RSPCA v Johnson
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE PILL,MRS JUSTICE RAFFERTY |
| Judgment Date | 16 October 2009 |
| Neutral Citation | [2009] EWHC 2702 (Admin) |
| Docket Number | CO/2083/2009 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 16 October 2009 |
[2009] EWHC 2702 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice Pill
Mrs Justice Rafferty
CO/2083/2009
MISS J MILLER QC and MR R JENKINS (instructed by MCKEOG & CO) appeared on behalf of the Claimant
MR P MOTT QC and MR H JENKINS (instructed by KNIGHTS SOLICITORS) appeared on behalf of the Defendant
This is an appeal by the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) by way of case stated from a decision of Consett Magistrates' Court, dated 30 October 2008. The District Judge refused to hear an information laid by the Society on the basis that it was out of time. Mr Paul Johnson, the respondent, was charged with a single offence of causing unnecessary suffering to a thoroughbred stallion between 11 May 2007 and 11 June 2007, at Low Wyndways Farm, White-le-Head, Tantobie, County Durham, contrary to section 4(1) of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 (“the 2006 Act”). The decision was that of Deputy District Judge Hayles. The issue raised by the respondent was whether the information and summons, dated 11 June 2008, were out of time. On that document the informant is stated to be “RSPCA Inspector Jackman 108 (on behalf of the RSPCA)”.
Section 127(1) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 provides that an information is required to be laid within 6-months of the date of commission of the offence. However, a number of statutes, including the 2006 Act, provide other time limits. Section 31(1) of the 2006 Act provides:
“ Time limits for prosecutions
(1) Notwithstanding anything in section 127(1) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 (c.43), a Magistrates' Court may try an information relating to an offence under this Act if the information is laid-
a) before the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the date of the commission of the offence, and.
b) before the end of the period of 6-months beginning with the date on which evidence which the prosecutor thinks is sufficient to justify the proceedings comes to his knowledge.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b)-
a) a certificate signed by or on behalf of the prosecutor and stating the date on which such evidence came to his knowledge shall be conclusive evidence of that fact, and
b) a certificate stating that matter and purporting to be so signed shall be treated as so signed unless the contrary is proved.”
The information/summons, being dated 11 June 2008, the Society sought to rely on a letter dated 4 June 2008 to establish that they were within time. The letter was signed “J Fletcher, Prosecutions Case Manager”. Under the heading “ RSPCA v Paul Johnson”, it was stated:
“In accordance with the provisions of section 31 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, please accept this letter as certification of the fact that evidence which the prosecutor thinks is sufficient to justify the proceedings came into the possession of the prosecutor on 21 December 2007. In accordance with the provisions of section 31(2), this certificate shall be conclusive evidence of that fact.”
The letter was addressed to the Magistrates' Court.
The Society relied on the certificate. The information was laid on 4 June 2008, that is before the end of the period of 6-months from the certified date of 21 December 2007, and thereby within the period provided in section 31(1) of the 2006 Act. I anticipate the respondent's submissions by stating that the relevant date for section 31 purposes was, in his submission, 10 December 2007, from which it would follow that the issue of the summons on 11 June 2008 was out of time.
The substantive part of the case stated consists of a series of findings of fact followed by a series of questions. No conclusions are expressed by the District Judge on the legal issues now raised, but his conclusions may be inferred from the findings of fact. The Judge found that Mr Jackman saw an injured horse, Hans Christian, at the farm on 11 June 2007. After examination by a veterinary surgeon the horse was put down on 13 June 2007. A chip implanted in the horse's neck indicated, as enquiries with the British Horseracing Authority revealed, that the respondent was the owner of the horse. On interview, on 14 June 2007, Mr Cecil Johnson said that the horse was owned by the respondent who was his son.
Throughout June, July and August, and later as the District Judge found, the respondent made concerted efforts to avoid and hide from Mr Jackman. I do not propose to describe the circumstances in detail, but Mr Jackman visited the farm in the course of his duties on: 27 June 2007, 26 July 2007, 21 August 2007, and 22 August 2007; he visited a different address to attempt to speak to Mr Christopher Johnson, son of the respondent, on 10 October; he again visited the farm on 17 October, 13 November, 15 November and 21 November. On 29 November he requested information regarding the respondent and the horse from the British Horseracing Authority, Weatherbys GSB Ltd, and Mr Johnson's own veterinary surgeon. On the following day, 30 November, Mr Jackman requested information from the Department of Work and Pensions regarding the respondent.
His visits to the farm continued after the December dates which are critical in this appeal; he visited on 23 January, 31 January, 13 February; he again visited an address he believed to be associated with Mr Christopher Johnson; he then made visits to a dental practice which was believed to be owned and operated by the respondent. Eventually, on 29 April, Mr Jackman saw Mr Christopher Johnson. Subsequently, he visited the dental practice again and when, on 27 May, he traced the respondent, the respondent said, “I am not interested in talking to you”. Further visits were subsequently made.
In discharging their duties, Inspectors of the Society clearly need to make enquiries. There is a public interest in prosecutions not being started otherwise than on good grounds and there is a public interest in fairness being shown to those whom it is proposed to prosecute.
I return to the District Judge's findings of fact. Having referred to the events of June, July and August, the Judge found that there was, on that basis, sufficient evidence that the respondent owned the horse. The Judge found that the Society is a body corporate. He concluded, first, that the Society had sufficient knowledge and evidence to issue a process within the usual 6-month time limit, that is within 6-months of 17 June; secondly, he found that the certificate dated 4 June 2008 was a misguided attempt by the Society to extend the time for the issuing of an information. That appears to me to be a finding of bad faith against the Society.
The Judge posed no fewer than eight questions. Counsel agree that the court need not answer each of them or answer them seriatim. The issues are whether the certificate is conclusive, if not then the judge was right to reach the conclusion he did. If on its face the certificate was conclusive, the judge was still able to investigate whether there had been fraud or an abuse of process. That will often involve, as it does in this case, going behind the certificate to look at the sequence of events. The Judge's finding as to whether the certificate was valid on its face is, with respect, not altogether clear. What is clear is that he did go behind it and he found that there had been an abuse of process by the Society. He did so, it would appear, by reference to the delay between June 17 2007, when the alleged ill-treatment was discovered, and the issue of the information/summons in June 2008.
In his skeleton argument, Mr Mott QC for the respondent put the issues in this way:
“(1) Who was the prosecutor for the purposes of section 31(1) of the 2006 Act; the RSPCA as a body, or their employee Mr Fletcher who signed the supporting certificate?
(2) Was the purported certificate in a form which complied wholly or sufficiently with the requirements of section 31(2) so that it was conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein?
(3) What is the meaning of the words 'the date on which the evidence which the prosecutor thinks is sufficient to justify the proceedings comes to his knowledge'; the date on which the prosecutor comes to his conclusion, or the date on which the evidence which later leads to that conclusion comes to his knowledge?
(4) In the light of the evidence before the Judge and his findings of fact, was he entitled (or even bound) to go behind the purported certificate, assuming it complied with section 31(2)?
(5) In the light of that evidence and those findings, was the Deputy District Judge entitled to reject jurisdiction?”
On behalf of the Society, Miss Miller QC submits that the Judge had no power to go behind the certificate drafted under section 31 of the 2006 Act. The date stated, December 21, was conclusive and the court was not permitted to go behind it to conduct an analysis of who knew what and when. Miss Miller relies on the statement from Mr Richard Smith, assistant manager of the British Horseracing Authority Licencing Department, not being received by the RSPCA until 5 December 2007. In it Mr Smith described the history of the horse's ownership; the horse was registered in the joint names of the respondent and Mrs D Johnson until June 2004 when Mrs Johnson cancelled her registration. The respondent had signed a return on 21 June 2007 stating that the horse was no longer training with him. Only having had a reasonable opportunity to consider that evidence, submits Miss Miller, did the prosecutor, claimed by her to be Mr...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lamont-Perkins v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
...approach has been followed in Burwell v DPP [2009] EWHC 1069 (Admin), Azam v Epping Forest District Council [2009] EWHC 3177 (Admin) and RSPCA v Johnson [2009] EWHC 2702 (Admin). 33 In Burwell Keene LJ, with whom Roderick Evans J agreed, had this to say about the approach adopted in Amvrosi......
-
Chesterfield Poultry Ltd v Sheffield Magistrates Court
...not merely whether the evidence amounts to a prima facie case, but also whether it is in the interests of justice to bring proceedings: RSPCA v Johnson [2009] EWHC 2702 (Admin) at [33]; Letherbarrow v Warwickshire County Council [2014] EWHC 4820 (Admin) at [17]; Riley v DPP [2016] EWHC 2......
-
The King on the application of Andreas Michli v Westminster Magistrates Court
...individuals. That decision needs to be made with especial care; and it cannot be avoided or delayed by – to use the phrase of Pill LJ in RSPCA v Johnson [2009] EWHC 2702 (Admin) at [33]) – the mere “shuffling of papers”, or by information being sat on so as to extend the time limit. So far......
-
David Letherbarrow v Warwickshire County Council
...for the purposes of the Trade Descriptions Act was the council and not an individual employee. 16 But reference was also made to RSPCA v Johnson [2009] EWHC 2702, in which, as in this case, the prosecution was bought under the Animal Welfare Act 2006. In Johnson this court (Pill LJ and Raff......