Leslie v Liverpool Corporation
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS,LORD JUSTICE SELLERS,LORD JUSTICE HARMAN |
| Judgment Date | 25 November 1959 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1959] EWCA Civ J1125-5 |
| Court | Court of Appeal |
| Date | 25 November 1959 |
[1959] EWCA Civ J1125-5
In The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal
The Master of the Rolls
(Lord Evershed)
Lord Justice Sellers and
Lord Justice Harman
Mr E. SOMERSET JONES (instructed by Messrs Donald A. Kershaw & Co.) appeared as Counsel for the Appellant.
Mr E. E. YOUDS (instructed by Mr Thomas Aker, Town Clerk, Liverpool) appeared as Counsel for the Respondents.
: These proceedings arose out of a road accident which occurred at 6 o'clock In the evening on the 13th September, 1968, that is to say, when it was daylight. As these accidents go, according to what one hears and reads, fortunately this was not serious. I shall presently have to describe in necessary detail the scene of the accident, but it is first to be noted that, according to the agreed medical report, supplemented by the agreement of the learned Counsel in the case, the total damage, including special damage, which the plaintiff suffered is to be taken at the sum of £100. That fact has a bearing upon a question which arose early in the case, namely, whether according to the terms of the statute this was a case in which an appeal lay at all to this Court on matters of fact. And because we thought this question of some importance, we reserved our Judgment and since the hearing of the case I have had an opportunity of consulting with my brethren presiding in the other Divisions of this Court, Lord Justice Hodson and Lord Justice Morris.
The relevant terms of the statute, namely, the County Courts Act of 1955 are to be found in Section 12, which conferred for the first time a right of appeal on matters of fact from a County Court to this Court; but the right of appeal so conferred was limited by the later terms of the section. So far as is relevant in the present case, sub-section 2 of Section 12 provides that the proceedings in which a right of appeal is conferred by the section are: "(a) any action founded on contract or tort, or for money recoverable by statute, where (i) the debt, demand or damages claimed exceeds £200". Sub-section 3 of the section in effect makes that provision applicable to a counterclaim.
In the present case the action was, of course, founded on tort, the tort of negligence. The particulars of claim, having stated the particulars of negligence of the motor driver in what one might call almost common form, proceeded to give particulars of the personal injuries (fractures of the fingers, physical and nervous shock) and special damage £27-O-7d. The claim concluded with the words "and the plaintiff claims damages limited to £400". That limitation is inspired, of course, by the language of Section 40 of the County Courts Act of 1934, as it is now amended by Section 1 of the County Courts Act of 1955, giving to a County Court jurisdiction in matters of this kind where the claim is limited to £400. It was suggested, however, in the present case that having regard to the nature of the injuries as specified in the particulars of claim, reinforced by what had since appeared as plainly the upper limit of any monetary damage that could be recovered, the plaintiff here had not brought himself within Section 12, sub-sections 1 and 2 and so had no right of appeal on matters of fact. On a plain use of the English language, it is, of course, manifest that a claim expressed thus, "and the plaintiff claims damaged limited to £400", is not the same thing as saying he claims damages exceeding £200, nor does the former, as a matter of English, as far as I can see, include the latter.
In all the circumstances of this case, which includes the general nature of the claim (an action for damages for negligence on the part of a bus driver), it has seemed to us that it would not be right to say of this plaintiff that he was not claiming damages, when his proceedings started, exceeding £200, and we have, therefore, treated it as open to the plaintiff to appeal to this Court on matters of fact. It was suggested that in truth the appeal was rather upon the inferences to be drawn from the facts found than upon the facts themselves. But to that aspect of the matter I shall refer again, if at all, only very slightly because I have already said that I think in all the circumstances of this case it would not be right to say that the plaintiff was not, when he started these proceedings, claiming damages exceeding £200.
But the fact that the question arose and caused some little debate, as I have already indicated, seemed to make it desirable that we should consider whether in cases of this kind a plaintiff should not make it clear from the start whether he is or is not claiming damages more than £200 in extent. From the language of the sub-section which I have read, it is to my mind clear beyond peradventure that the question whether there is or is not a right of appeal depends upon the claim that is made in the case and not upon the award which may later be recovered, and that view is I think supported by other language in the relevant section. In many cases — and this is, of course, especially true where the claim is for money recoverable by statute and very often true where the claim is founded on contract — it will be apparent from the language of the particulars of claim whether the amount which the plaintiff seeks to recover does or does not exceed £200. But in other cases, and more especially in actions founded on tort where damages are, as it is said, at large, this very often may not be so. After speaking, as I have said, to my brethren, we think that as a matter of general practice a prayer in a statement of claim should state whether or not the claim does or does not exceed £200. I have said "as a matter of general practice" because there will be cases where such a result is obvious from the nature of the claim. But where it is not so clear, then I think it would be a proper practice that the prayer should make it clear. There are good reasons, as it seems to me, for such a view. In the first place I do not think it right that a plaintiff, if he should be the unsuccessful party, should be in the position of getting the best of both possible worlds so that in matters relating to costs he might say afterwards: "Although I did not say so, obviously my claim was a very small one from the start". On the other hand, whatever the actual sum that the Judge might say he would have recovered had he succeeded, he might say: "My claim was always for more than £200". Perhaps even more important, I think it is right that the defendant in such a case should know where he stands upon this matter. In the present case if the plaintiff had recovered say the amount of the £100, it might well have been a hardship to tell the defendant that he had no right of appeal on fact because the claim had not in fact in terms stated a demand for more than £200. Nor do I think that the adoption of such a practice is likely to lead to any kind of abuse. In trivial cases to put in that the plaintiff's claim exceeds £200 obviously might involve him in having to pay, if he lost, on a scale of costs which was in-appropriate to the claim. More than that, I think the defendant would have a remedy if it was reasonably apparent that, in spite of the terms of the prayer, the real claim could not possibly be any figure as large as £200, so that the prayer had plainly been inserted solely to confer a right of appeal on fact. In such a case I should have thought a defendant could make the appropriate application to the County Court to amend the statement of claim by striking out such part of it as was, as I say, inappropriate to the true nature of the claim and designed merely for the purpose of conferring this right.
We, therefore, are of opinion that in this type of case as a general matter a plaintiff should state whether or not his claim exceeds £200. The present prayer does say that the claim does not exceed £400 in order to confer County Court jurisdiction beyond a doubt. Whether that limitation should properly be inserted is a matter that was considered, incidentally, by this Court in the case of Tideway Investments and Property Holdings Ltd. v. Wellwood, 1952, 2 All England Reports, p. 514, and at page 520 of the report I am there reported as declining to express a view whether the limitation ought to be expressed. I...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Doyle v Talbot Motor Company Ltd
...not exceed the county court limit whether on balance of account or otherwise." 11 I turn first to the decision of this court in Leslie v. Liverpool Corporation [1960] 1 W.L.R.1. That was a case which came before the court at a time when, by virtue of section 12(2) of the County Courts Act 1......
-
Mallinson (William) & Sons (Mfg.) Ltd v Key Transport Company Ltd
...there was a right to maintain this appeal. Mr. Titheridge based his argument upon a recent decision of this Court in Leslie v. Liverpool Corporation and Another, where certain views were expressed by the Master of the Rolls on this matter. That was a claim for damages for personal injuries ......
- R (Nurse Prescribers Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health