DPP v George Whittle
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE SIMON BROWN,MR JUSTICE CURTIS |
| Judgment Date | 27 April 1995 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1995] EWHC J0427-5 |
| Docket Number | CO 3382/94 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 27 April 1995 |
[1995] EWHC J0427-5
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(DIVISIONAL COURT)
Before: Lord Justice Simon Brown -and- Mr Justice Curtis
CO 3382/94
MR SR NOBLE (Instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service, Stockport Branch, Cheshire SK1 3AD) appeared on behalf of the Appellant.
MR W MASSEY (Instructed by Harvey Roberts, Reddish, Stockport SK5 6AN) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
I will ask Curtis J to give the first judgment.
MR JUSTICE CURTISThis is a Prosecutor's appeal by way of Case Stated from a decision of the Greater Manchester Justices, sitting at Stockport and dated 14th September 1994.
It is indisputable that the Respondent, George Raymond Whittle, drove his Mercedes motorcar on 23rd January 1994 at about 2.30 am in Hall Moss Lane, Cheadle Hulme, when he had consumed so much alcohol that the proportion of it in his breath was over the statutory limit. We now know the precise figures, namely 61 microgrammes per hundred millilitres of breath, that is to say nearly double the permitted limit.
On the facts found the Respondent took over the driving of the car from his wife, who then went and sat in the rear of the car in the course of a journey on which she had earlier embarked. There were two other passengers in the car. All four persons had been out drinking, according to the facts found by the Magistrates.
The reason the Respondent took over from his wife during the journey was that she had complained of dizziness and blurred vision. The Justices found that the Respondent "panicked and decided to drive the car". He was also found by the Justices to have intended to take the other two passengers home first before taking his wife either home or anywhere else. On the way to these persons' home he was stopped by the police and, to use the common phrase, "breathalysed".
At court he pleaded guilty but submitted to the Justices that there were special reasons for not disqualifying him, namely a medical emergency occurring to his wife. However, it is to be noted that there was no suggestion before the Magistrates that he, the Respondent, thought his wife was in need of urgent medical attention. It is right to observe the Justices further found that neither the Respondent nor his wife mentioned her medical condition, which we have described, to the police. It must be said that the Respondent, far from mentioning the medical condition to the police, actually gave them a false name when the police asked for his identity.
Before the Justices there was a medical report from a Dr Miller. She examined the Respondent's wife on 27th of January 1994, that is four days later. It is true that she had the general medical care of the Respondent's wife. The report revealed to the court that the Respondent's wife suffered from cervical spondylosis, characterised by attacks of intermittent pain in her neck and limitation of neck movement. The report was in general terms and did not refer in any way at all to the episode of blurred vision and dizziness of which the Respondent's wife complained on the night of 23rd January.
It is a little difficult to see what evidential value, other than in very general terms, that report afforded. However, be that as it may, the prosecutor submitted to the Justices that there was no emergency, that there was an alternative course of action open to the Respondent other than driving the car, such as calling for an ambulance, alternative transport and leaving his wife in the care of others and going for assistance.
It is to be noted that the topography of the area in which this incident took place was a suburb of Manchester. Furthermore, there was a telephone in the car, but the Justices observe in the case that there was no evidence it was in working order. In my view they fell in error there as well, since the prima facie state of the evidence was that the telephone was in working order, like a clock or any other mechanical device, unless the contrary is proven in evidence. (See Professor Cross On Evidence at pages 30 to 31).
The Justices expressed their opinion at paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Case Stated thus:
"We were of the opinion that the respondent had panicked and in the situation presented he could see no reasonable possible alternative to driving the car himself.
….. there was an emergency situation and on the particular facts we considered the respondent had explored every reasonable possible alternative and accordingly we found that special reasons existed and decided not to disqualify the respondent ……"
Analysing what the Justices said, I have found some difficulty in understanding what they meant by the word "panicked". It also appears to be that the Justices are looking at the matter subjectively instead of objectively, as is required by the law. The questions stated by the court are twofold:
"(i) Was there evidence upon which the Justices were entitled to conclude that special reasons existed?
(ii) Were the facts found by the Justices capable of amounting in law to special reasons?"
I...
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