Goodrich v Paisner
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Viscount Simonds,Lord Morton of Henryton,Lord Reid,Lord Radcliffe,Lord Somervell of Harrow |
| Judgment Date | 19 April 1956 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1956] UKHL J0419-2 |
| Date | 19 April 1956 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[1956] UKHL J0419-2
Viscount Simonds
Lord Morton of Henryton
Lord Reid
Lord Radcliffe
Lord Somervell of Harrow
House of Lords
Upon Report from the Appellate Committee, to whom was referred the Cause Goodrich against Paisner and others, that the Committee had heard Counsel, as well on Monday the 12th, as on Tuesday the 13th and Wednesday the 14th, days of March last, upon the Petition and Appeal of Beatrice Goodrich, of 4 Mansfield Road, Ilford, in the County of Essex, praying, That the matter of the Order set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely, an Order of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal of the 27th of April 1955, so far as therein stated to be appealed against, might be reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, and that the said Order, so far as aforesaid, might be reversed, varied or altered, or that the Petitioner might have such other relief in the premises as to Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, might seem meet; as also upon the printed Case of Leslie Lazarus Paisner, Edward Israel Jaffe and Maurice Jaffe, lodged in answer to the said Appeal; and due consideration had this day of what was offered on either side in this Cause:
It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen assembled, That the said Order of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal of the 27th day of April 1955, in part complained of in the said Appeal, be, and the same is hereby, Reversed: And it is further Ordered, That the Order of His Honour Judge Clark of the 13th day of January 1955, thereby Affirmed, be, and the same is hereby, Discharged so far as it relates to the Appellant's claim in the proceedings in the Ilford County Court: And it is further Ordered, That the Cause be, and the same is hereby, remitted back to the Ilford County Court, with a Declaration that upon the true construction of section 12 of the Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, the accommodation at 4 Mansfield Road, Ilford, in the County of Essex, let to the Appellant, was "let as a separate dwelling", to do therein as shall be just and consistent with this Judgment: And it is further Ordered, That the Respondents do pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Appellant the Costs incurred by her in the Ilford County Court so far as regards her Defence to the claim for possession of the above-mentioned premises: And it is further Ordered, That the Respondents do pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Appellant the Costs incurred by her in the Court of Appeal: And it is also further Ordered, That the Respondents do pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Appellant the Costs incurred by her in respect of the said Appeal to this House, such Costs to be taxed in the manner usual when the Appellant sues in formâ pauperis.
My Lords,
The facts of this case and all the relevant authorities are so fully examined in the Opinion of my noble and learned friend, Lord Morton of Henryton, which I have been privileged to read, that I can state my own views very briefly.
In my opinion this appeal should be allowed, but in coming to that conclusion I have been influenced solely by the unusual nature of the tenancy agreement which we have had to consider. I do not wish to cast any doubt upon the correctness of the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Neale v. Del Soto [1945] 1 K.B. 144, or Cole v. Harris [1945] 1 K.B. 474, and what have been called their satellite cases. Nor, if any formula must be found, can I think of a better one than that stated by my noble and learned friend and approved by Lord Justice MacKinnon, viz., that to create a demise of part of a house as a separate dwelling there must be an agreement by which the occupier has the exclusive use of the essential living rooms of a separate dwelling house. But this can at best be only a general guide. The contrast to the "exclusive" use of a living room by one person is that it is shared by him with another. And at once the question arises what constitutes a sharing for this purpose. It would, I think, be in conformity with the decisions of the Court of Appeal in the many cases which have come before it, if I said that a sharing involves the right of simultaneous use of a living room in such a manner that the privacy of the landlord or tenant as the case may be is invaded. Upon this point I concur in the Opinion of my noble and learned friend, Lord Reid, which also I have had the advantage of reading. Turning to the present case, I find that the tenant has in addition to the four rooms let to her, which by themselves would undoubtedly be a part of a house "let as a separate dwelling", also "the use in common with the landlord of the back bedroom on the first floor", and I ask whether this is such a sharing of a living room as to exclude the operation of the Rent Acts.
My Lords, I must admit that I find great difficulty in giving any effect in law to these words. It may well be that they are too vague to be enforceable. But in any event I cannot suppose that they create a right in the tenant at any time and at all times to enter and occupy the bedroom. It is, I think, presupposed that there will be some further arrangement by which there will be not simultaneous user but separate user at successive times, in fact such user in common or sharing as will not involve the invasion by the one of the privacy of the other. If so, it would not, I think, be proper to conduce that, because the Appellant has such a right in addition to the four rooms demised to her, she was not the tenant of a separate dwelling and entitled to the protection of the Act.
I would allow the appeal.
Before putting the Questions to the House, I will give Counsel an opportunity of saying what they have to say on the question of costs.
My Lords,
By a memorandum of agreement dated 1st February, 1950, and made between Mrs. Ethel Jaffe (therein called "the landlord") of the one part and the Appellant (therein called "the tenant") of the other part it was agreed as follows:—
"1. The Landlord lets and the Tenant takes ALL THOSE the four rooms now in the occupation of the Tenant on the first floor of the dwellinghouse known as 4, Mansfield Road, Ilford aforesaid (hereinafter called 'the rooms') TOGETHER with the use in common with the Landlord of the back bedroom on the first floor on a weekly tenancy from the 31st day of October One thousand nine hundred and forty-nine at the rent hereinafter mentioned.
2. The rent shall be at the rate of ONE POUND FIVE SHILLINGS per week.
3. During the continuance of the tenancy the Tenant shall be entitled without any payment beyond the said rent to the use (in common with the Landlord and all others authorised by the Landlord) of the bathroom and lavatories in the said house.
4. During the tenancy the Tenant shall take reasonable care of all fixtures and fittings in the rooms and shall not cause any damage or permit or suffer any damage to be done to the rooms or the decorations thereof and shall make good and pay for any damage thereto (including accidental damage) caused by any act or neglect on the part of herself her family or visitors and on the determination of the tenancy the Tenant shall deliver up the rooms and all the fixtures and fittings therein in a proper condition of cleanliness.
5. The Tenant shall not assign the benefit of this agreement nor assign or sublet the rooms or any part thereof during the continuance of the tenancy."
Mrs. Jaffe died on the 8th May, 1954, and thereupon No. 4 Mansfield Road became vested in the Respondents, subject to the Appellant's tenancy. In December, 1954, the Respondents determined the tenancy by a notice to quit, but the Appellant refused to deliver up possession, and on the 15th December, 1954, the Respondents issued a plaint in the Ilford County Court claiming possession of the four rooms let to the Appellant. The Appellant defended the action, contending that at the time when the Respondents claimed possession (which is agreed to be the relevant date) the four rooms in question were "let as a separate dwelling" within the meaning of section 12 (2) of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, and consequently the Appellant was entitled to the protection afforded by the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Acts, 1920 to 1939.
In the County Court evidence was given by two of the Respondents and by the Appellant and her daughter and son as to the user of the "back bedroom" and other matters, but it is clear that none of the events which happened before December, 1954, gave rise to any change in the rights created by the Agreement of 1950. Consequently, your Lordships have only got to consider whether, by that Agreement, the "four rooms on the first floor" were or were not let to the Appellant as a separate dwelling. The County Court Judge held that they were not so let. In his judgment he posed two questions:
"1. Is there under this contract a sharing of some room not actually included in the tenancy? and
2. If so, 'Is that room part of the essential living accommodation?' (per Jenkins, L.J., at p. 96/97 of Hayward v. Marshall [1952] 2 Q.B. 89)".
The learned Judge then continued:
"I felt that both must be answered in the affirmative. A bedroom, in my view, is clearly part of the essential living accommodation of a dwelling. Accordingly I held this to be a Neale v. Del Soto case and made an order for possession."
The Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, and Denning, L.J., would have allowed the appeal, but Romer and Parker, L.JJ., felt bound to dismiss it, having regard to the case of Neale v. Del Soto [1945] K.B. 144, and other authorities.
In these circumstances, my Lords, it is convenient to turn at once to the relevant authorities, and I trust I may be...
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