Jaswir Singh Chaggar v Jaspal Singh Chaggar and Harbhajan Singh Chaggar
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE BUXTON |
| Judgment Date | 30 October 2002 |
| Neutral Citation | [2002] EWCA Civ 1637 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Date | 30 October 2002 |
| Docket Number | A3/2002/1443 |
[2002] EWCA Civ 1637
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT
CHANCERY DIVISION
BIRMINGHAM DISTRICT REGISTRY
(His Honour Judge Norris Qc)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London, WC2
Lord Justice Buxton
Lord Justice Carnwath
A3/2002/1443
The Appellant appeared on his own behalf.
The Respondent did not appear and was not represented.
This appeal marks the latest stage in a most unfortunate dispute between three brothers in respect of the title to and disposal of the property that was once their and their father's home, in which they now all reside. The three gentleman concerned are the appellant, Mr Jaspal Singh Chaggar, and the two respondents, Mr Jaswir Singh Chaggar and Mr Harbhajan Singh Chaggar. We were glad to be told that it would not be regarded as any way discourteous or inappropriate if we refer in this judgment to those three gentleman simply as Jaspal, Jaswir and Harbhajan. In relating the number of orders that have previously been made in this matter, I will attempt to substitute those names for the description of the various people as parties, since different people have played different rôles at different stages of the development of the case.
As I have said, the property concerned is the residence of the three gentlemen. Jaswir and Harbhajan live in one half of the property and Jaspal in the other. Intractable differences appear to exist as to the way in which the ownership and disposal of the property should be regulated; differences that the courts have not, unfortunately, succeeded beyond a short measure in reconciling. I regret that the order that this court has it in mind to make will only go a modest way towards resolving these disputes.
I would, however, venture to say this. The judge, His Honour Judge Norris QC, who bore the burden of dealing with this matter in its latter stages, said that it was apparent to him (and he has now heard the matter on several occasions) that all the parties, singly or in combination, want to purchase this property, and they each will do whatever is necessary to prevent the other achieving a purchase. I would venture, with all respect, to express the hope that those attitudes can now be put in the past and that all concerned will appreciate that the only way forward is to follow the orders the courts have made, whether or not they were in every respect acceptable to those concerned, because the court really has tried to reach a fair assessment of the matter and it is important that the parties should now, whatever they think about each other and whatever they think about each other's conduct in the past, cooperate in the working out of those orders.
With those observations, I now turn to the matter with which this court is concerned, which, as we explained to the respondents, falls into a narrow, and unfortunately somewhat technical, compass. Before us the appellant, Jaspal, had the advantage of representation by Mr Wyvill. He did not appear in the previous proceedings. Jaswir and Harbhajan have acted in person, as I understand they have largely done throughout these proceedings. They have both provided material, addressed the court and have discharged that duty carefully and with commendable courtesy. Mr Wyvill, I do not need to say, sought to draw our attention to any point that could be urged on the part of the gentlemen who are unrepresented, bearing in mind that the particular question this court has to deal with is one of law, and one of law of some technicality.
So far as the court orders are concerned, we have to go back to 20 June 2000 when the question of the ownership of the property came before the then Vice-Chancellor, Sir Richard Scott. He declared that the legal estate in the property was held by Jaspal and Harbhajan on trust for Jaswir and Jaspal in equal shares. Various other orders were made by the Vice-Chancellor with regard to the mortgage on the property and other matters. There has been a certain amount of litigation in respect of those provisions, but we are not concerned with them today because it appears that they have largely been resolved.
The actual dispute with which we are concerned involves orders made subsequent to the Vice-Chancellor's order for the sale of the property. Such an order was made by His Honour Judge Boggis, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, on 13 November 2000. That order is stated to be by consent. No sale resulted, however, from Judge Boggis' order. It is very regrettable that that was not so.
The parties then returned to court and a further order was made, in somewhat different terms, on 3 December 2001. Paragraph 1 of that order, which was recited to be an order by consent, provided that, subject to Jaspal obtaining a satisfactory survey of the property within 42 days of 3 December, the property should be sold in the sum of £290,000.
Paragraph 4 set out what the order described as "the mechanics of such sale". Subparagraph i provided for the finalisation of liabilities arising from the order of the Vice-Chancellor; subparagraph ii for the payment of a deposit; and subparagraph iii for the exchange of contracts in these terms:
"Upon the exchange of contracts and upon the payment of the said deposit, Harbhajan and Jaswir shall deliver vacant possession of the property to Jaspal."
So far, so good. On 10 February 2002, Harbhajan applied for an order that Jaspal had lost his right, so given by that order, to purchase the property because he had not produced a satisfactory survey within the stated time limit. That application came before Judge Norris on 23 April 2002. He did not accede to it, but he went on to deal with other matters. They arose not because there was any cross application in front of him, but because counsel for the first defendant (counsel, that is, for Jaspal) filed a substantial skeleton argument seeking directions as to the further pursuit of the matter, which the judge was prepared to entertain. The order relevant to our concerns that the judge made was in the following terms:
"Unless Jaspal offers for exchange, a signed contract (in such form as may be agreed, or in default of agreement, determined by the Chancery Judge), by 15 May 2002, the order of 3 December 2001 shall treated as repudiated".
I will return in due course to that particular phraseology.
A contract was proffered on 7 May 2002, but there were disagreements as to its terms so, in accordance with his order, the judge sat, as a matter of urgency, on 15 May 2002 to try to get this matter progressed. He took the contract, he amended it in the way that he thought appropriate and ascertained from those representing Jaspal that it would be possible to proffer that contract that day. He then ordered in the following terms, having referred to the contract that he had approved as amended:
"2. A contract in this form signed by Jaspal and Iqbal Kaur Chaggar [that lady is Jaspal's wife] is to be available for collection at 4.45 pm in the Reception Area of the offices of Challinors Lyon Clarke at St Chad's House [address given] for collection by Harbhajan.
3. If Paragraph 2 of this order is complied with then Jaspal shall have complied with his obligations under Paragraph 2 of the Order of 23 April 2002."
That again was an attempt by the judge to make it absolutely clear what had to happen and again to try to move this matter forward.
At 4.45 pm,Harbhajan attended at the solicitors' office, as the judge had told him he should do. He was given a contract, as I understand it contained in an envelope, at the reception desk. It turned out...
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