Stephen Corrigan v Chelsea Football Club Ltd
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice McCombe,Lady Justice Asplin DBE,Lord Justice Davis |
| Judgment Date | 19 November 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] EWCA Civ 1964 |
| Date | 19 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No: A2/2019/2367 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
[2019] EWCA Civ 1964
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice Davis
Lord Justice McCombe
and
Lady Justice Asplin DBE
Case No: A2/2019/2367
A2/2019/2368
Mr Adam Tear, solicitor advocate of Hodge, Jones and Allen for the Appellant
Mr Edward Rowntree (instructed by Kerman + Co LLP) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 9 th November 2019
Approved Judgment
Introduction
The activity of ticket touting has been judicially described as a “disreputable scourge”. It is in fact capable of constituting a criminal offence under s.166 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. It particularly affects, although is by no means confined to, sporting and musical events.
Chelsea Football Club, the famous Premier League football club, is one of a number of holders or organisers of such events seeking, by use of civil proceedings, to detect, deter and disrupt the activities of ticket touts.
In the present case, it is alleged that the defendant, Stephen Corrigan, was detected seeking to engage as a tout in an unauthorised ticket transaction on 8 April 2019. He arranged to sell to an individual (in fact, an agent of the football club) a ticket with a face value of £23.50 for the sum of £125, payable in cash, for the home game that evening against West Ham United. The transaction took place in Fulham Broadway, near to the football club's ground at Stamford Bridge.
The defendant was in due course identified as the individual undertaking the sale. Civil proceedings were commenced against him in the High Court on 12 April 2019. On 15 April 2019, on the ex parte application of the claimant, Stewart J granted wide ranging relief by way both of negative injunctions and of mandatory orders for disclosure.
As at 15 July 2019 the defendant had, notwithstanding due service, failed to comply with the mandatory orders, to appear at a hearing in the interim or to take any part in the proceedings. On that date, when the defendant again did not attend, Murray J made an order committing him to prison for 6 months, suspended until 26 July 2019. That period of suspension was stated to be designed to enable the defendant even then to comply with the Order of 15 April 2019. He did not do so; and on 26 July 2019 Murray J confirmed that the suspension ceased to have effect. On 30 July 2019, the defendant attended in person before Murray J having been arrested under a bench warrant and, following a further hearing, the immediate term of imprisonment was confirmed. The defendant was eventually released from prison on 10 September 2019.
It is now said on this appeal, brought on behalf of the defendant as of right, that the suspended sentence order for contempt of court should not have been made; or, even if it was properly made, it should not thereafter have been activated.
It seemed, at least in the written arguments presented by Mr Tear on behalf of the defendant prior to the hearing, that it was being suggested that potentially important points of principle and practice arose: in particular by reason of the asserted mental capacity issues of the defendant and by reason of his lack of legal representation at all relevant stages. However, my own firm opinion is that the proper outcome for this appeal rests on the particular circumstances of this particular case. No point of principle arises.
Background
The ticket transaction in question was, on the current evidence, initiated by the defendant at a Starbucks café in the Fulham Broadway Centre, at around 6pm on 8 April 2019. This is a short distance from the football club's ground at Stamford Bridge. An individual, described in the evidence as “the claimant's agent”, was, as it is alleged, approached by a man subsequently identified as the defendant. The agent was asked if he wanted to buy a ticket for the match that evening. It is said that a number of other tickets were at that time identified in the defendant's possession.
The agent agreed to pay £125 in cash, which he was told was the price. He handed over £130, receiving £5 by way of change in return. He was handed a ticket with a face value of £23.50. It is alleged that the defendant also told the agent that he regularly dealt in tickets for Chelsea matches; and he provided the agent with his telephone number. The ticket in question was identified as having been initially issued to an individual who was a member of the club. It was a genuine ticket. There was evidence that tickets are issued to members subject to Match Ticket Conditions of Issue. Further, Terms are printed on the back of each ticket. It is sufficient for present purposes to say that the various terms and conditions make clear that a match ticket may not be resold and may not be transferred to a guest at above face value. It is also made clear in the terms and conditions both that the unauthorised sale or disposal of a match ticket may result in a criminal offence and that the football club may commence court proceedings in the event of a breach.
In due course the defendant was identified as the individual concerned in the sale. His home address in Hertfordshire was also ascertained. (It seems, in fact, that he had formerly been a member of the club.) It was further established that the defendant operated a Twitter account. That, when accessed, included posts advertising tickets for sale for a variety of football matches.
The proceedings
Proceedings were started, with leave of the Master, in the High Court on 12 April 2019. The Particulars of Claim – doubtless in standard form for a case of this kind brought by the club, albeit adapted to the facts of the particular case – are detailed. There are various causes of action advanced: breach of contract, conspiracy, procuring or inducing a trespass, wrongful interference with goods and so on. Damages, an account of profits and injunctive relief are among the remedies sought.
On 15 April 2019 the claimant applied for wide-ranging orders. The application was made ex parte: the defendant thus had no notice of it and was not present. Stewart J granted the orders sought. These included injunctions restraining the defendant from trading in Chelsea tickets and restraining him from being within 400 yards of the ground at Stamford Bridge or 200 yards of Fulham Broadway Underground Station in the 48 hours prior to the date of any home match.
In addition, the Order included mandatory orders for delivery up and disclosure. I need not, for present purposes, set out the precise terms of such orders: but they extended to delivery up of all Chelsea tickets in the defendant's possession or control; required him to give contact details, with regard to certain identified home matches, of those from whom the defendant had purportedly acquired, and of those to whom the defendant had purportedly sold, Chelsea tickets; and further required him to give details of any such transactions. The latter aspects were required to be verified by affidavit, served by 18 April 2019, of the defendant.
In addition, this was stated at paragraph 2(d) of the Order:
“If the provision of any of this information is likely to incriminate the Defendant, he may be entitled to refuse to provide it, but must set this out fully in the affidavit. The Defendant is recommended to take legal advice before refusing to provide any information referred to in this Order. Wrongful refusal to provide the information is contempt of court and may render the Defendant liable to be imprisoned, fined or have his assets seized.”
The Order, as sealed, included (as is required) a Penal Notice endorsed on the front page. That Notice, printed in bold and in capital letters, made clear, among other things, that disobedience might result in a finding of contempt of court and imprisonment. The Order further went on among other things to state, in bold letters, that the defendant should read the order very carefully and that “you are advised to consult a solicitor as soon as possible”. The right to apply to vary or discharge was also highlighted. The Return Day was specified as 24 April 2019 at 10:30 am.
The Order and other documents (including the Claim Form) were personally served on the defendant on 16 April 2019. Also on that date, the claimant's solicitors, Kerman & Co. (“Kerman”), wrote to the defendant at his home address enclosing an application notice for the Return Day.
The defendant did not comply with the Order by serving any affidavit by 18 April 2019. Nor did he attend on the Return Day. In such circumstances, inevitably, Waksman J in effect continued the previous Order of Stewart J: he also ordered the defendant to pay costs of £12,679 by 8 May 2019. That order of Waksman J was served on the defendant thereafter.
It is common ground that on 29 April 2019 the defendant telephoned Mr Thorndyke, an associate partner of Kerman. He said that he had received the paperwork. According to Mr Thorndyke, the defendant also said that he could not afford to pay the costs of over £12,500 thus far awarded against him. He also referred to mental health problems and to having been in a mental health hospital and to being on prescription drugs; and said that he could not read. It was suggested to him by Mr Thorndyke that he go to the Citizens Advice Bureau. He was also reminded of the salient terms of the Order of Stewart J with regard to the production of information. Nothing further happened, however.
During June 2019 Kerman wrote a number of letters to the defendant about proposed proceedings for contempt. An application to commit for contempt of court and an application for judgment in default were issued...
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