R v Bracknell Justices, ex parte Griffiths
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Lord Wilberforce,Lord Simon of Glaisdale,Lord Cross of Chelsea,Lord Edmund-Davies,Lord Fraser of Tullybelton |
| Judgment Date | 24 June 1975 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1975] UKHL J0624-2 |
| Date | 24 June 1975 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[1975] UKHL J0624-2
Lord Wilberforce
Lord Simon of Glaisdale
Lord Cross of Chelsea
Lord Edmund-Davies
Lord Frazer of Tullybelton
House of Lords
Upon Report from the Appellate Committee, to whom was referred the Cause Pountney (Assisted Person) against Griffiths (on Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division), That the Committee had heard Counsel, as well on Wednesday the 14th as on Thursday the 15th, days of May last, upon the Petition and Appeal of Alan Roy Pountney (Assisted Person), of Broadmoor Hospital, near Crowthorne in the County of Berkshire, praying. That the matter of the Order set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely, an Order of a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice of the 16th of January 1975, so far as regards the words: "IT IS ORDERED that the said Order dated the 19 th day of November 1974 be removed into the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice and that the Clerk to the said Justices do forthwith send the said Order or a copy thereof under the hand and seal of the Chairman of the said Justices to the Master of the Crown Office Royal Courts of Justice London AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that thereupon the said Order be quashed", might be reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, and that the said Order, so far as aforesaid, might be reversed, varied or altered, and that the Petitioners might have the relief prayed for in the Appeal, or such other relief in the premises as to Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, might seem meet; and Counsel having been heard on behalf of Elvet Griffiths, the Respondent to the said Appeal; and due consideration had this day of what was offered on either side in this Cause:
It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen assembled, That the said Order of a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice of the 16th day of January 1975, in part complained of in the said Appeal, be, and the same is hereby, Affirmed, and that tlfe said Petition and Appeal be, and the same is hereby, dismissed this House: And it is further Ordered, That the Costs incurred by the Appellant in respect of the said Appeal be taxed in accordance with the provisions of the Second Schedule to the Legal Aid Act 1974, the amount thereof to be certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments: And it is also further Ordered, That the Costs incurred by the Respondent in respect of the said Appeal be paid out of Central Funds pursuant to section 6(1) of the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1973, the amount thereof to be certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments.
My Lords,
I have had the benefit of reading in advance the speech to be delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Edmund-Davies. I agree with it and would dismiss the appeal.
My Lords,
Section 141 of the Mental Health Act 1959 places a hindrance on the recourse of a class of citizens to the courts of justice. Although Magna Carta promised that to no man would justice be denied or delayed, it is not unparalleled for the legislature to constitute such lets and conditions. An obvious example is the legislation relating to vexatious litigants. The mischief and the parliamentary objective must be similar. It must have been conceived that, unless such classes of potential litigant enjoy something less than ready and unconditional access to the courts, there is a real risk that their fellow-citizens would be, on substantial balance, unfairly harassed by litigation. Section 141 of the Mental Health Act admittedly modifies the general right of recourse to the courts. The only question is how far it goes. I have had the advantage of reading the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Edmund-Davies. I agree with it, and I would therefore dismiss the appeal.
I would, however, venture to add this. Patients under the Mental Health Act may generally be inherently likely to harass those concerned with them by groundless charges and litigation, and may therefore have to suffer modification of the general right of free access to the courts. But they are, on the other hand, a class of citizen which experience has shown to be peculiarly vulnerable. I therefore presume to suggest that the operation of section 141 should be kept under close scrutiny by Parliament and the Department of Health and Social Security.
My Lords,
I have had the advantage of reading the speech of my noble and learned friend, Lord Edmund-Davies. I agree with his conclusions, and would therefore dismiss the appeal.
My Lords,
This appeal arises from the quashing by the Divisional Court of the conviction of the respondent by the Bracknell Magistrates for committing a common assault on the appellant, contrary to section 42 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. At the material time the respondent was a male nurse in the Special Hospital at Broadmoor. The appellant was a patient who had been transferred there from Aylesbury Prison under section 71 of the Mental Health Act 1959 he having been convicted of murder when he was fifteen years old and sentenced to be kept in custody during Her Majesty's pleasure.
The assault complained of was alleged to have taken place on May 24th, 1974, which was a visiting day at Broadmoor. The appellant's case was that when the time for visitors to leave had arrived, he was bidding farewell to members of his family when the respondent approached, said "Come on, you", and without more, punched him on the shoulder and almost caused him to lose his balance. The respondent, on the other hand, denied any punching, and claimed that, having three times called out "Somerset House", of which the appellant was an inmate, he had collected all the inmates with the exception of the appellant. When he saw the appellant, he asked him to come along, but Pountney walked past, whereupon Griffiths put up his hand to stop him. When he did this, Pountney "went up and fell heavily on "his heels", although he had merely touched Pountney's shoulder. Having heard the evidence of warder and patient and other witnesses, the magistrates found the charge of common assault proved and conditionally discharged Griffiths for two years.
Most unfortunately, at no stage before or during the hearing of the private prosecution instituted by Pountney did anyone make reference to section 141 of the Mental Health Act 1959 which is in the following terms: —
"141. (1) No person shall be liable, whether on the ground of want of jurisdiction or on any other ground, to any civil or criminal proceedings to which he would have been liable apart from this section in respect of any act purporting to be done in pursuance of this Act or any regulations or rules thereunder, or in, or in pursuance of anything done in, the discharge of functions conferred by any other enactment on the authority having jurisdiction under Part VIII of this Act, unless the act was done in bad faith or without reasonable care.
(2) No civil or criminal proceedings shall be brought against any person in any court in respect of any such act without the leave of the High Court, and the High Court shall not give leave under this section unless satisfied that there is substantial ground for the contention that the person to be proceeded against has acted in bad faith or without reasonable care.
(3) This section does not apply to proceedings for an offence under this Act, being proceedings which, under any provision of this Act, can be instituted only by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
(4) In this section, references to the High Court shall be construed, in relation to Northern Ireland, as references to a judge of the High Court of Northern Ireland."
The sole question involved in the successful certiorari proceedings before the Divisional Court and in this appeal relates to the applicability of that section to the variously-described incident of May 24th. Giving the judgment of the court that the conviction must be quashed, Lord Widgery, C.J., said: —
"It seems to me that the nurse was entitled to the protection of the section. He was exercising his function to control the patients when he was calling upon them to say goodbye to their families and make their way back to their quarters. His defence to the charge was that he had not struck the patient, but had merely put out his arm to separate the patient from his family, there being some reluctance on his part to leave his family. On any view, the incident happened when the nurse was on duty and when he was purportedly exercising his functions as a nurse. Accordingly, he could claim the protection of the section and, since the leave of the High Court was not obtained, the proceedings were a nullity."
The basic propositions advanced by Mr. Blom-Cooper, for the clarity of whose submissions I should like to express my indebtedness even though (as will presently appear) I find them unacceptable, are that the protection afforded by section 141 is limited to acts done, or purported to be done, in discharge of functions expressly provided for by the wording of the section itself; that no other functions may be implied or read into it; that, so limited, the section has no application to the incident of May 24th, 1974; and that, accordingly, the complainant was entitled to institute his private prosecution for assault without...
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