Lord v Sunday Telegraph Ltd
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS,LORD JUSTICE SACHS,LORD JUSTICE MEGAW |
| Judgment Date | 21 July 1970 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1970] EWCA Civ J0721-1 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Date | 21 July 1970 |
[1970] EWCA Civ J0721-1
The Master of the Rolls (Lord Denning),
Lord Justice Sachs and
Lord Justice Megaw
In The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal
Appeal of plaintiff from order of Mr. Justice Bean dated May 14th, 1970.
Mr. MICHAEL KEMPSTER, Q.C., and Mr. D. BROWNE (instructed by Messrs. Victor Mlshcon & Co.) appeared on behalf of the Appellant Plaintiff.
Mr. H. DAVIDSON (instructed by Messrs. Simmons and Simmons) appeared on behalf of the Respondent Defendants.
On the 17th November of 1968 the Sunday Telegraph published an article in which they severely criticised the affairs of Cyril Lord Ltd., the carpet manufacturers. The article described an offer of shares in 1965, the decline of the company in 1968 and the retirement of Mr. Cyril Lord himself to the Bahamas. It drew attention to "the way" – and I quote –"in which shares from whatever source were sold around the City before Mr. Lord's retirement." A fortnight later, on the 2nd December, 1968, Mr. Cyril Lord issued a writ against the Sunday Telegraph Ltd. claiming damages for libel and served a statement of claim. The defendants delivered a defence in which they denied that the words were defamatory of Mr. Cyril Lord. They went on to plead fair comment in the general form which has been accepted for many years. This is how it ran: "The said words are fair comment made in good faith and without any malice upon a matter of public interest, namely the issue to the public of shares in Cyril Lord Limited, a public company of which the Plaintiff was at all material times the Chairman and Managing Director, and the subsequent record and fate of Cyril Lord Limited and the shares thereof, and the acts and transactions of the Plaintiff in relation to the said events".
If the plea had stopped there, it would have been insufficient: for the simple reason that in order to make a defence of fair comment, the facts on which the comment is based must be true. The plea must be read therefore as carrying with it, by implication, an allegation that the facts on which the comment was based were true. ( ( London Artists v. Littler 1969 2 Q.B. at page 390). The defendants realised this and gave particulars of the facts on which they based their comment, see Cunnlng– ( Ham–Howle v. F.W. Dlmbleby & Sons Ltd. 1951 1 K.B. 360). They set out in seven numbered paragraphs a whole series of facts which they intend to prove at the trial.
Now the plaintiff's advisers seek to get more information from the defendants. They make an application for furtherparticulars, asking the defendants, to "state which of the words complained of the defen dants allege to be statements of fact." In other words, they want the defendants to go through the article and say which are statements of fact and which are expression of opinion. In support of this request they rely on Order 82, rule 3(2), which says that: "Where in an action for libel or slander the defendant alleges that, in so far as the words complained of consist of statements of fact, they are true in substance and in fact, and in so far as they consist of expressions of opinion, they are fair comment on a matter of public interest, or pleads to the like effect, he must give particulars stating which of the words complained of he alleges are statements of fact and of the facts and matters he relies on in support of the allegation that the words are true."
Mr. Kempster for the plaintiff says that the general plea of fair comment which I have read is a pleading "to the like effect" within the meaning of that rule, so that he is entitled to the particulars for which he now asks, "stating which of the words are statements of fact".
I do not think that this rule applies to the general plea of fair comment. The rule applies only to what has been known for several years as the "rolled–up plea", which has always run in these words:
"In so far as the words complained of...
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Lord Ashcroft KCMG v Stephen Foley and Others
...they rely to "warrant" the comment; see CPR 53PD.14 para 2.6(2), and further Cunningham-Howie v Dimbleby [1951] 1 K. B. 360 and Lord v Sunday Telegraph [1971] 1 Q.B. 235. If it was the defendants' intention to establish in their honest comment particulars a matter of fact that the claimant ......
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Kenny D. Anthony Plaintiff v Peter Josie Defendant [ECSC]
...particularized his pleadings by stating which of the words complained of are statements of fact and which are comments. Lord v. Sunday Telegraph Ltd. (1970) 3 AER 504. 121 If I am in error on this aspect, I will now go on to consider whether the Defendant has pleaded a sufficient substratum......
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Francis George Polidore Plaintiff v (1) Crusader Caribbean Publishing Company 1971 Ltd (2) George Odlum Defendants [ECSC]
...to that effect, or on the basis of their comment and indeed, such have not been pleaded as required. 68 InLord v Sunday Telegraph [1971] 1 Q.B. 235, it was held that evidence to sustain the defence of fair comment will be largely, if not exclusively, directed to establishing the facts relie......
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Pleadings
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