St. Helen's Colliery Company Ltd v Hewitson
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Buckmaster,Lord Atkinson,Lord Shaw of Dunfermline,Lord Wrenbury,Lord Carson |
| Judgment Date | 22 November 1923 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1923] UKHL J1122-1 |
| Date | 22 November 1923 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[1923] UKHL J1122-1
Lord Buckmaster.
Lord Atkinson.
Lord Shaw.
Lord Wrenbury.
Lord Carson.
House of Lords
After hearing Counsel, as well on Thursday the 28th day of June last, as on Monday the 2d day of July last, upon the Petition and Appeal of the St. Helens Colliery Company, Limited, whose Registered Office is at Workington, in the County of Cumberland, praying, That the matter of the Order set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely, an Order of His Majesty's Court of Appeal, of the 7th of November 1922, might be reviewed before His Majesty the King in His Court of Parliament, and that the said Order might be reversed, varied, or altered, or that the Petitioners might have such other relief in the premises as to His Majesty the King in His Court of Parliament might seem meet; as also upon the printed Case of Joseph Hewitson, lodged in answer to the said Appeal; and due consideration had of what was offered on either side in this Cause:
It is Ordered and Adjudged, in the name of the House of Lords, by the Lords of Appeal sitting in the House of Lords during the Dissolution of Parliament, by virtue of a Writing by His Majesty the King under His Sign Manual, dated the 16th day of November 1923, pursuant to the provisions of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, That the said Order of His Majesty's Court of Appeal, of the 7th day of November 1922, complained of in the said Appeal, be, and the same is hereby, Reversed, and that the Cause be, and the same is hereby, remitted back to the County Court Judge of the County Court of Cumberland, holden at Workington and Cocker-mouth, with a Direction to make an award in favour of the Appellants and to do therein as shall be just and consistent with this Judgment: And it is further Ordered, That the Respondent do pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Appellants the Costs incurred by them in the Courts below, and also the Costs incurred by them in respect of the said Appeal to this House, the amount of such last-mentioned Costs to be certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments.
My Lords,
This Appeal is brought by the St. Helens Colliery Company against a judgment of the Court of Appeal, who have decided that the Respondent, a miner in the Appellants' service, is entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, for injuries sustained by him when travelling in a train from his place of residence at Maryport to the colliery. Such a claim can, of course, only be maintained if the injury arose to the workman "in the course of and arising out of his employment." It is useless to lament the obscurity of these words, and wrong to enquire what was the intention behind the Act except so far as such intention is disclosed in the language of the Statute construed in accordance with certain fixed and well-known principles. The facts of the case, according to my view, are these:
The workman lived at Maryport, some 5 miles distant from the colliery. A number of other colliery workers were in like case, and the Appellants, recognising no doubt the importance of securing transport for their men to and from the pits, entered into a contract with the L. & N.W. Railway Company, by which the company agreed to provide special trains for the conveyance of the workmen to and from the colliery and Maryport. By this contract the Appellants agreed to indemnify the railway company against claim for damages by the passenger in case of accident. The Appellants then provided to each workman a pass upon the railway and charged them for it a sum which did not represent the full amount of the agreed fare, and this sum was deducted week by week from their wages. On entering the employment of the colliery company, the workman who desired to avail himself of this means of transport signed an agreement with the railway company releasing them from all claims in case of accident.
On the 10th October, 1921, the Respondent, while travelling by virtue of the pass thus obtained as a workman, was injured through a railway accident. He has been deprived of his claims against the railway company; if he has no claims against his employers, he is left wholly unprotected.
The learned County Court Judge has found that it was an implied term of the contract of service that the train should be provided by the employers. I entirely agree with that conclusion. It was as a workman entering the service of the employers that he obtained a pass enabling him to travel and released his rights against the railway company. It was, I think, an inseparable part of his contract of employment. It does not, however, seem to me that this conclusion determines the case in his favour. He had undoubtedly the right to travel by the train—the right enjoyed by him as a miner in the service of the Appellants; but he was not directed to travel by such a train; had he found it convenient or desirable, he could have travelled by other means.
The real question to my mind is whether, when he entered the train in the morning, it was in the course of his employment within the meaning of the Act. I find it difficult to fix the test by which this question can be answered in favour of the Respondent. In the case of Cremins against Guest, Keen and Nettlefold, 1908, K.B. 469, the circumstances are, as the Court of Appeal thought, indistinguishable from the present, and it is there stated that the phrase "in the course of his employment" is satisfied if the workman is in the place where the accident occurred by reason of an implied term of the contract of service that he should have the right if not the obligation to use the train. I find it difficult to accept this test. A man entitled by virtue of his contract of service to a holiday and a free ticket will equally be on his journey by virtue of the right obtained by his contract of service. But it seems to me difficult to say that an accident occurring to him in the train must be in the course of his employment. The workman was under no control in the present case, nor bound in any way either to use the train or, when he left, to obey directions; though he was where he was in consequence of his employment—I do not think it was in its course that the accident occurred.
The case of Holmes v. The Great Northern Railway Company, 1902, 2 K.B., page 409, is a different case, for there a railway man, working at King's Cross, was told to go to Hornsey and a train was provided for him at King's Cross. Lord Justice A. L. Smith held that it was as a workman in the course of his employment that he entered the train at King's Cross; but I cannot see that those are the circumstances here.
The case of Longhurst, 1920, A.C. 757, does not really offer much assistance. There the access to the work was dangerous and was the only means by which the work could be approached or left. The man was bound by the terms of his employment to be where he was.
I think it would be wrong, having regard to the purpose of this Statute, as disclosed both in its construction and in its history, to narrow the meaning of the words used; they are general words intended, as I regard them, for a wide and general application: but I find myself unable so to construe them as to include in their operation the right of travelling by a train which the workman was under no obligation and no proved necessity to use.
My Lords,
I share the difficulty the late M.R. said, in this case, he felt in reconciling the case of Davies v. Rhymney Iron Company, 16 T.L.R. 329, with the case of Cremins v. Guest, Keen, Nettlefold & Co., 1908, K.B. 469, and also in reconciling all the authorities on the point as to when and under what circumstances an injury by accident can properly be held to have been sustained in the course of a workman's employment within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906. I do not wonder at his difficulty in reconciling the two cases mentioned, for this reason if for no other—that in the first of the two the facts and findings of the County Court Judge are clearly, distinctly and unambiguously stated; while in the second these matters, as I shall presently show, are stated in such an incomplete, ambiguous and puzzling way that I think the case must be misreported.
In the first of them, according to the report, the workman was a collier in the employment of the Defendant Company, the owners of a colliery and also of a little railway about 1½ miles in length leading from the colliery towards the workmen's homes. On this railway the Company ran trains to take some of the colliers, including the sufferer, to and from the colliery in the direction of their homes. It was quite optional with the workmen whether they travelled in the train or not, and if they did travel in it they were not charged anything for the service. The Company were not in any way bound to carry the colliers upon the train. The injured workman, in descending from the train when it was some distance from the colliery, fell and was injured. Though the accident occurred before 1906, nothing turned upon the point of the scene of the accident being some distance from the colliery. The County Court Judge found that it was not a condition of the workman's employment that he should be carried to and from his work upon the train; that the Company provided this train as a convenience for the workmen, and were not under any duty or obligation to provide it.
Collins, M.R., in giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said the appellant ( i.e., the workman) left his place of work and availed himself of the facilities given by the Company. He went home by a route he was not bound to take. He was under no duty to the Company at the time of the accident, and in no sense could the accident be said to be connected with...
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