Hall v Hall
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS,LORD JUSTICE DUNN,LORD JUSTICE O'CONNOR |
| Judgment Date | 01 April 1981 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1981] EWCA Civ J0401-3 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Docket Number | 81/0223 |
| Date | 01 April 1981 |
[1981] EWCA Civ J0401-3
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY COURT
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE STOCK, Q.C.)
Royal Courts of Justice.
The Master of The Rolls
(Lord Denning)
Lord Justice Dunn
and
Lord Justice O'connor
81/0223
County Court No. 79 01231
MR. A.V. MINNS (instructed by Richard Predko, Esq.) appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff (Appellant).
MRS. L. DAVIES (instructed by Messrs. Hepherd Winstanley & Pugh) appeared on behalf of the Defendant (Respondent).
We have many cases nowadays where a man and a woman live together without getting married. This is a typical case. A Mrs. Mills left her husband and went to live with a Mr. Hall who was a divorced man. He lived in a one-bedroomed flat at 37 Woodside Court, Southampton. After a time Mrs. Mills got a divorce from her husband. She then took Mr. Hall's name by deed poll. They lived as Mr. and Mrs. Hall in the one-bedroomed flat, which was in Mr. Hall's name. Mrs. Hall received £2,500 by way of a divorce settlement. She worked and had an income of her own. So together they bought a house at No. 20 Fulmar Close about two or three years later. At some stage Mrs. Hall was made redundant and received a redundancy payment together with social security payments until she obtained further work. Eventually they bought another house at No. 6 Hammonds Close, Totton, Hampshire. It was a three-bedroomed house, with two sitting-rooms, to which they built on a sun lounge. It was quite a good house. They bought it for £19,400 in 1977.
So there they were, living together as husband and wife with no intention of getting married at all. Their attitude was, "We are happy. What is the point in getting married?" If they had thought a little more about it, they would have realised that marriage is quite a good thing for the protection of the wife.
The flat and the two houses had been purchased solely in the man's name. No. 6 Hammonds Close was purchased for £19,400 with a mortgage of £6,600. So there was quite a good deal of equity in it. But the last arrangement between this couple did not last more than six months. The man told her to go. She had no right there. She was not his wife. She had not the protection which is provided for wives by the Matrimonial Homes Act. It was not a matrimonial home. He told her to go. She had to go—and she went. That was in 1978.
I will not go into all the history that followed. The man took another woman into the house. After that woman left, he took another woman in. Mrs. Hall, after a time, got another man. She separated from him and got yet another man. So here we have a couple who regularly change their partners.
Then the question arose about the house, No. 6 Hammonds Close. She claimed a share in the equity. She said that they had lived together for seven years. The judge found—and the man agreed—that they would not have been able to make the moves and buy the house except for the fact that this couple had been living together and they had both been earning. Her contributions paid for a great amount of the furniture, equipment and fittings. She also bought a car. And she contributed her earnings towards the housekeeping.
So it is said that she is entitled to a share in the equity of the house: not on the matrimonial law which governs husband and wife: but on the principle of a resulting trust. There have been a number of cases recently in the courts where women in the position of this lady have been given protection to this extent: If a man and a woman have been living together as husband and wife, and the woman has been contributing towards the establishment of the joint household, although the house is in the man's name, there is a resulting trust as a matter of ordinary common justice for her. The two cases in which that principle has been settled are Cooke v. Head (1972) 1 Weekly Law Reports 518 and Eves v. Eves (1975) 1 Weekly Law Reports 1338, to which I would add the case of Tanner v. Tanner. It is quite clear from the authorities that, although a couple are not husband and wife, the woman can—because of her contributions to the joint household—after a time obtain a share in the house by way of a resulting trust.
But what should that share be? That is always the difficulty. It is not always one-half. It may be a good deal less. It depends on the circumstances and how much she has contributed—not merely in money—but also in keeping up the house: and, if there are children, in looking after them. In Cooke v. Head the woman's share was found to be one-third: and in Eves v. Eves it was a quarter. In the case before us the judge said:
"The Plaintiff's—that is, the woman's—"money has for the most part gone into furnishing the homes apart from the food and household effects which she paid for in full. She claims a share in the equity. I have looked for guidance at the cases to which I have been referred. In my view one fifth is the correct proportion for the Plaintiff".
It seems to me that the judge directed himself properly in making that determination. It is not a proportion with which this court should interfere. The woman comes before us claiming one-half. It seems to me that that is far too much. One-fifth would be just about right.
The next question is new. At what time should her share be taken to be realised? Should it be taken at the time when she left in 1978? Or should it be taken at the time of the hearing before the court? In the meantime this house has increased in value. At the time she left in 1978 the equity was £15,000-odd. Now it is £24,000-odd. The woman says that her share should be taken as at the date of the hearing. But the judge said it should be one-fifth at the time when she left—when the parties separated. Even so, he said that interest should be allowed at 10 per cent over the intervening period.
That is a nice point. If it were husband and wife, their relationship was intended to be permanent. The trust should continue during the continuance of that relationship. The trust should not be deemed to be extinguished until the relationship is extinguished. But, in a case of this kind, the relationship comes to an end when the parties separate—whoever orders the other out. This is supported by some observations of this court in Munday v. Robertson (unreported) Bar Library, 18th April, 1973. It was pointed out that—in a situation like this—although the house has increased in value, the man has been living in it, keeping up the mortgage payments, keeping it in repair, and the like. Any increase in value is therefore largely due to his efforts in keeping the house going, rather than selling it. In view of the guidance in Munday v. Robertson, and viewing it in the same way as the judge did, it seems to me that he was quite entitled to treat the trust as extinguished at the time of the separation. He said that he thought it was illogical that the woman should be able to enjoy the benefit of the present value which had been brought about by inflation after she had left what was never a permanent relationship./ He went on to make this important observation:
"She gets the benefit of her new set up and I see no reason why she should continue to benefit".
So there it is. She gets the benefit of her new relationship. For all I know, she may be getting the benefit of any inflation in the house in which she now lives. It seems to me that the judge was quite entitled—it would be a matter for his discretion—to treat the trust as being extinguished and the shares to be ascertained as at the date of the separation. On the other hand, as the judge pointed out, she should be entitled to interest on her proportion of the equity assessed at the date she left up to the present time—one year and ten months. So, after making all the calculations, he ordered the man to pay the sum of £3,632 to the woman: and the man holds the property in trust to pay her that sum.
That seems to me a very fair and just decision in the circumstances of the case, and I would not interfere with it.
I agree. This couple lived together as man and wife,...
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