R (Snelgrove) v Woolwich Crown Court
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice Auld,Mr Justice Richards |
| Judgment Date | 29 September 2004 |
| Neutral Citation | [2004] EWHC 2172 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/228/2004 |
| Date | 29 September 2004 |
[2004] EWHC 2172 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
IN THE MATTER OF A CLAIM FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
The Right Honourable Lord Justice Auld And
The Honourable Mr Justice Richards
Case No: CO/228/2004
Miss Antoinette Mackeson-Sandbach (instructed by TNT Solicitors) for the Claimant
Mr David Perry (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service) for and as the Interested Party
Introduction
The claimant, Lee Snelgrove, is currently awaiting trial in the Crown Court at Woolwich charged on a single count indictment with an offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 ("the 1861 Act"). The prosecution case is that on 21 st March 2002 the claimant, acting together with his co-accused, Mark Williams, assaulted Darren Reynolds. He claims judicial review of decisions of His Hon Judge Norris on 30 th October and 5 th November 2003 to refuse: 1) to direct disclosure of material to the claimant; 2) to adjourn the application to enable him to call oral evidence; 3) to consider any material outside the copy witness statements relied upon by the prosecution; and 4) to dismiss the charge against him pursuant to paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 ("the 1998 Act").
An offence contrary to section 18 of the 1861 Act is an indictable-only offence. Section 51 of the 1998 Act provides that an adult defendant who appears before a magistrates' court charged with an offence which is triable only on indictment shall be "sent forthwith to the Crown Court for trial". On 2 nd September 2003 the claimant appeared in a magistrates' court and was sent to the Crown Court for trial. The prosecution case against him depends entirely upon the evidence to be given by Reynolds identifying him as one of his assailants. In unused material disclosed by the police, namely crime reports, there were previous inconsistent statements of Reynolds, a note signed by him "dropping all charges", contradiction of part of his account by a person named by him as a witness, and information to suggest that he suffered from mental illness.
The claimant sought to bring the prosecution against him to an early end by an application to dismiss under the 1998 Act on grounds of the paucity and/or unreliability of the prosecution evidence against him. In October 2003 he notified in writing his intention to apply for the charge to be dismissed pursuant to paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the 1998 Act and of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Dismissal of Charges Sent) Rules 1998 (SI 1998 No. 3048) ("the Dismissal of Charges Sent Rules"). His notice detailed the limits of the prosecution evidence available against him and of the unused material disclosed by the police relied on by the claimant in support of his case that the evidence of Reynolds was likely to be so unreliable that no jury could properly convict him. His counsel, Miss Antoinette Mackeson-Sandbach, also lodged skeleton arguments in support of his application, which included reference to the well known tests in R v Galbraith (1981) 73 Cr App R 124 and R v Shippey [1988] Crim LR 767.
On 30 th October 2003, the day fixed for the application, the claimant, through Miss Mackeson-Sandbach, sought disclosure of Reynolds' psychiatric records and an adjournment to enable him to obtain an opinion of, and, if so advised to call, a psychiatrist as to the mental state of Reynolds and for Reynolds to be made available for cross-examination. The Judge, His Hon. Judge Norris, refused to grant an adjournment for those purposes, indicating that he could only consider the case against the claimant on the basis of the witness statements served by the prosecution, adding that he could not take account of matters in the crime reports because they were hearsay, on which the claimant was not entitled to rely. He adjourned consideration of the application to dismiss to 5 th November, inviting Miss Mackeson-Sandbach to make submissions to him at that adjourned hearing also as to abuse of process.
On 5 th November, Miss Mackeson-Sandbach made applications for dismissal and/ or for a stay of the prosecution as an abuse of process. The Judge refused both applications. Before doing so, he had clearly looked at the crime reports and other un-used material disclosed by the prosecution. He held, however that there was sufficient evidence in the form of the prosecution witness statements of a case to answer. He added that that the claimant's concerns as to the quality of the proposed evidence of Reynolds could be examined as part of the normal trial process. This is how, after referring briefly to the provisions of section 51 of, and Schedule 3 to, the 1998 Act and to the Dismissal of Charges Sent Rules, he expressed his ruling:
"… The Judge decides the point on the papers, unless it appears with regard to [any matters stated in the application for leave] that the interests of justice require him to hear any evidence orally – paragraph 2(4).
The first question which arose – which I raised – was what papers the Judge is entitled to look at. My preliminary view was that it was only the statements on which the prosecution rely, and that it should be determined on the basis of those statements whether there is a prima facie case.
Miss Mackeson submitted that I can and must look at documents – for example the Crime Report – which the prosecution have served as part of primary disclosure, and that I should look at those to determine whether Darren Reynolds' evidence relating to Lee Snellgrove, especially his identification evidence, is likely to be such that a reasonable jury could ever rely upon, because this is the only evidence relating to Lee Snellgrove.
It is largely a question of the complainant's mental state and what the police officers have noted in the Crime Report about him. Mr Slack for the prosecution maintains that all of these are matters that the defence can probe at trial and are not properly determined on an application to dismiss.
I have had regard to all the authorities cited.
The view I finally take is that, even going behind the scenes beyond the prosecution bundle to the Crime Report (and I have doubts still as to whether I should do so), I am not persuaded that this application is properly grounded. The complainant will be available at trial to give evidence to the jury and the defence will have every opportunity then to probe. [my emphasis]
I am not persuaded either that a reasonable Crown Prosecutor, because of the complainant's mental health, couldn't be satisfied that there is a case to put forward.
The issues that Miss Mackeson raises at this stage are trial issues; they are normal incidents of a trial. There is a prima facie case against this defendant to go to trial. I do not need to hear any oral evidence to be satisfied of that.
I also invited arguments on the grounds of abuse. I have concluded that there is no unfairness to the defendant, or any question that he cannot have a fair trial for the reasons I have already given. I am satisfied that the abuse argument must fail."
The claimant now claims judicial review of the Judge's rulings culminating in and including his decision not to dismiss the charge, but not of his refusal to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process. All of his complaints are directed to the unreliability of Reynolds's proposed evidence, largely on account of his inconsistencies and psychiatric state and because of the absence or weakness of any supporting evidence. He challenges the Judge's refusal to dismiss the charge, having regard to: 1) his decision to confine his consideration to the witness statements served by the prosecution; 3) his alleged failure to consider, on the issue of an adjournment for further investigation, the material in the crime reports relevant to Reynolds' mental state; and 3) his decision not to permit the claimant to call oral evidence from a psychiatrist.
The Crown Prosecution Service, as interested party, seek to uphold the Judge's decisions, primarily on the jurisdictional rule in section 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 ("the 1981 Act") that judicial review is not available "in matters relating to trial on indictment", alternatively on the basis that the Judge's decisions on the merits were, in any event, correct.
Following the hearing on 5 th November 2003, the prosecution preferred a bill of indictment charging the section 18 offence, and the trial stands adjourned pending the outcome of the claim for judicial review.
The Issues
The primary issue for consideration is thus whether the decisions under challenge are matters relating to trial on indictment for the purposes of section 29(3) of 1981 Act ('the jurisdiction issue'). The secondary and alternative issue is whether the Judge was entitled to reach the decisions he did on the written prosecution evidence before him, or whether he should have considered or given more weight to the material in the Crime Reports as to Reynolds's mental state, and/or heard or otherwise received psychiatric evidence on the issue.
The jurisdiction issue
Before I consider this issue, I should summarise the legal framework in which it is set.
The 1998 Act contains a miscellany of provisions dealing with a wide range of matters, including the important one on avoidance of delay in the criminal justice process. Section 51 of, and Schedule 3 to, the Act...
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