R v The Secretary of State tor the Home Department ex parte and Another

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeMR JUSTICE LAWS,MR. JUSTICE LAWS
Judgment Date22 January 1998
Judgment citation (vLex)[1998] EWCA Civ J0122-3
Docket NumberCO/4526/97
Date22 January 1998
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)

[1998] EWCA Civ J0122-3

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

(CROWN OFFICE LIST)

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London WC2

Before:

Mr. Justice Laws

CO/4526/97

Regina
and
The Secretary of State tor the Home Department
Respondent
ex parte
Joseph Idowu
Applicant

MISS B. HARRIS (Instructed by Messrs. Hereward & Foster) appeared on behalf of the Applicant.

MR. S. WOLFE (Instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.

1

( )

2

Thursday, 22nd January 1998

MR JUSTICE LAWS
3

This applicant for judicial review leave is a 74-year-old gentleman born in Nigeria who unfortunately has insulin-dependent diabetes. He lived here for some 23 years until 1983, working for the Ford Motor Company. He then retired. In 1993 I understand that he travelled to Nigeria, hoping that he might benefit from traditional remedies available there to ameliorate his ill health. He lived there in what has been described as a compound, and the conditions in which he lived are dealt with in his affidavit.

4

By November 1996, the applicant says that his illness had become a good deal worse and he came back to the United Kingdom, intending at that stage to see whether it might be possible to arrange for supplies of insulin to be sent to Nigeria. Apparently that proved difficult or impossible, so he was minded to remain in the United Kingdom. However on 30th July 1997 he went back to Nigeria, to his old address. The facts relevant to that accommodation and its availability figure in the dispute between the parties, and I will say a little more about it in a moment. At all events, he returned to the United Kingdom on 25th September 1997 with two teenage children and on the following day applied to the respondent authority to be accommodated as a homeless person under the relevant legislation, namely the Housing Act 1996. The council provided him with temporary accommodation on a bed-and-breakfast basis with the children. On 15th December 1997 they refused his homeless application, stating as follows:

"This Authority is not satisfied that you are homeless or threatened with homelessness. This decision has been reached for the following reasons:

You have accommodation that is available and reasonable for you to occupy at 4 Idow Street, Ijebu, Ogun State, Nigeria."

5

Against that decision under the Act of 1996 the applicant has a right to seek a review (see s.202) and in due course, if he is unsuccessful in that review, there is now a right to what is in effect a statutory judicial review in the County Court. The applicant has exercised that right but the review decision remains pending. In those circumstances, the closing words of s.188 of the Housing Act 1996 are in play. They state:

"The authority may continue to secure that accommodation is available for the applicant's occupation pending a decision on a review".

6

The initial duty to house the applicant on a temporary basis, which arises under s 188(1) where a local housing authority, before determining a homeless application, have reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless, eligible for assistance and have a priority need, ceases to apply once the decision is made on the substantive homeless application that is adverse to the applicant. That is, as I have said, what has happened here; and accordingly, as at today's date, the issue between the parties which brings the applicant to this court is whether or not the authority have lawfully exercised their discretion conferred by the closing words of s.188. They have in fact refused to secure that accommodation is available pending a decision on review. That refusal is the subject of this judicial review leave application. It is contained in a letter dated 14th January 1998 which says:

"My difficulty with this case is that Mr Idowu has given contradictory information concerning the accommodation he occupies in 4 Idow Street [which is the Nigerian address]. I was originally minded to support the original decision made on his application, on the basis that it is probable that his accommodation there consisted of use of a family apartment consisting of 2 bedrooms and a living room, with shared use of kitchen and bathroom. This accommodation has now become a veranda and quite frankly I do not believe this in the absence of any supporting evidence.

"It is also clear that Mr Idowu has resided in Nigeria with his three children since 1983, and returned to the U. K. without having made adequate arrangements for the accommodation of himself and his family. Were I to accept your assertion that his accommodation at 4 Idow Street has been sublet, I might well be minded to conclude that he was effectively homeless from that address. In that case, he would only be entitled to temporary accommodation for a month or...

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