Williams v Globe Coaches (A Firm)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS,LORD JUSTICE WAITE,LORD JUSTICE OTTON |
| Judgment Date | 18 December 1995 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1995] EWCA Civ J1218-3 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Docket Number | CCRTI 95/0585/G |
| Date | 18 December 1995 |
[1995] EWCA Civ J1218-3
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE CARDIFF COUNTY COURT
ON APPEAL FROM THE PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT
(Judge Michael Burr) (Appeal)
(His Honour Judge Wigmore) (Appeal)
Before: The Master of the Rolls (Sir Thomas Bingham) Lord Justice Waite Lord Justice Otton
CCRTI 95/0585/G
CCRTI 95/0654/G
MR. E GLASGOW QC & MR. I BULLOCK (Instructed by Messrs. Lyons Davidson, Bristol) appeared on behalf of the Appellant, Susan Williams
MR. J BELL (Instructed by Messrs. Cole & Cole, Berkshire) appeared on behalf of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, Globe Coaches & Peter Evans
MR. E GLASGOW QC & MR. A CHIPPINDALL (Instructed by Messrs. Blight, Broad & Skinnard, Cornwall) appeared on behalf of the Appellant, Julia Derby
MR. J ROYCE QC & MR. R STEAD (Instructed by Messrs. Cartwrights, Bristol) appeared on behalf of the Respondent, Ginsters Cornish Pasties Ltd.
Monday 18 December 1995
THE MASTER OF THE ROLLSOn 1 October 1990 a new county court rule was brought into force. This was Order 17, rule 11 which applied to a wide range of actions a new procedural regime for the giving of automatic directions in the county court. This rule has given rise to many different problems of interpretation, and different judges up and down the country have reached different conclusions as to how the rules should be understood and applied. It was plainly desirable that there should be a clear and uniform understanding and application of the rules, and for that purpose six test cases were assembled and heard together, now reported under the name of the first of the cases, Rastin v British Steel & Ors [1994] 1 WLR 732. That series of decisions achieved part, at least, of its purpose, in that certain of the questions which had given rise to differing answers were, as it was hoped, resolved.
There has, however, been a stream of additional cases reaching this Court raising different aspects of the problem. There have been many decisions in accordance with the principles laid down in Rastin. It is, however, quite plain that there are many problems continuing to arise. There are floods of cases coming before district judges, many appeals to circuit judges and a formidable total of appeals and applications for leave reaching this Court. Again we have assembled a sample of test cases which we shall hear during this week and on which we shall give rulings. These rulings will not resolve all the outstanding cases either here or below, but we very much hope that they will resolve a large number of them.
It would be extremely tedious in a series of judgments such as this if we were to recite the full terms of Order 17, rule 11 in each, or indeed in any, of the judgments, and in many cases it will be unnecessary to go into the facts in any great detail. It would, however, I think, be convenient if at the outset there were some common vocabulary, and accordingly I have suggested to counsel that certain terms might conveniently be used.
Under Order 17, rule 11(3) the automatic timetable runs from the date on which pleadings are deemed to be closed. That date is defined in rule 11(11) and is 14 days after the delivery of a defence in accordance with Order 9, rule 2; or, where a counterclaim is served with the defence, 28 days after the delivery of the defence. That is the date on which pleadings are deemed to be closed and it is of fundamental importance since it is the date from which the timetable begins. I have accordingly suggested that one might call this "the trigger date", being the date which triggers the operation of the timetable.
If no request is made to the proper officer to fix a hearing day within 15 months of the trigger date, the action is to be automatically struck out under rule 11(9). In saying that, I bear in mind the point made in the course of argument that under rule 11(9) the date is specified as 9 months after the expiry of the initial six-month period for seeking a hearing date or any other period fixed by the Court. This rule was considered in Rastin and the other guideline cases, and the Draconian effect of this rule has provoked widespread difficulty. The fifteen-month date, in the absence of any other order by the Court, is the date on which the guillotine falls and it is, I hope, convenient to refer to this as "the guillotine date".
The first two appeals which we have, and which have been heard this morning, both concern the effect of a county court form which appears on page 2014 of the 1995 County Court Practice and which is numbered N450. It is headed "Notice that automatic directions apply" and makes reference to Order 17, rule 11. There are boxes at the top of the form which contain room for the name of the plaintiff and the defendant to be inserted, the name of the county court with a reference to the number given to the case and the plaintiff's and the defendant's respective references. Then there is a box for the date to be inserted. The language of the form following these details begins in this way:
"The court has received a defence in this case which is one to which automatic directions apply. This means you will not have to come to a court hearing or a District Judge to give directions, that is, to tell you what you have to do to prepare your case for trial. Instead these notes tell you what you must do and the timetable you must follow. If you want to change any of these directions you must apply to the court."
Then, in heavy type:
" The timetable begins 14 days after the date given above, or 28 days if a counterclaim was filed with the defence."
One has, therefore, a date and a clear statement that the trigger date is 14 days after that date or 28 days if a counterclaim was filed with the defence. There then follow in the form a series of steps described in turn and making reference to automatic striking-out if a date for trial has not been requested within 15 months or within 9 months of any date set by the court for requesting a date for trial.
The form is one that has been approved but not prescribed. By "approved" I mean that it is a form which has the approval of the Lord Chancellor or his Department. It is not, however, "prescribed", by which I mean that there is no county court rule which requires such a notice to be served or in any way specifies the content of such a notice. It seems reasonably plain that the object of this form is to alert recipients to the timetable, to remind them of the effect of Order 17 rule 11 and to encourage compliance with the automatic directions regime. It is also clearly intended to alert recipients to the sanction if the hearing date is not requested within the time limit.
This is a form which is routinely sent out from county courts to litigants without any judicial intervention or decision of any kind. In such cases it would seem clear that the sending of the form does not involve any exercise of the Court's jurisdiction by a judge or a district judge as provided by Order 1, rule 8. It is merely an administrative act intended, as I say, for the assistance of litigants and perhaps particularly litigants appearing in person.
In each of these two appeals there is a clear finding by the judge involved (which is in no way challenged) that the forms N450 was despatched in this way. There was no judge who reviewed the timetable at any stage and decided that any timetable different from that prescribed in the rules should apply. In such cases, therefore, the description that I have given of an administrative act is clearly...
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Re Order 17, Rule 11 of the County Court Rules; Bannister v S.G.B. Plc and Others and other Cases
...apply that sanction where the failure to meet the timetable arises through no fault on the part of the Plaintiff. 149For this reason Williams v Globe Coaches lays down a different guideline. That case was concerned with an error on the part of the court administration, but there is no reaso......
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Dermot Gerard Richard Walsh (Appellant/Claimant) v Andre Martin Misseldine (Respondent/Defendant)
...the claimant, understandably told him that he had not come prepared to deal with reinstatement as such. The judge then referred to Williams v Globe Coaches Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 553, from which he derived the proposition that in the absence of very special circumstances the court should be willi......
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Perry v Wong
...proper officer to fix a date for the hearing. The phrase "the trigger date" is taken from the judgment of Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Williams v Globe Coaches [1996] 1 WLR 553 at 556C. 26 If an extension of time is not obtained, it is said, no valid request can be made after the six months hav......