Re SC (Mental Patient: Habeas Corpus)

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeTHE MASTER OF THE ROLLS,LORD JUSTICE NEILL,LORD JUSTICE HIRST
Judgment Date22 November 1995
Judgment citation (vLex)[1995] EWCA Civ J1122-1
Docket NumberQBCOF 95/1657/D
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
Date22 November 1995

[1995] EWCA Civ J1122-1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE

COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, CROWN OFFICE LIST

Appeal

(Mr. Justice Turner)

Before: The Master of the Rolls (Sir Thomas Bingham) Lord Justice Neill Lord Justice Hirst

QBCOF 95/1657/D

In the Matter of Simpson-Cleghorn

MR. BONNEY QC & MR. T R RYDER (Instructed by Messrs. Roland Robinsons & Fentons, Blackpool) appeared on behalf of the Appellant

Mr. McKeon (Instructed by Messrs. Hill Dickinson Davis Campbell, Liverpool) appeared on behalf of the Warrington Community Health Care

MR. R SINGH (Instructed by the Legal Services for Lancashire County Council) appeared on behalf of Lancashire County Council

1

Wednesday 22 November 1995

THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS
2

THE MASTER OF THE ROLLSThis is an appeal against a decision of Turner J, given on 26 October 1995, when he refused an application by the Appellant for an order of habeas corpus. The Appellant is an adult and unmarried and has for some years had the misfortune to suffer from mental ill health. On previous occasions he has been admitted to various hospitals for assessment and treatment, but this appeal concerns the legality of his admission on, and detention after, 10 July 1995.

3

The appeal appears to raise certain fundamental principles. As we are all well aware, no adult citizen of the United Kingdom is liable to be confined in any institution against his will, save by the authority of law. That is a fundamental constitutional principle, traceable back to chapter 29 of Magna Carta 1297, and before that to chapter 39 of Magna Carta 1215. There are, of course, situations in which the law sanctions detention. The most obvious is in the case of those suspected or convicted of crime. Powers then exist to arrest and detain. But the conditions in which those powers may be exercised are very closely prescribed by statute and the common law. Another instance that springs to mind is that of unlawful immigrants. Again, they may be apprehended and detained but again the powers to detain are very closely prescribed by legislation and subordinate legislation in the field of immigration.

4

More relevant to this appeal is the instance of mental patients. They present a special problem since they may be liable, as a result of mental illness, to cause injury either to themselves or to others. But the very illness which is the source of the danger may deprive the sufferer of the insight necessary to ensure access to proper medical care, whether the proper medical care consists of assessment or treatment, and if treatment, whether in-patient or out patient treatment.

5

Powers therefore exist to ensure that those who suffer from mental illness may, in appropriate circumstances, be involuntarily admitted to mental hospitals and detained. But, and it is a very important but, the circumstances in which the mentally ill may be detained are very carefully prescribed by statute. Action may only be taken if there is clear evidence that the medical condition of a patient justifies such action, and there are detailed rules prescribing the classes of person who may apply to a hospital to admit and detain a mentally disordered person. The legislation recognises that action may be necessary at short notice and also recognises that it will be impracticable for a hospital to investigate the background facts to ensure that all the requirements of the Act are satisfied if they appear to be so. Thus we find in the statute a panoply of powers combined with detailed safeguards for the protection of the patient. The underlying issue in the present appeal is whether those powers were properly exercised and whether the Appellant was lawfully detained. One reminds oneself that the liberty of the subject is at stake in a case of this kind, and that liberty may be violated only to the extent permitted by law and not otherwise.

6

With that by way of background, I turn to the Mental Health Act 1983. It is convenient to start by reference to section 3(1) in which there is a general provision authorising the admission to hospital of patients and their detention in hospital for the period allowed by the Act "in pursuance of an application made in accordance with this section." Subsection (2) sets out the grounds upon which such an application may be made and they include in (a) mental illness. Subsection (3) includes a requirement that two registered medical practitioners should recommend admission for treatment, and details are prescribed as to the contents of those recommendations. A registered medical practitioner is defined in section 5 and Schedule I of the Interpretation Act 1978.

7

Section II of the Act gives further details governing generally the making of such applications and subsection (1) is important:

"Subject to the provisions of this section an application for admission….. for treatment…..may be made either by the nearest relative of the patient or by an approved social worker, and every such application shall specify the qualification of the applicant to make the application."

8

The meaning of "approved social worker" is defined in section 145 of the Act. Section 11(4) is central to this appeal, and I read that subsection:

"Neither an application for admission for treatment….. shall be made by an approved social worker if the nearest relative of the patient has notified that social worker….. that he objects to the application being made and, without prejudice to the forgoing provision, no such application shall be made by such a social worker except after consultation with the person (if any) appearing to be the nearest relative of the patient unless it appears to that social worker that in the circumstances such consultation is not reasonably practicable or would involve unreasonable delay."

9

It is, I think, unnecessary for present purposes to refer to subsection (6).

10

Section 13(1) of the Act defines the duties of approved social workers and provides:

"It shall be the duty of an approved social worker to make an application for admission to hospital…..in respect of a patient within the area of the local social services authority by which that officer is appointed in any case where he is satisfied that such an application ought to be made and is of the opinion, having regard to any wishes expressed by relatives of the patient or any other relevant circumstances, that it is necessary or proper for the application to be made by him."

11

In subsection (5) one finds an important reiteration of the need to consult the nearest relative. That subsection provides:

"Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorising or requiring an application to be made by an approved social worker in contravention of the provisions of section 11(4) above, or as restricting the power of an approved social worker to make any application under this Act."

12

It is in section 26(1) of the Act that one finds the meaning of nearest relative defined. In subsection (1)(c) it is defined to mean the father or mother of the proposed patient, and subsection (3) of that section makes plain that, where both father and mother are alive, then it is the older of the two who is to be treated as the nearest relative. It is unnecessary to go into the provisions relating to cohabitees and children.

13

Section 29 gives power to the County Court, on application, in effect to override the wishes of the nearest relative. Application may be made by an approved social worker, and one of the grounds upon which the application may be made is that the nearest relative of the patient unreasonably objects to the making of an application for admission for treatment in respect of the patient. That section, therefore, provides a necessary remedy in a case where admission is clearly indicated but where the nearest relative objects. Under section 23 the nearest relative has power to discharge the patient from hospital, but that is not an absolute power since it is liable to be, in effect, blocked by an order made by a responsible medical officer under section 25 of the Act.

14

I then come to section 6 of the Act, which is again very important in the context of this case. It provides:

"(1) An application for the admission of a patient to a hospital under this Part of this Act, duly completed in accordance with the provisions of this Part of this Act, shall be sufficient authority for the applicant, or any person authorised by the applicant, to take the patient and convey him to the hospital within the following period….."

15

and periods of time are then set out.

"(2) Where a patient is admitted within the said period to the hospital specified in such an application as is mentioned in subsection (1) above, or, being within that hospital is treated by virtue of section 5 above as if he had been so admitted, the application shall be sufficient authority for the managers to detain the patient in the hospital in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

(3) Any application for the admission of a patient under this Part of this Act which appears to be duly made and to be founded on the necessary medical recommendations may be acted upon without further proof of the signature or qualification of the person by whom the application or any such medical recommendation is made or given or of any matter of fact or opinion stated in it.

(4) Where a patient is admitted to a hospital in pursuance of an application for admission for treatment, any previous application under this Part of this Act by virtue of which he was liable to be detained in a hospital…..shall cease to have effect."

16

Plainly that section provides protection for a hospital...

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