Method Development Ltd v Jones

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeLord JUSTICE SALMON,LORD JUSTICE FENTON ATKINSON,LORD JUSTICE KARMINSKI
Judgment Date10 November 1970
Judgment citation (vLex)[1970] EWCA Civ J1110-4
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
Date10 November 1970

[1970] EWCA Civ J1110-4

In The Supreme Court of Judicature

The Court of Appeal

(Civil Division)

(From: His Honour Judge McKee - Leeds County Court)

Before:

Lord Justice Salmon

Lord Justice Fenton Atkinson and

Lord Justice Karminski

In the Matter of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954:

Between:
Method Developments Limited
Applicants
- and -
Kenneth Walpron Jones Edward Joshua Varley and William Whalley
Respondents

Mr. LIONEL BLUNDELL, Q.C. and Mr. ASHLEY BRAMALL (instructed by Mr. J.G. Haley) appeared on behalf of the Appellants (Respondents).

Mr. STANLEY GILL (instructed by Messrs, Gregory Rowcliffe & Co., Agents for Messrs. Craven, Clegg & Theaker, Leeds) appeared on behalf of the Respondents (Applicants).

Lord JUSTICE SALMON
1

The appellants are the trustees of the National and Local Government Officers Association. In their capacity of trustees they hold a lease of the whole of the second floor of Rippon House, Westgate, Leeds. They occupy premises on this floor which cover just over 1,500 square feet. Since 1963 they have sublet the other part of the second floor to the respondents, who carry on business there as business consultants. The part let to the respondents (whom I will call the tenants) is just over 1,800 square feet. The sublease was terminable by notice expiring at the end of March, 1970. The appellants (whom I will call the landlords) became increasingly aware between 1963 and 1969 that the part of the second floor which they occupied was much too small for their requirements: their activities were developing and they were extremely cramped. Accordingly, on the 12th September, 1969, they served a notice on the tenants under the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, to terminate their business tenancy. The landlords sought to terminate that. tenancy and to refuse to grant any new tenancy on the ground set out in section 30 (1) (g) of the Act. It reads as follows: "The grounds on which a landlord may oppose an application under sub-section 1 of section 24 of this Act are such of the following grounds as may be stated in the landlord's notice under section 25 of this Act or, as the case may be, under sub-section 6 of section 26 thereof, that is to say…": then (g) t "subject as hereinafter provided, that on the termination of the current tenancy the landlord intends to occupy the holding for the purposes, or partly for the purposes, of a business to be carried on by him therein, or as his residence". Then sub-section 2 makes some provision relating to paragraph (g) of sub-section 1 but it is not material for the present purposes.

2

The notice which the landlords served was in the statutory form and informed the tenants that they were required within two months after the giving of the notice to notify the landlords in' writing whether or not they would be willing to give up possession.The tenants indicated that they were not willing to give up possession, and they asked for a new lease to he granted to them under the Act.

3

The matter came before the learned County Court judge at Leeds, and the question was whether the landlords had made out the ground specified in paragraph (g) of sub-section 1 of section 30 of the Act, that is to say, had the landlords established that they intended on the termination of the current tenancy to occupy the holding for the purposes or partly for the purposes of a business to be carried on by them in those premises.

4

It appears that the premises sublet to the tenants consisted of one large undivided room which occupied a little more than three-quarters of the whole of their holding and another room which occupied a little less than a quarter of their holding. The landlords' case was that they intended to occupy the holding, amongst other things, in order to provide themselves with a store C and dispatch room, a room for an administrative assistant and typist, and a waiting room. They intended immediately to carve out of the premises let to the tenant the accommodation which they required. For this purpose they would have to construct rooms. To begin with the accommodation which they used would D cover about 700 square feet. Within a year of obtaining possession they would be requiring to use more and more of the available space so that at the end of the year the only part of the premises now occupied by the tenant which would not be used for the purposes of the landlords' business would be something just under 400 square feet. Therefore their immediate intention was to use a substantial part of the premises in question for the purposes of their business and, within a short time, to use the whole of the premises for the purposes of their business except for the 400 or so square feet to which I have referred. They had not really made up their...

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9 cases
  • S Franses Ltd v The Cavendish Hotel (London) Ltd
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division
    • 3 Julio 2017
    ...Counsel are in disagreement as to whether Ms Wicks' point on section 31(2) is covered by Court of Appeal authority, in particular Method Developments v Jones [1971] 1 WLR 168. That was a case on ground (g), not ground (f), and the point is made that section 31(2) does not cover ground (g). ......
  • Inclusive Technology Ltd v Williamson
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 7 Mayo 2009
    ...has to show an intention to start to carry out the work on which he relies within a reasonable time after the termination: see Method Developments Ltd v Jones [1971] 1 All ER 1027. 5 In this case, as the judge found, the landlord had by June 2006 formed a genuine intention to refurbish the ......
  • Dolgellau Golf Club v Hett
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 3 Abril 1998
    ... ... personal qualities and the financial muscle to do what he genuinely intended, and that his method of going about it would reasonably depend on what, if any, agreement he and the club might make ... ...
  • Warwickshire Aviation Ltd v Littler Investments Ltd
    • United Kingdom
    • Chancery Division
    • 25 Marzo 2019
    ...the current tenancy” in ground 30(1)(f) include a reasonable time after the tenancy has terminated. The fourth appellant also cited Method Development v Jones [1971] 1 WLR 168 and London Hilton Jewellers v Hilton International Hotels [1990] 20 EG 37 The argument was that on the evidence th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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