R v Millward (Neil)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE |
| Judgment Date | 25 January 1985 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1985] EWCA Crim J0125-9 |
| Docket Number | No. 7176/C/83 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) |
| Date | 25 January 1985 |
[1985] EWCA Crim J0125-9
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
The Lord Chief Justice of England (Lord Lane)
Mr. Justice Russell
and
Mr. Justice Kennedy
No. 7176/C/83
MR. R. TUCKER, Q. C. and MR. T. S. BROWN appeared on behalf of the Appellant.
MR. P. STRETTON appeared on behalf of the Crown.
In November 1983 at the Crown Court at Stafford before Mr. Justice Drake and a jury, this appellant, who was at all material times a police officer, was charged with perjury. He pleaded not guilty. At the close of the prosecution case submissions were made by counsel on his behalf. The Judge rejected those submissions. The effect of that rejection was to render the appellant's proposed defence ineffective. He was thereupon advised — and correctly advised — to change his plea to guilty, which he did.
He was sentenced to three months' imprisonment suspended for twelve months and ordered to pay £500 towards his legal aid costs. The only issue in this appeal is whether the learned Judge was correct in law in the rulings which he made.
The facts were as follows. On 10th June 1982 the appellant had reason to stop a car containing two Indian men. He considered that certain offences had been committed by the driver. He knew the driver by sight but not by name. The driver gave his name as Parshan Singh. The appellant asked the driver for his driving licence and other documents, but these were not forthcoming and accordingly the appellant served Form HORT 1 on the driver requiring him to produce the necessary documents at the police station.
These documents relating to Parshan Singh (hereinafter called Parshan) were produced by Parshan at the police station in due course.
On 14th July the appellant saw Parshan at the police station and told him that he, the appellant, was satisfied that Manjit Singh (hereinafter called Manjit) and not Parshan had been the driver of the car on the 10th June and that Manjit had given a false name at the scene (presumably because he held no proper driving licence); Parshan had accordingly also been guilty of deception when he produced the documents in answer to the HORT 1 and when he claimed to have been the driver.
On 10th January 1983 Parshan and Manjit duly appeared at Walsall Magistrates' Court. Manjit was charged with driving offences and both defendants were charged with offences allegedly committed on 13th June in connection with the production of the driving documents.
Whilst the two Indians were waiting outside the Court for the case to be called on, they saw the appellant talking to another police officer, Police Constable Revelle. Revelle, it should be said, had no connection with the trial of the two Inidans at all. Revelle left the appellant, came over to the two Inidans and asked to see their driving licences. Parshan produced his. Manjit did not. The incident struck the two Indians as being somewhat odd and they reported it to their solicitor.
The hearing started soon afterwards. The prosecution case depended principally (if not entirely) on the evidence of the appellant to the effect that Manjit and not Parshan was the driver of the car which he had stopped on 10th June. He was cross-examined on behalf of the defendants to suggest that his identification of the driver was mistaken. He was then asked the following questions:
"Q. Have you spoken to PC Revelle this morning? A. Yes.
"Q. Are you aware that PC Revelle approached my clients this morning and asked to see their driving licences and inspected Parshan's driving licence, but could not inspect Manjit Singh's driving licence because he didn't have it with him? A. No." (that was a lie).
"Q. Did you ask PC Revelle to see my clients? A. No." (that was also a lie).
"Q. Did PC Revelle talk to you after he had spoken to my clients?
A. No." (that was also a lie).
"Q. Is it not the case that you asked PC Revelle to see my clients so that you could find out which one was Manjit Singh and which one was Parshan Singh because you were not sure? A. No."
"Q. (This was in re-examination) Has there been any sort of conversation between you and PC Revelle even remotely resembling that suggested to you? A. No." (that also was a lie).
The matter was investigated. The appellant eventually admitted the lies and the charges against the two Indians were therefore quite properly dropped.
During the subsequent inquiries the appellant gave as his reason for enlisting the help of Police Constable Revelle that he suspected Parshan and Manjit were going to try in some way to deceive the Magistrates by switching their identities. It seems that there was some basis for that suspicion. He wanted to be sure who they were saying they were on that particular day. When questioned he panicked, hence the lies.
The submissions made to the learned Judge were twofold: (1) that there was no prima facie case that the admittedly false statements were made with the requisite guilty mind and (2) that in any event the false statements were not "material" to the proceedings.
As already indicated the Judge rejected both submissions. These submissions have now been repeated before this Court.
The basis of counsel's first submission is that the word "wilfully" requires proof by the prosecution of knowledge or belief by the accused man that the question asked and the answer to be given are material. No offence is committed, it is submitted, if a person makes a statement even though he knows it to be false and even though it is in law material, if he does so in the honest though mistaken belief that it is not material in that proceeding. The appellant, it is suggested, believed or may have believed, that the lying answers that he gave were immaterial to the proceedings and if so, it would follow that no offence would have been committed. In other words the submission is that the prosecution must prove not only that the...
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