Hennell v Ranaboldo
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS,LORD JUSTICE RUSSELL |
| Judgment Date | 18 October 1963 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1963] EWCA Civ J1018-1 |
| Date | 18 October 1963 |
| Court | Court of Appeal |
[1963] EWCA Civ J1018-1
In The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal
From Mr Justice Widgery
The Master of the Rolls
(Lord Denning)
Lord Justice Diplock and
Lord Justice Russell
This is an ordinary case of personal injuries. A young man was riding his motor cycle along Wands worth Road and he came into collision with the defendant who was driving a motor car. He was injured. His right big and second toes required imputation, his right leg was broken and his right knee dislocated. He was off work for six months or so, but he has made a quite good recovery. He can carry on with his work normally but he is restricted in his recreations. The question is whether the case shall be tried by a jury or by a Judge alone. The Master has ordered it to be tried by a jury and his decision has been affirmed by Mr Justice Widgery. The defendant appeals to this Court.
There is no doubt that the matter is completely in the discretion of the Judge: see Hope v. Great Western Railway, 1937, 2 King's Bench, p. 130. Under Order 36, Rule 1, the discretion of the Judge is an absolute one. So be it. The discretion is absolute. It will not be interfered with by this Court unless there is some sufficient ground, such as that the Judge has taken into account matters which he ought not to have taken into account or has not taken into account matters which he should have taken into account. It is said that the Judge here took something into account which he ought not to have done, namely, that he thought it would be a good thing if occasionally an action such as this was tried by a jury so as to be, so to speak, a sample case in order to see what damages a jury would award. I must say that if the Judge took such a consideration into account, it would vitiate the exercise of his discretion. I do not think it right to expect any jury in any one case to give a figure which would be a guide for other cases. One set of twelve men may come to a different conclusion on the self-same facts from another twelve men.
This is an ordinary typical running down case. The injuries were serious but, I fear, very usual. It is just thesort of case which is tried up and down the country by Judges alone without juries; and they have done so with, I believe, universal satisfaction. Trial by Judge alone has this advantage, that Judges do know the sort of scale of damages which are awarded in these cases. And it has the further advantage, that if the Judge should give a sum which is wholly out of proportion to the accepted scale, it can be set right in this Court, whereas it could not be done, or at all events not so easily done, in the case of a jury. Further, it is important in these cases that there should be some degree of uniformity, not uniformity for its own sake, but in order to do justice as between plaintiff and plaintiff, as well as between defendant and defendant. In order to achieve uniformity, a case of this kind should be recognised nowadays as fit and proper to be tried by a Judge alone unless there is something exceptional in it. And it must be remembered that trial by jury involves extra costs to the parties and extra work on the members of the public which is not warranted in the circumstances. Seeing that this is quite an ordinary case, I cannot help feeling that the Judge here can only have departed from the general rule because he thought it desirable to treat it, as it has been said in argument, as a "guineapig" case. As I feel he must have been influenced by such a consideration, I think his discretion was not properly exercised and can be interfered with by this Court. This Court is, therefore, in a position to exercise its own discretion. And I must say that in cases of this kind I feel the discretion of a Judge is well exercised in ordering trial by Judge alone, except in very special circumstances.
I see no special circumstances here and I would, therefore, allow this appeal and order trial by Judge alone. LORD JUDTICE DIPLOCK: I agree. The discretion of the Judge in determining the made of trial in a case of this description is expressed in the relevant rule, Order 36, rule 3, to be an"absolute" one, but, as pointed out by this Court in the unreported case of Whipps v. Powell Duffryn Engineering Co, Ltd., the addition of the word "absolute" adds nothing, for any discretion which is not qualified is an absolute discretion without the addition of that word. But, like all discretions which have to be exercised by Judges, the Judge in exercising it must act judicially, that is to say he must consider what is just...
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Watts v Manning
...in trial by jury, it will cost more than trial by Judge alone. Then there were certain reasons which were stated very clearly in Hennell v. Ranaboldo. reported in this Court in 1963, 1 Weekly Law Reports, page 1391, and the observations are to be found at page 1392 in the Master of the Roll......
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...is it to be tried? The Master and the Judge have ordered trial by jury. The defendants appeal. They say that this Court recently in Hennell v. Ranaboldo. 1963, 1 Weekly Law Reports, page 1391, laid down the principle that a case of this kind should be tried by a Judge alone, unless there is......
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