Hall v Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company Ltd
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Chancellor,Lord Reid,Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest,Lord Hodson,Lord Guest |
| Judgment Date | 12 February 1964 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1964] UKHL J0212-3 |
| Docket Number | No. 5. |
| Court | House of Lords |
| Date | 12 February 1964 |
[1964] UKHL J0212-3
House of Lords
Lord Chancellor
Lord Reid
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest
Lord Hodson
Lord Guest
After hearing Counsel as well on Monday the 7th as on Tuesday the 8th, days of October last, upon the Petition and Appeal of Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company Limited, having a place of business at Govan Road, Glasgow, praying, That the matter of the Interlocutors set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely, an Interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary in Scotland (Lord Walker) of the 9th of March 1962 and also an Interlocutor of the Lords of Session there of the Second Division of the 7th of November 1962, might be reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, and that the said Interlocutors might be reversed, varied or altered, or that the Petitioners might have such other relief in the premises as to Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, might seem meet; as also upon the Case of Peter Scott Hall, lodged in answer to the said Appeal; and due consideration had this day of what was offered on either side in this Cause:
It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen assembled, That the said Interlocutors of the 9th day of March 1962 and of the 7th day of November 1962, complained of in the said Appeal, be, and the same are hereby, Recalled: And it is further Ordered, That the said Cause be, and the same is hereby, remitted back to the Court of Session in Scotland with a Direction to pronounce Decree of absolvitor, and to proceed as accords: And it is further Ordered, That the Respondent do pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Appellants the Costs of the Action in the Court of Session and also the Costs incurred by them in respect of the said Appeal to this House, the amount of such last-mentioned Costs to be certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments: And it is also further Ordered, That unless the Costs, certified as aforesaid, shall be paid to the parties entitled to the same within one calendar month from the date of the certificate thereof, the Court of Session in Scotland, or the Judge acting as Vacation Judge, shall issue such summary process or diligence for the recovery of such Costs as shall be lawful and necessary.
My Lords,
The Respondent, Mr. Hall, a welder employed by the Appellants, the Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company Limited, shortly before the end of his shift on the 15th February, 1960, was walking along a passage way in the Appellants' boiler shop when he trod on a piece of metal, slipped and fell, sustaining an injury to his left leg as a result of which he was unable to work for some weeks.
He instituted proceedings against the Appellants for damages, alleging in his condescendence that his accident was caused by a breach of statutory duty on the part of the Appellants in that they failed to discharge the duty imposed on them by the Factories Acts of 1937 and 1959.
Section 25 (1) of the Factories Act, 1937 , as amended by section 4 of the Factories Act 1959 (now replaced by section 28 (1) of the Factories Act, 1961), reads as follows:
"All floors, steps, stairs, passages and gangways shall be of sound construction and properly maintained and shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, be kept free from any obstruction and from any substance likely to cause persons to slip."
The Respondent thought that he had trodden on a piece of bolt or round bar. A Mr. Kelly who was close to him when he fell, said he noticed "round pieces of rod lying about". The Respondent also when he was helped on to his feet noticed "quite a few pieces of metal lying around".
It was contended on behalf of the Appellants that the duty so far as reasonably practicable to keep floors, passages, etc. free from any substance likely to cause persons to slip did not extend so far as to impose a duty to prevent, so far as reasonably practicable, any such substance getting on to the floor but only arose if such a substance got on to the floor.
I do not regard this contention as well founded. The duty is so far as reasonably practicable to keep all floors, passage ways etc. free from obstruction and from such substances. One way in which this duty can be discharged is by taking such steps as are reasonably practicable to prevent something getting on the floors, passage ways, etc. which is an obstruction or is such a substance.
In this case there was no evidence showing how the piece of metal on which the Respondent trod came to be in the passage way.
The Appellant in evidence said he thought that the pieces of metal had come from a guillotine machine but he had no idea how they came to be there. They might, he said, have come from some fitters' benches. Mr. Kelly said there were bits of screwed rod and also of round bar lying about He, too, thought that they must have come from the guillotine. Mr. Donovan, another witness for the Respondent who was with Mr. Kelly at the time, said there were some sawn-off bolts and some sheared ones. The ones which were sawn, he said, could not have come from the guillotine, and he had no idea where they had come from.
Mr. Gowans, the Head Foreman Boilermaker, the next morning inspected the place where the Respondent had fallen and saw there two or three round pieces of steel three-quarters of an inch to an inch and a quarter in length. He said they had not been sheared and so could not have come from the guillotine. He expressed the view that they had not come from the boiler-shop. Mr. Duff, who says he was shown a piece of metal by Mr. Gowans a week later, (whereas Mr. Gowans said he showed it to Mr. Duff the day after the accident) said it appeared to have been cut and not sheared by the guillotine. He thought it might have come from the fitters' benches.
The Lord Ordinary thought that on a balance of probabilities the pieces had come from the fitters' benches in the boiler-shop.
While one is reluctant to interfere with a conclusion reached by the judge who has heard and seen the witnesses, I cannot agree that in the light of the evidence to which I have referred there is any balance of probability in favour of the pieces having come from the fitters' benches. I can find no evidence upon which one can form any conclusion as to from where these pieces had come.
The Respondent in his condescendence averred that:
"It was reasonably practicable" for the Appellants "to have kept said passage clear of said object" (on which the Respondent slipped) "by instructing their employees to refrain from throwing or leaving bolts, pieces of rod or similar objects there".
It was further averred that:
"Had the defenders fulfilled the duties incumbent upon them in the circumstances …"
the accident would not have happened.
The Appellants in their answer said they had discharged their statutory duty and asserted that they took all reasonable steps to keep the paths and passage ways clear, and they had, it was asserted, a reasonable system of cleaning in operation and in the circumstances it was not reasonably practicable for the bolt or rod to be removed from the floor prior to the accident.
In the absence of any knowledge of how the piece of metal came to be in the passage way, I cannot myself conclude that giving instructions of the kind suggested would have prevented the accident, or that failure to give such instructions caused it. There is no evidence that the pieces of metal were thrown by any employee or left there by any employee. They may have rolled there from some part of the boiler-shop. They may have fallen off a bench or from a barrow of scrap being taken through the shop.
The Respondent who, when not working in a ship, was employed in the boiler-shop testified as follows: —
"Q. And you would know that in the course of work various bits of metal and so on find their way on to the floor?
A. Yes.
Q. And was the general rule that everyone working there had to try and keep the place tidy and keep bits of metal off the floor?
A. Yes.
Q. Everyone knew that?
A. Yes.
Q. And, as you have said, if you ever saw any piece of metal, then the obvious reaction was to kick it out of the way?
A. Yes.
Q. So that everyone knew that they had to keep the floor clean as far as possible?
A. I suppose so.
Q. Well, you know that?
A. Yes."
Mr. Kelly gave the following evidence to the same effect.
"Q. Everyone working in the boiler-shop knew, didn't they, that pieces of scrap metal should not be left lying about?
A. Well, not officially. There was no notice or anything like that telling you things. It was left to your own discretion.
Q. But you did not need a notice to tell you not to leave things lying about, did you?
A. No. It depends on the case. Common sense tells you not to leave them lying about.
Q. And I take it that, in addition to that, everyone working in the boiler-shop would know that there were sweepers going around cleaning up every now and then?
A. Yes.
Q. And from Messrs. Fairfield's point of view, would you agree that the only way they could keep the floor of the shop clear was to have the sweepers going around regularly?
A. That's right, yes."
Mr. Donovan, the last witness for the Respondent, was asked:
"Q. I suppose everyone knows that they have to keep the place tidy and they should clear them" (pieces of metal) "aside—either put them in a box or kick them aside?
A. Yes."
In the light of the evidence cited, it may perhaps be doubted whether the exhibition of notices telling employees not to throw or leave bolts, pieces of rod or similar objects on the floor or giving such instructions in other ways would have materially reduced the possibility of such a piece of metal as that on which the Respondent trod getting on to the passage...
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