Howard v Charlton
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice Carnwath,Lord Justice Clarke,Lord Justice Ward |
| Judgment Date | 25 July 2002 |
| Neutral Citation | [2002] EWCA Civ 1086 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Date | 25 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | Case No: B2/2001/1491 |
[2002] EWCA Civ 1086
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM Canterbury County Court
His Honour Judge Poulton
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand,
London, WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice Ward
Lord Justice Clarke and
Lord Justice Carnwath
Case No: B2/2001/1491
Mr Kelvin Rutledge (instructed by Turbervilles with Nelson Cuff) for the Appellant
Ms Linda Pearce (instructed by Bassetts (Gillingham, Kent)) for the Respondent
This is an appeal from Judge Poulton sitting in the Canterbury County Court. He had before him two cases arising out of disputes concerning mobile homes at the Stoneway Park in Petham, Kent. Only one of those cases is subject to appeal. Mrs Charlton, the respondent, occupies Plot 15 at Stoneway Park. She acquired the site in June 1991, taking over the agreement of her predecessor, Mrs Keates, made in 1984 with the then owner. In its original form the home was a purpose-built Donnington caravan, Castle model, manufactured in 1977. It measured 13 metres x 3.05 metres.
At the end of 1992 Mrs Charlton obtained planning permission for an extension which the Judge described as a "porch". The extension was 3.7 metres x 1.88 metres, and was attached to the side of the main home. The walls of the extension were of painted boarding. Mrs Charlton says that she obtained verbal permission from the then owner, Mr Tulett, for the extension. We have been shown a letter from Mr Tulett to the new owner, dated 20 th November 1999, saying that he never gave permission for any extensions, but Mrs Charlton's plot is not one of those specifically mentioned in the letter, and he did not give evidence.
In about 1995, Mrs Charlton altered the roof of her home. According to the description of the single expert, Mr Taylor:
"Originally the roof of the main home was a flat construction covered in felt or, more likely, in a metal sheet. According to the plan, originally, the extension was to have a clear Perspex roof. Either at the time of construction or later, the roof was altered. The roof has been constructed to cover both parts and is tile covered. "
There is no evidence of a specific consent from the owner for this change, nor of planning permission (assuming it was needed). Nor, however, is there any evidence of complaint by the owner or by the planning authority.
Mrs Howard, the appellant, acquired the park in March 1999. She immediately set about improving the site overall. The Judge found that this was done with the best of intentions, but as he said, "one woman's improvement is another one's disruption". There were disagreements with some of the residents, including in due course Mrs Charlton, who originally had given her support for the improvements. We are not directly concerned with these difficulties. The present claim arises from Mrs Charlton's action for damages and an injunction, based on various incidents of damage and disturbance referred to in the claim as "harassment". On these complaints, Mrs Charlton was partially successful, to the extent that the Judge awarded £600 damages for serious damage to her garden caused by Mrs Howard. There is no appeal against that part of the judgment.
The issue with which we are concerned was raised by amended defence and counterclaim. It was asserted that Mrs Charlton's home was not a mobile home within the meaning of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 and that "accordingly she enjoys neither the protection of the Act nor of the covenants in the said written agreement". The particulars asserted that following the addition of the porch extension the home "has lost the essential quality of mobility in that both it and the extension cannot be moved from one place to another as a single unit", or alternatively it could not be moved lawfully on the highway since the overall width was more than the maximum permitted on the public roads, which was said to be 12 feet.
As I have said, there were two cases before the learned Judge. The other case, that of Mr Hursey, raised similar points. In his case the Judge found that the home had ceased to be a mobile home and had therefore ceased to enjoy the protection of the Act. There is no appeal in that case. In Mrs Charlton's case however he held, as a "question of fact and degree", that the addition of the porch had not changed the character of the original structure as a mobile home. He therefore dismissed the claim for possession. Mrs Howard appeals against that decision.
Before returning to the judgment below, I should refer to the relevant legislation and to the terms of the agreement. The law relating to caravans and mobile homes has both public and private aspects. Sites for caravans require planning permission under the Town and Country Planning Acts, but in addition the layout and use of such sites are controlled by a site licensing system operated by the local authority under the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960. That system of control has no direct bearing on the present case, save that certain definitions, including that of "caravan", are imported into the Mobile Homes Act 1983. The private law aspects of such sites, that is the relations between owner and licensee, are subject to control under the Mobile Homes Act 1983, which was passed in order to make permanent the temporary system of control introduced by the Mobile Homes Act 1975. The 1983 Act is not the direct concern of the local authority. It operates by imposing special terms and restrictions on agreements for mobile homes, which are enforceable by the parties through civil courts, in the same way as other contractual obligations. (There are also criminal sanctions against unlawful eviction or harassment: Caravan Sites Act 1968 s 3)
By section 1 (1) the Act applies —
"to any agreement under which a person ('the occupier') is entitled–
a) To station a mobile home on land forming part of a protected site; and
b) To occupy the mobile home as his only or main residence."
There is no dispute that this is "a protected site" within the meaning of the Act (incorporating the definition in Part 1 of the Caravan Sites Act 1968). Section 2 requires there to be "implied" in any agreement to which the Act applies the terms set out in Part 1 of Schedule 1. By section 3 any such agreement is binding on any successor in title of the owner. The terms implied under Schedule 1 deal, among other things, with the duration of the agreement and termination. For present purposes the provisions for termination by the owner are relevant. They are as follows:
4. The owner shall be entitled to terminate the agreement forthwith if, on the application of the owner, the court –
(a) is satisfied that the occupier has breached a term of the agreement and, after service of a notice to remedy the breach, has not complied with the notice within a reasonable time; and
(b) considers it reasonable for the agreement to be terminated.
5. The owner shall be entitled to terminate the agreement forthwith if, on the application of the owner, the court is satisfied that the occupier is not occupying the mobile home as his only or main residence.
6.(1) The owner shall be entitled to terminate the agreement at the end of a relevant period if, on the application of the owner, the court is satisfied that, having regard to its age and condition, the mobile home –
(a) is having a detrimental effect on the amenity of the site; or
(b) is likely to have such an effect before the end of the next relevant period.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1) above "relevant period" means the period of five years beginning with the commencement of the agreement and each succeeding period of five years.
At this point it is necessary to say something about the definitions of "caravan" and "mobile home". The 1983 Act uses the term "mobile home" but this is stated (s 5(1)) to have the same meaning as the word "caravan" in the 1960 Act. Section 29 of the 1960 Act defines a "caravan" as (so far as relevant) —
"Any structure designed or adapted for human habitation which is capable of being moved from one place to another (whether by being towed, or by being transported on a motor vehicle or trailer)…".
It is immediately apparent that something may be a "caravan" for these purposes, even though it bears no relation to what might be regarded as a caravan in ordinary language. In particular it does not need to have wheels; it is enough that it can be transported on a trailer. The definition was further expanded by the Caravan Sites Act 1968. This, it seems, was intended to remove doubts about the application of the definition to the larger types of caravan, usually referred to as "twin unit caravans", which became popular in the 1960s. Section 13 of the 1968 Act, headed "twin unit caravans", provides:
"(1) A structure designed or adapted for human habitation which –
(a) is composed of not more than two sections separately constructed and designed to be assembled on the site by means of bolts, clamps or other devices; and
(b) is, when assembled, physically capable of being moved by road from one place to another (whether by being towed, or by being transported on a motor vehicle or trailer), shall not be treated as not being (or as not having been) a caravan within the meaning of (Part 1 of the 1960 Act) by reason only that it cannot lawfully be so moved on a highway when assembled".
Sub-section (2) imposes an overall limit of 60 feet (18.288 metres) in length or 20 feet (6.096 metres) in width.
We were referred to one case in this court, in which the 1960 Act definition has been considered, Carter v Secretary of State for...
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