Javanshir Feyziyev v The Journalism Development Network Association
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Warby |
| Judgment Date | 16 April 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] EWHC 957 (QB) |
| Docket Number | Case No: HQ18M01270 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Date | 16 April 2019 |
[2019] EWHC 957 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
THE HONOURABLE Mr Justice Warby
Case No: HQ18M01270
Adam Wolanski QC (instructed by Atkins Thomson Solicitors) for the Claimant
Jonathan Price and Jennifer Robinson (instructed by Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP) for the Defendants
Hearing date: 12 April 2019
Approved Judgment
I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
THE HONOURABLE Mr Justice Warby
This is a libel action brought in respect of two articles which have been published online in and since September 2017, concerning an alleged money-laundering operation and slush-fund involving members of the ruling elite in Azerbaijan:
(1) an article dated 4 September 2017 (“the First Article”), under the heading “Azerbaijani Laundromat”; and
(2) an article dated 20 September 2017 (“the Second Article”) entitled “AvroMed May Have Received Millions Through Laundromat”, amended on 21 September 2017.
This has been the trial of the issue of meaning, pursuant to an Order of Master Davison, and the hearing of an application by the claimant, for orders striking out parts of the Defence and requiring further information about the defendants' case.
The claimant is is a member of the Azerbaijani parliament and co-chair of the EU/Azerbaijan Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. His claim is brought in respect of publication within this jurisdiction only, via a website at the address https://occrp.org (“The Website”), and on Twitter and other social media His case, which is admitted by the defendants, is that he lives for a substantial proportion of the year in a home he owns in London, where his wife and children live permanently and where his two children are at school, and that he invests significant sums in this jurisdiction.
The first defendant is a registered association in Romania. The claimant's case is that the first defendant operates a journalistic enterprise called the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, or OCCRP, and publishes content on the Website. The first defendant maintains that it has no responsibility for the publication of anything on the Website, or for any publication that may have occurred on Twitter or other social media. The first defendant's case is that OCCRP is the operating name of a separate organisation called Journalism Development Network Inc, a non-profit corporation incorporated in the State of Maryland, United States.
The second defendant is resident in Romania. The claimant's case is that the second defendant was the co-ordinator, in the sense that he edited and arranged and authorised the publication on the Website, of the articles complained of. The second defendant admits to being a member of the board of the first defendant, and to being a co-executive director of OCCRP. He also admits that he was listed on the Website as a co-ordinator of the Azerbaijani Laundromat project of OCCRP. But his case is that he did not edit, arrange, authorise or play any other role in the publication of either of the articles complained of, on the Website, on Twitter, or on other social media.
The claim was begun in March 2018, the complaint being in essence that the publications complained of implicated the claimant as a participant in the alleged corruption. On 7 August 2018, the defendants served a Defence, in which both defendants denied responsibility for the publications complained of. But they went on to take issue with the defamatory meanings complained of, maintaining that the articles were not reasonably capable of bearing the meanings complained of, and did not bear any defamatory meaning about the claimant. In the alternative, the defendants advanced a defence of truth. In the further alternative, it was pleaded that the publication of the words complained of was “clearly and fully” in the public interest. In addition, it was denied that the publication had caused serious harm to the claimant's reputation.
The claimant sought further information about the Defence. The Request sought details of the defendants' case on three topics: (1) responsibility for publication, (2) truth, and (3) public interest. A response was served on 2 November 2018, which addressed the first two topics, but not the third.
On 30 November 2018, the claimant filed two application notices, one seeking orders for meaning to be tried as a preliminary issue, and the other seeking the orders to strike out, and for the outstanding further information. The strike-out application targeted paragraphs 22–24 of the Defence, on the footing that they disclosed no reasonable grounds for defending the claim on the grounds of truth. The argument, in short, was that the meaning defended as true is a non-defamatory meaning and, further, that the facts pleaded in support of the defence could not on analysis support any defence of truth.
On 21 December 2018, Master Davison granted the application for a trial on meaning and gave directions, including costs management directions. He ordered that the trial and the claimant's application be heard together. He refused the defendants' application for a trial of the preliminary issue of responsibility for publication.
Since then, the issues have narrowed. The defendants no longer maintain that the articles are not defamatory at all, nor is there an issue about serious harm. The defendants do not seek to maintain the pleaded defence of truth. The strike-out application is conceded. On 28 March 2019, the defendants proposed an amendment to their meaning. The claimant has accepted that the meaning proposed is an arguable one, so that the amendment would cure the existing defect. But the defendants have deferred a decision on whether to make any amendment until after the Court's decision on what the words complained of actually mean. The contest today is essentially between rival meanings which are, by concession, seriously defamatory.
Meaning
The claimant's case is that in their natural and ordinary meaning the First Article, and the Second Article in each of its versions, meant:
“that the Claimant had, through the company AvroMed, engaged or assisted in illegal money laundering and in the bribery of influential European politicians, journalists and businessmen on a vast scale, or that there were very strong grounds so to suspect.”
The defendant's draft amended meaning, and their contention today, is that the articles meant that that “there are grounds to suspect that the claimant was complicit in money laundering and corruption.”
This, therefore, is one of those cases in which the contest is between meanings at different levels of gravity. These are often expressed as “ Chase levels”. Nicklin J explained this terminology in Brown v Bower [2017] 4 WLR 197 at [17]:
“They come from the decision of Brooke LJ in Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2003] EMLR 11 [45] in which he identified three types of defamatory allegation: broadly, (1) the claimant is guilty of the act; (2) reasonable grounds to suspect that the claimant is guilty of the act; and (3) grounds to investigate whether the claimant has committed the act. In the lexicon of defamation, these have come to be known as the Chase levels. Reflecting the almost infinite capacity for subtle differences in meaning, they are not a straitjacket forcing the court to select one of these prescribed levels of meaning, but they are a helpful shorthand. In Charman v Orion Publishing Group Ltd, for example, Gray J found a meaning of “ cogent grounds to suspect” [58].”
It is sometimes overlooked that the wording of Chase Level 2 derives from a particular context. It comes from Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1954] AC 234, where the words complained of referred to a “fraud probe” by police. “Reasonable grounds to suspect” is of course a well-known threshold in the law of police powers, such as the power of arrest. So it makes sense for a reader to infer, from a report that the police have arrested someone, that they had reasonable grounds for acting as they did. The implications may be different in other contexts.
The principles to be applied when deciding the natural and ordinary meaning of allegedly libellous words are well-established and uncontroversial. They were conveniently re-stated in a recent judgment of Nicklin J in Koutsogiannis v The Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB). Omitting internal citations, they are these:-
“11. The Court's task is to determine the single natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of, which is the meaning that the hypothetical reasonable reader would understand the words bear. It is well recognised that there is an artificiality in this process because individual readers may understand words in different ways: Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157, 173D–E, per Lord Diplock.
12. The following key principles can be distilled from the authorities:
(i) The governing principle is reasonableness.
(ii) The intention of the publisher is irrelevant.
(iii) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Teal Swan v Associated Newspapers Ltd
...one of the two articles complained of bore a Chase Level Two meaning, but the second bore a meaning of “strong grounds to suspect”: [2019] EWHC 957 (QB) [25], [36]. The meaning I found in Sheikh at [37] included the imputation that the claimant's conduct “provides strong grounds for suspec......
-
Lord Mohamed Sheikh v Associated Newspapers Ltd
...one of the two articles complained of bore a Chase Level Two meaning, but the second bore a meaning of “strong grounds to suspect”: [2019] EWHC 957 (QB) [25], [36]. Fact and opinion 21 The principles to be applied in deciding whether words are statements of fact or opinion are well-settled......
-
Travel Insurance Facilities Plc (trading as “Tifgroup”) v Times Newspapers Plc
...Random House Group [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), paras 11 and 12; and by Warby J in Feyziyev v The Journalism Development Network Association [2019] EWHC 957 (QB), paras 15–18. It is unnecessary to set these passages out in this judgment; I have them well in 15 In Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC......
-
Mohamed Amersi v British Broadcasting Corporation
...of decisions on the degree of reasonable suspicion. For example, in Feyziyev v The Journalism Development Network Association [2019] EWHC 957 (QB) at [25] and [36], Warby J (as he then was) found one of the articles complained of to mean that there were “reasonable grounds to suspect”, whe......