Michael Mansell v Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council Croudace Portland and Another (Interested Parties)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice Lindblom,Lord Justice Hickinbottom,The Chancellor of the High Court |
| Judgment Date | 08 September 2017 |
| Neutral Citation | [2017] EWCA Civ 1314 |
| Docket Number | Case No: C1/2016/4488 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Date | 08 September 2017 |
and
[2017] EWCA Civ 1314
The Chancellor of the High Court
Lord Justice Lindblom
and
Lord Justice Hickinbottom
Case No: C1/2016/4488
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
PLANNING COURT
MR JUSTICE GARNHAM
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Ms Annabel Graham Paul (instructed by Richard Buxton Environmental and Public Law) for the Appellant
Mr Juan Lopez (instructed by Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council Legal Services) for the Respondent
The interested parties did not appear and were not represented
Hearing date: 4 July 2017
Judgment Approved by the court for handing down
(subject to editorial corrections)
Introduction
Should the judge in the court below have quashed a local planning authority's grant of planning permission for the redevelopment of the site of a large barn and a bungalow to provide four dwellings? That is what we must decide in this appeal. It is contended that the authority misdirected itself in considering a "fallback position" available to the landowner, and also that it misapplied the "presumption in favour of sustainable development" in the National Planning Policy Framework ("the NPPF") – a question that can now be dealt with in the light of this court's recent decision in Barwood Strategic Land II LLP v East Staffordshire Borough Council [2017] EWCA Civ 893.
The appellant, Mr Michael Mansell, appeals against the order of Garnham J., dated 10 November 2016, dismissing his claim for judicial review of the planning permission granted on 13 January 2016 by the respondent, Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council, for development proposed by the first interested party, Croudace Portland, on land owned by the second interested party, the East Malling Trust, at Rocks Farm, The Rocks Road, East Malling. The proposal was to demolish the barn and the bungalow on the land and to construct four detached dwellings, with garages and gardens. Mr Mansell lives in a neighbouring property, at 132–136 The Rocks Road – a grade II listed building. He was an objector.
It was common ground that the proposal was in conflict with the development plan. Rocks Farm is outside the village of East Malling to its south- east, within the "countryside" as designated in the Tonbridge and Malling Borough Core Strategy. The site of the proposed development extends to about 1.3 hectares. The barn, about 600 square metres in area, had once been used to store apples. The bungalow was lived in by a caretaker. The application for planning permission came before the council's Area 3 Planning Committee on 7 January 2016. In his reports to committee the council's planning officer recommended that planning permission be granted, and that recommendation was accepted by the committee. The officer guided the members on the "fallback position" that was said to arise, at least partly, through the "permitted development" rights for changes of use from the use of a building as an agricultural building to its use as a dwelling-house, under Class Q in Part 3 of Schedule 2 to the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 ("the GPDO").
Mr Mansell's challenge to the planning permission attacked the officer's approach to the "fallback position" and his assessment of the proposal on its planning merits. Garnham J. dismissed the claim for judicial review on all grounds. Permission to appeal was granted by McCombe L.J. on 21 February 2017.
The issues in the appeal
The appeal raises three main issues:
(1) whether the council correctly interpreted and lawfully applied the provisions of Class Q in the GPDO (ground 1 in the appellant's notice);
(2) whether the council was entitled to accept there was a real prospect of the fallback development being implemented (ground 2); and
(3) whether the council misunderstood or misapplied the "presumption in favour of sustainable development" (ground 3).
Did the council correctly interpret and lawfully apply the provisions of Class Q?
When the council determined the application for planning permission the permitted development rights under Class Q were in these terms, so far is relevant here:
"Q. Permitted development
Development consisting of –
(a) a change of use of a building and any land within its curtilage from a use as an agricultural building to a use falling within Class C3 (dwellinghouses) of the Schedule to the Use Classes Order; and
(b) building operations reasonably necessary to convert the building referred to in paragraph (a) to a use falling within Class C3 (dwellinghouses) of that Schedule.
Q.1 Development not permitted
Development is not permitted by Class Q if –
…
(b) the cumulative floor space of the existing building or buildings changing use under Class Q within an established agricultural unit exceeds 450 square metres;
(c) the cumulative number of separate dwellinghouses developed under Class Q within an established agricultural unit exceeds 3;
…
(g) the development would result in the external dimensions of the building extending beyond the external dimensions of the existing building at any given point;
(h) the development under Class Q (together with any previous development under Class Q) would result in a building or buildings having more than 450 square metres of floor space having a use falling within Class C3 (dwellinghouses) of the Schedule to the Use Classes Order;
… ."
The permitted development rights under Class Q are subject to several "Conditions" in paragraph Q.2, none of them controversial here.
In section 6 of his main report to committee for its meeting on 7 January 2016 the officer dealt at length with the "Determining Issues". In discussing those issues he considered the "fallback position" in paragraphs 6.14 to 6.19:
"6.14 In practical terms for this site, the new permitted development rights mean that the existing agricultural barn could be converted into three residential units. Some representations point out that only a proportion of the barn could be converted in such a manner (up to 450sqm) but the remainder – a small proportion in terms of the overall footprint – could conceivably be left unconverted and the resultant impacts for the site in terms of the amount of residential activity would be essentially the same. The building could be physically adapted in certain ways that would allow for partial residential occupation and the extensive area of hardstanding which exists between the building and the northern boundary could be used for parking and turning facilities.
6.15 The existing bungalow within the site could be replaced in accordance with policy CP14 with a new residential building provided that it was not materially larger than the existing building. Such a scenario would, in effect, give rise to the site being occupied by a total of four residential units albeit of a different form and type to that proposed by this application. This provides a realistic fallback position in terms of how the site could be developed.
6.16 I appreciate that discussion concerning realistic 'fallback' positions is rather complicated but, in making an assessment of any application for development, we are bound to consider what the alternatives might be for a site: in terms of what could occur on the site without requiring any permission at all (historic use rights) or using permitted development rights for alternative forms of development.
6.17 In this instance a scheme confined to taking advantage of permitted development would, in my view, be to the detriment of the site as a whole in visual terms. Specifically, it would have to be developed in a contrived and piecemeal fashion in order to conform to the requirements of the permitted development rights, including the need to adhere to the restrictions on the floor space that can be converted using the permitted development rights.
6.18 I would also mention that should the applicant wish to convert the entire barn for residential purposes, above the permitted development thresholds, such a scheme (subject to detailed design) would wholly accord with adopted policy. Again, this provides a strong indicator as to how the site could be developed in an alternative way that would still retain the same degree of residential activity as proposed by the current application but in a more contrived manner and with a far more direct physical relationship with the nearest residential properties.
6.19 The current proposal therefore, in my view, offers an opportunity for a more comprehensive and coherent redevelopment of the site as opposed to a more piecemeal form of development that would arise should the applicant seek to undertake to implement permitted development rights."
For Mr Mansell, Ms Annabel Graham Paul submitted to us, as she did to the judge, that the officer's advice in those six paragraphs betrays a misunderstanding of the provisions of Class Q in the GPDO, in particular sub-paragraphs Q.1(b) and Q.1(h). She argued that the restriction to 450 square metres in sub-paragraph Q.1(b) applies to the total floor space of the agricultural building or buildings in question, not to the floor space actually "changing use". Before the judge, though not in her submissions in this court, Ms Graham Paul sought to bolster that contention with a passage in an inspector's decision letter relating to a proposal for development on a site referred to by the judge as "Mannings Farm". The inspector had observed that "[the] floor space of the existing building … far exceeds the maximum permitted threshold, of 450 sq m, as set out in [sub-paragraph] Q.1(b)", and that "the intention is to reduce the size...
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