Goring, The (Admiralty)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Bridge of Harwich,Lord Fraser of Tullybelton,Lord Brandon of Oakbrook,Lord Ackner,Lord Oliver of Aylmerton |
| Judgment Date | 25 February 1988 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1988] UKHL J0225-2 |
| Court | House of Lords |
| Date | 25 February 1988 |
[1988] UKHL J0225-2
House of Lords
Lord Bridge of Harwich
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
Lord Brandon of Oakbrook
Lord Ackner
Lord Oliver of Aylmerton
My Lords,
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Brandon of Oakbrook. I agree with it and for the reasons he gives I would dismiss the appeal.
My Lords,
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend Lord Brandon of Oakbrook. I agree with it and for the reasons which he has given would dismiss the appeal.
My Lords,
The question for decision in this appeal is whether there is under English law a cause of action for salvage in respect of services rendered to a ship in danger in a navigable non-tidal part of an English river. The question does not appear to have arisen for decision before and its difficulty is shown by the fact that the four judges who have considered it in the two courts below have been divided equally in their opinions upon it.
The way in which the question has arisen is as follows. It is alleged by the appellants that shortly before midnight on 14 September 1984 the "Goring," a passenger vessel owned by the respondents, broke free of her moorings in the river Thames upriver of Reading Bridge. She was unmanned and her downward drift, if not checked, would have caused her to collide with a line of moored vessels and afterwards taken her on to Reading Bridge and the weir beyond. The appellants were a group of five persons who were members or employees of the Bohemian Club, the premises of which are situated on De Montford Island in the middle of the river. With the help of the Club's ferry boat they managed to put one of their number on board the "Goring," thereby making it possible to get a line from her to the island, to check her drift and thereafter to haul her to a vacant mooring where she was made fast.
Two matters are agreed. The first matter is that the Thames above Reading Bridge is not tidal. The second matter is that, if services of the kind which the appellants allege that they rendered to the "Goring" had been rendered further down the river where it is tidal, the appellants would have a cause of action against the respondents for salvage in respect of them. This second matter is agreed because the services as alleged contained, apart from the question of the place in which they were rendered, all four of the classic ingredients necessary to salvage services. First, the appellants were volunteers; secondly, the "Goring," being a ship, was a recognised subject matter of salvage services; thirdly, she was in danger; and, fourthly, the services were successful in saving her from that danger.
On 22 July 1985 the appellants began in the Admiralty Court an action in rem against the "Goring" in which they claimed salvage remuneration for the services to her described above. The respondents entered an appearance in the action and by notice of motion dated 27 August 1985 applied to strike out the writ. Various grounds were put forward in support of the application, but the essential ground, as it emerged during the proceedings, was that, because the services on which the appellants founded their claim had been rendered in a non-tidal part of the Thames, the appellants had no cause of action for salvage in respect of them.
The application to strike out was heard by Sheen J. [1987] Q.B. 687 who on 14 November 1985 delivered a reserved judgment dismissing it with costs. He gave the respondents leave to appeal on terms that they should not ask for costs against the appellants. Pursuant to such leave the respondents appealed to the Court of Appeal [1987] Q.B. 687 which in reserved judgments delivered on 25 February 1987 by a majority (Ralph Gibson and Bingham L.JJ., Sir John Donaldson M.R. dissenting) allowed the appeal. The appellants were ordered to bear their own costs of the application and the appeal. The appellants, with the leave of the Court of Appeal, now bring this further appeal to your Lordships' House.
My Lords, the cause of action for salvage is an ancient one, derived from the maritime law and peculiar to it. Before the coming into operation of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 jurisdiction over claims for salvage under the maritime law was exercised by the High Court of Admiralty and by that court alone. As a result of two statutes passed as early as the 14th century (13 Rich. II st. 1, c. 5 and 15 Rich. II, c. 3) and the jealous protection of their own jurisdiction by the Courts of Common Law, the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty over claims for salvage, as over other claims, was restricted to claims arising on the high seas, and was not permitted to be exercised over claims arising "within the body of a county." The geographical extent of that expression, in the context of the restriction of the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty over claims for salvage, is not wholly clear. I would, however, adopt the following passage from British Shipping Laws, vol. 14, Maritime Liens by D. R. Thomas (1980), p. 147, para 259:
"The upshot of the geographical limitation on the Admiralty jurisdiction was that salvage services rendered to property cast on the sea-shore, or within a port, dock, or harbour, or within a haven, channel, estuary, or other like places, were outside the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty."
With regard to rivers the High Court of Admiralty appears only to have asserted, and accordingly only to have been prohibited from exercising, jurisdiction over tidal rivers as far up as the first bridge.
Between 1840 and 1982 numerous statutes were passed dealing with either the substantive law of salvage or Admiralty jurisdiction over claims for salvage or both. In order that the arguments advanced on both sides of the case may be properly appreciated it is necessary that I should examine in some detail the relevant provisions of those statutes. In doing so I shall omit any references to provisions or parts of provisions relating to life salvage, since that form of salvage is not here in issue.
Section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act 1840 (3 & 4 Vict. c. 65), provided, so far as claims for salvage are concerned:
"the High Court of Admiralty shall have Jurisdiction to decide all Claims and Demands whatsoever in the Nature of Salvage rendered to … any Ship or Sea going Vessel … and to enforce the Payment thereof, whether such Ship or Vessel may have been within the Body of a County or upon the High Seas at the time when the Services were rendered …"
The effect of that provision was to abolish the previous restriction on the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty over claims for salvage to claims arising on the high seas, and to extend it to claims for services rendered "within the body of a county," in the sense of that expression which I have explained earlier. Although section 6 refers expressly only to services rendered to ships, it appears to have been treated as applying also to services rendered to other property capable of being the subject matter of salvage services, including in particular cargo and freight. The extension of jurisdiction so made did not, in my view, extend the cause of action for salvage which previously existed, or create a new one. Its effect was rather to enable the High Court of Admiralty to hear and determine claims for salvage founded on a cause of action which, under the maritime law administered by that court, already existed.
It was contended for the appellants that the expression "within the body of a county" was wide enough to include non-tidal inland waters navigable by ships, and that the effect of section 6 was to extend not only the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty over claims for salvage, but also the scope of the cause of action for salvage, to services rendered to ships in such waters. I cannot accept that contention for two reasons. First, it seems to me unlikely that the legislature would have given the High Court of Admiralty jurisdiction in respect of claims for salvage over which that court had never previously asserted jurisdiction, and there is no material of any kind to suggest that that court had ever asserted jurisdiction over claims for salvage in respect of services rendered to ships in non-tidal inland waters. Secondly, except for cases of services in enclosed docks, to which I shall refer later, counsel for the appellants was unable to point to any authority which supported his contention.
Some of the results of section 6 can be seen in two reported cases decided in 1862 and 1863. In The Tees (1862) Lush. 505 the High Court of Admiralty awarded salvage remuneration for services rendered to two ships, and the cargo on board one of them, in a dock adjoining the river Thames just below London Bridge. The two ships were in danger from fire spreading to them from burning warehouses by which the dock was surrounded. The salving ship towed them out of the dock to a place of safety in the river. In The Carrier Dove (1863) 2. Moo. N.S. 243 there was an appeal to the Privy Council from the High Court of Admiralty in respect of salvage remuneration awarded for services to a ship in difficulties in a tidal part of the river Mersey after a collision with another ship. The suit was brought, and the award made, against ship, cargo and freight. In both these cases the High Court of Admiralty appears to have exercised jurisdiction under section 6. It seems therefore that the expression "within the body of a county" as used in section 6 was, by 1863 at least, being interpreted as including...
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