R (Griffin) v Southwark London Borough Council
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Silber |
| Judgment Date | 29 October 2004 |
| Neutral Citation | [2004] EWHC 2463 (Admin) |
| Date | 29 October 2004 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/3594/2004 |
[2004] EWHC 2463 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
The Honourable Mr Justice Silber
Case No: CO/3594/2004
Edward Fitzpatrick (instructed by Southwark Law Centre of London SE 15) for the Claimant
Donald Broatch (instructed by Deborah Holmes, Borough Solicitor, London Borough of Southwark) for the Defendant
I. Introduction
In August 2002, Kelly Griffin ("Ms Griffin") together with her then partner Mr George Gibson made a joint homelessness application ("the 2002 application") pursuant to section 184 of the Housing Act 1996 as amended ("the 1996 Act") to the London Borough of Southwark ("Southwark") seeking accommodation for both of them and also for their child George, who was born on the 26 July 2002. Southwark accepted a "full" duty to provide accommodation and it initially in August 2002 provided Ms Griffin, George Gibson and their son with temporary accommodation, but they applied for permanent accommodation. They were made an offer of accommodation in a co-operative but the other occupants rejected Ms Griffin and Mr. Gibson.
On 10 December 2002, Southwark then made an offer to Ms Griffin and to George Gibson of accommodation on the Aylesbury Estate. This offer of accommodation was refused because of concerns about safety on the estate. Ms Griffin had been assaulted there a few years earlier and she believed that she would be attacked there again if she went to live there. In a witness statement, Sandra Pass, a Casework Team Leader in the Homeless Person's Unit of Southwark, explained that Ms. Griffin had not previously stated that she did not wish to live on the Aylesbury Estate and that her temporary accommodation was "quite near to the Aylesbury Estate". This evidence has not been challenged by Ms Griffin.
An appeal was made against the offer of accommodation by Ms Griffin, who explained that she had been previously attacked on the Aylesbury Estate but on 31 December 2002, an Appeals Panel of Southwark rejected her appeal. By a letter dated 17 January 2003, Southwark explained to Mr. Gibson that it had discharged its duty by offering accommodation, which had been rejected. On 21 January 2003, Ms Griffin made an application for review to Southwark of its decision that it had discharged its duty but a review team of Southwark rejected this application on 13 March 2003 although Ms Griffin did not receive the decision until some time in April 2004. The claimant did not challenge that decision in the County Court.
Possession proceedings were meanwhile brought by Southwark against Ms Griffin in respect of the temporary accommodation occupied by her. A possession order was made against her and she had to leave this accommodation on 7 February 200Thereafter, she stayed with friends on a temporary basis but she had to keep moving on. She latterly stayed for a short while with her son's grandmother but she ultimately also had to leave that accommodation
On 13 May 2004, Ms Griffin's present solicitors wrote to Southwark explaining why Ms Griffin's circumstances had changed and asking that she be provided with temporary accommodation while a fresh homelessness application by Ms Griffin was being considered. On 19 May 2004, Southwark informed Ms Griffin's solicitors that they would accept a further application from Ms Griffin who duly made a fresh homelessness application to Southwark (" the 2004 application"). Ms Griffin was eventually provided with temporary accommodation.
By letter dated 10 June 2004 (" the decision letter"), Southwark notified Ms Griffin that although she was homeless, in priority need and not intentionally homeless, the 2004 application still had to be rejected as Southwark had already previously discharged its duty under the 1996 Act because first she had previously been offered accommodation on the Aylesbury Estate and second she had not subsequently "secured any secured accommodation before the fresh approach for assistance". It is this decision not to consider the 2004 application, which is the subject of the challenge to the decision letter on this application. Ms Pass has explained in the witness statement to which I have already referred in paragraph 2 above that there had been no changes in Ms Griffin's requirements since the 2002 application or in her position since that time; she pointed out that Ms. Griffin had parted company with Mr. Gibson before she had viewed the accommodation on the Aylesbury Estate and that Ms Griffin had not been in settled accommodation since the 2002 application. None of these allegations have been disputed.
The consequence of Southwark's decision in the decision letter that it could not consider Ms Griffin's 2004 application is that Ms Griffin was thereby deprived of a decision under section 184 of the 1996 Act, which if not to Ms Griffin's liking, would itself have been subject to a review and to an appeal. By the present application, Ms Griffin is seeking with leave of Collins J. first to quash the decision of Southwark contained in the decision letter that it could not consider the 2004 application and second to obtain an order that Southwark now considers substantively her 2004 application.
II. The Issues
The basis of Ms Griffin's challenge to the decision letter is that the decision of Southwark not to consider Ms Griffin's 2004 application is based on an error of law because Southwark failed to realise that the 2004 application was not based on identical facts to the 2002 application for the reason, which I will explain in paragraph 25 below. Mr Edward Fitzpatrick for Ms Griffin conceded first, that he could not contend the decision was perverse and second, that he could rely on any of the erroneous statements made by Southwark to found a claim based on a legitimate expectation or any other matter. It is convenient to record at this stage some of these very regrettable errors of Southwark in its dealings with Ms. Griffin.
The first of these errors was the statement made to Ms Griffin's solicitors by a representative of Southwark on 19 May 2004 that Southwark would consider a further application from Ms Griffin. The next error is to be found in the decision letter of 10 June 2004 in which Southwark referred to Ms Griffin's right to obtain a review of the decision not to accept the 2004 application under section 202 of the 1996 Act. Ms. Griffin duly made a request for a review before Southwark later informed Ms Griffin correctly in a letter dated 16 July 2004 that the decision under challenge was not a decision susceptible to review, as it did not fall within any of the categories specified under section 202(1) of the 1996 Act. Finally, in a letter dated 26 July 2004 the Legal Department of Southwark stated that they would accept a further homelessness application from Ms Griffin and that they would then provide a further decision. Subsequently on 27 July 2004 when Ms Griffin attended for an interview at the Homeless Person Unit when she was told that Southwark had discharged its duty towards her and so it would not accept from her a further homelessness application based on a change of circumstances. In other words, the final stance of Southwark was that of relying on the decision letter to assert that it could not consider the 2004 application and that has prompted the present application.
III. The Statutory Background
Section 184 of the 1996 Act states insofar as is material to the present proceedings that:
"(1) If the local housing authority have reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness, they shall make such enquiries as are necessary to satisfy themselves –
(a) whether he is eligible for assistance, and
(b) If so, whether any duty, and if so what duty, is owed to him under the following provisions of this Part
…
(3) On completing their inquiries, the authority shall notify the applicant of their decision and, so far as any issue is decided against his interests, inform him of the reasons for their decision.
…
(5) A notice under subsection (3).. shall also inform the applicant of his right to request a review of the decision and of the time within which such a request must be made"
Section 193 of the 1996 Act provides so far as is material to this application that:
"(1) This section applies where the local housing authority are satisfied that an applicant is homeless, eligible for assistance and has a priority need, and are not satisfied that he became homeless intentionally
…
(3) The authority are subject to the duty under this section until it ceases by virtue of any of the following provisions of this section
…
(5) The local housing authority shall cease to be subject to the duty under this section if the applicant, having been informed by the authority of the possible consequence of refusal and of his right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, refuses an offer of accommodation which the authority are satisfied is...
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...the local authority "could not but have concluded that this was an application which they are obliged to entertain". In R (Kelly Griffin) v London Borough of Southwark [2004] EWHC 2463 (Admin) Silber J stated that "an applicant is entitled to have a further section 184 [of the 1996 Act] ap......
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Jennifer Hoyte v London Borough of Southwark
...but that has not happened despite the relevant legislation being updated. 25 The "exactly the same facts" test was applied in R (Griffin) v Southwark LBC [2005] H.L.R. 12 and was crystallised by the Court of Appeal in Rikha Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2005] 1 W.L.R. 2103. ......
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