingly, it is argued that the court should not go behind their conclusions.
I interpolate in the judgment to say that those two summaries of the submissions made do not adequately describe the excellence of the arguments that have been presented to me today for which I am very grateful.
The direction in law given to the Justices was in the following terms, according to the case stated:
"Our Legal Adviser outlined a summary of the respondent's case and then provided us with the following legal advice. In doing so our Legal Adviser read from the Legal Adviser Manual.
'You must be satisfied that a special reason exists before going on to consider whether or not to exercise your discretion not to disqualify (the defendant) for holding or obtaining a driving licence.
A special reason must fulfil four requirements as per the case of R v Wickins [1958]. The four requirements are:
(i) it must be a mitigating or extenuating circumstance;
(ii) it must not amount in law to a defence to the charge;
(iii) it must be directly connected to the commission of the offence, and
(iv) it must be one which the court ought properly to take into consideration when imposing punishment.
It is for the defence to establish, on a balance of probabilities that there are special reasons. In reaching your decision as to whether a special reason exists you must apply your minds to all the circumstances of this particular case and the representations made on behalf of the defence and the prosecution. If you find that special reasons do exist, you may exercise your discretion not to disqualify. In these circumstances, you must state the grounds for so doing in open court and these will be recorded in the court register.'"
Mr Weekes accepted that that was a correct direction in law, see skeleton argument paragraph 33. However, he submits that the Justices erred in finding that the situation in which the respondent found himself amounted truly to emergency and that the reasons for the finding in the stated case are flawed to the extent rendering the decision perverse.
I say immediately I agree with that submission. The decided case law has been helpfully summarised in the written arguments of the parties and there is essentially not much controversy about it. I need...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Table of Cases
...Hayward v Eames; Kirkpatrick v Harrigan [1985] RTR 12, DC! 260 .................................................... Heathcote, DPP v [2011] EWHC 2536 (Admin)! 490 Hereford Magistrates’ Court, R v, ex p Rowlands [1998] QB 110, ! [1997] 2 WLR 854, [1997] 2 Cr App R 340, DC .........................
-
Special Reasons
...driven the car herself.” The answer to question (1) was yes; the answer to question (2) was no. Appeal dismissed. DPP v Heathcote [2011] EWHC 2536 (Admin), unreported, 5 July 2011, QBD (Admin) On the facts of this case (driving in pursuit of a stolen vehicle; high breath alcohol reading; ob......