Okereke v Brent London Borough Council
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE SELLERS,LORD JUSTICE DAVIES,LORD JUSTICE SALMON |
| Judgment Date | 25 November 1965 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1965] EWCA Civ J1125-1 |
| Court | Court of Appeal |
| Date | 25 November 1965 |
[1965] EWCA Civ J1125-1
In The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal
(From: His Honour Judge Stokdilc - Willesden Country Courty)
Lord Justice Sellers
Lord Justice Davies and
Lord Justice Salmon
In the Matter of Section 15 of the Housing Act 1961
In the Matter of 48 and 48a Cavendish Road, N. W. 6
Mr. M. H. SPENCE (instructed by Mr. R. S. Forster, Town Clerk, London Borough of Brent) appeared on behalf of the Appellant (Defendant).
Mr. J. D. JAMES (instructed by Messrs. Davis Bieber & Co.) appeared on behalf of the Respondent (Plaintiff).
On the 13th October, 1964, the Town Clerk of the Borough of Willesden (now part of the new London Borough of Brent) served on Mr. P. Okereke a notice under section 15 of the Housing Act, 1961, requiring him, as the person having con-trol of the premises known as 48 and 48a Cavendish Road, N. W.6, to "Provide over the sink (in the basement kitchen) a suitable and sufficient supply of hot water. Carry out all necessary and incidental works, including the provision of gas or electric points as may be necessary".
Instead of complying with this not very onerous requirement and desirable improvement Mr. Okereke appealed against it, as he was entitled to do, to the Willesden County Court on the ground that the order was erroneously made as the property does not fall within section 15 of the Act. The matter came for consideration before Judge Stockdale.
The premises to which the notice referred are divided into three separate dwellings. The basement is self-contained and is lived in by one family or household. The ground floor likewise is self-contained and is lived in by one family or house-hold. The first floor in August, 1964, was inhabited by one family and one single person, and by November, 1964, another family had entered in and all those so living on the first floor shared a bathroom, water closet and kitchen. They had separate sleeping and living accommodation. There was a common staircase leading to the first and second floors but the second or top floor was not fit for human habitation and was in fact empty. The basement and the ground floor and the first and second floors together, which three occupied parts comprise the whole building, are separately rated hereditaments.
Sections 15 and 21 of the Housing Act, 1961, call for consideration. These are both contained in Part II of the Act which contains amendments of the Housing Act, 1957, and which deals with "Houses in multiple occupation". As far as is directly relevant to this case the two sections provide asfollows:
Section 15 (l): "If the condition of a house which, or a part of which, is let in lodgings, or which is occupied by Members of more than one family, is, in the opinion of the local authority, so far defective with respect to any of the following matters, that is to say — natural and artificial lighting, ventilation, water supply, personal washing facilities, drainage and sanitary conveniences, facilities for the storage, preparation and cooking of food, and for the disposal of waste water, or installations for space heating or for the use of space heating appliances, having regard to the number of individuals or households, or both, accommodated for the time being on the premises, as not to be reasonably suitable for occupation by those individuals or households, the local authority may serve either (a) on the person having control of the house (as defined by sub-section 2 of section 39 of the principal Act), or (b) on any person to whom the house is let at a rack rent, or on any person who, as the agent or trustee of a person to whom the house is let at a rack rent, receives rents or other payments from tenants of parts of the house or lodgers in the house, a notice specifying the works which in the opinion of the local authority are required for rendering the premises reasonably suitable for such occupation as aforesaid, and requiring the person on whom the notice is served to execute those works".
Section 21 (1): "Sections twelve to fifteen of this Act shall apply — (a) to a building which is not a house but comprises separate dwellings, two or more of which do not have a sanitary convenience and personal washing facilities accessible only to those living in the dwelling, and (b) to a building which is not a house but comprises separate dwellings, two or more of which are wholly or partly let in lodgings or occupied by members of more than one family, as if references in those sections to a house which, or part of which, is let in lodgings or which is occupied by members of more than one family includedreferences to any such building…."
Section 21 in terms therefore extends the provisions of sections 12 to 15 to buildings comprising separate dwellings but applies the sections only under (a) where two or more separate dwellings do not have a sanitary convenience and personal washing facilities restricted to those living in the dwelling and (b) where two or more of which are wholly or partly let in lodgings or occupied by members of more than one family.
The Council cannot proceed in the present case under section 21 because under (a) the separate dwellings have the necessary facilities stipulated and under (b) although the first floor is one instance of a separate dwelling being so occupied it is the only one of the separate dwellings in the building which is so occupied and the sub-section requires two or more to be so before section 15 can be applied to the building as if it were a house. The Council had contended before the County Court that there were two or three separate dwellings on the first floor but the judgment found — and it was a finding of fact — that the first floor was one separate dwelling only and therefore it did not avail the Council that there was only one sanitary convenience and one personal washing place on that floor and section 21 sub-section 1 (a) could not be relied on. That finding was not challenged before us.
The Council have relied on, and given the notice the subject of this appeal under, section 15 of the Act and have contended that the premises are a house notwithstanding that the whole building is divided into three separate and self-contained dwellings.
The difficulty in the application of these provisions is that section 15 refers to a "house" and section 21 applies "to a building which is not a house but comprises separate dwellings".
The construction and occupation of these premises make them without question a building comprising separate dwellings. Is the building then a house within the meaning of the Act when itis wholly comprised of separate buildings? There is no relevant definition of "house" in the 1961 Act. In the Housing Act, 1957, by section 189 "unless the context otherwise requires…. 'house' includes…. (b) for the purposes of any provisions of this Act relating to the provision of housing accommodation, any part of a building which is occupied or intended to be occupied as a separate dwelling". And the Housing Act, 1964, section 44 (1) provides in relation to Part II of that Act that "unless the context otherwise requires 'tenement' means a building which as constructed contained, and which contains, two or more flats". I would interpret "as constructed" as "in its present state of construction". These are illustrations only from housing legislation and they do not indicate that the word "house" has a clear, accepted and certain meaning. It is a word which is widely used with no precise or uniform meaning. It is used in differing senses and the question is to ascertain what its meaning is in the context of the relevant sections of this Act.
A similar approach was made by Lord Justice Salmon in Quiltotex Co. Limited. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government (1965 3 Weekly Law Reports page 801) in deciding whether tenement houses were houses within section 2 of the Housing Act, 1957, which deals with demolition.
There was no evidence about it but it may well have been that the building 48 Cavendish Road, N. W.6, was at one time an ordinary house occupied by one household (family, possibly relatives and servant(s)) but I doubt if at the present time the premises in their reconstructed state of three separate dwellings would any longer be referred to, even popularly, as a house. The premises now would, in some probability, be described as flats or tenements or possibly as "a converted house" or in the language of various statutes as comprising "separate dwellings". Whether that be so or not I think the Housing Act, 1961, draws a distinction.
The finding of the learned judge is in somewhat crypticform as it is contained in a note and not a full transcript of the judgment. "Had section 15 stood alone without section 21 it would have been clear to me that the word 'house' in section 15 should be given the ordinary meaning it has been given in similar contexts in earlier housing legislation". I take it to be the learned judge's finding that the premises here, in his view, are not a house to which sections 12 to 15 of the Act would apply if they had stood alone, because the judgment continues "but section 21 expands the scope of sections 12 to 15 and in particular lays down the applicability to buildings comprising separate dwellings". The judgment then considers whether section 21 on the facts of the case can be invoked.
The judge's finding therefore seems to be a finding of fact based on the learned judge's knowledge of the earlier housing legislation.
Legislation of this character, designed to improve housing conditions, has a long history and has been enacted in piecemeal fashion and not without regard to the way in which earlier legislation has been interpreted from time to time by the...
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