R SIGGS, FRENCH and Others v Chief Constable of Sussex and The Police COMPLAINTS Authority
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | MR JUSTICE ELIAS,MR JUSTICE WILKIE |
| Judgment Date | 20 December 2004 |
| Neutral Citation | [2004] EWHC 3217 (Admin),[2002] EWHC 2528 (Admin) |
| Docket Number | CO/1244/2002,Case No HQ 0101747/36/R/2004 |
| Date | 20 December 2004 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
[2002] EWHC 2528 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION THE
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Mr Justice Elias
CO/1244/2002
MR T LANGDALE QC, MR P GIBBS (FRENCH) AND MR J BEGGS (SIGGS) (instructed by Goodall Barnett James, Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the CLAIMANTS
MR M CHAWLE QC and MR A CHAPLAIN (instructed by The Sussex Police Authority) appeared on behalf of the DEFENDANT
MR H KEITH (instructed by the Police Complaints Authority) appeared on behalf of the INTERESTED PARTY
I am going to give a very brief judgment in this matter because it has been resolved between the parties but, because it was resolved in the light of some indications I gave as to the way in which I was approaching the matter, I think it right that I should give a very brief judgment.
The essential facts are these. The claimants are serving officers in the Sussex Police. There was an instance where a police suspect was shot dead by a member of the Sussex Firearms Team during an armed operation. Without going into any of the detail, that led to criminal prosecutions against both the claimants for misfeasance in public office.
On 22nd May 2001 both claimants were acquitted when the Crown offered no evidence. There had been, prior to the trial, an indication from the relevant officer at the Sussex Police that he took the view that it would not be appropriate for disciplinary charges to be preferred after the criminal proceedings. However, the matter went to the Police Complaints Authority and they recommended that disciplinary proceedings should be taken. Various charges have now been laid against these two claimants.
They submitted that they ought not now to face disciplinary charges. They prayed in aid section 104 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which provides as follows:
"Where a member of a police force has been convicted or acquitted of a criminal offence, he shall not be liable to be charged with any offence against discipline which is in substance the same as the offence of which he has been convicted or acquitted."
The submission for the two claimants was that, in substance, they were now facing the same offence as that of which they had been acquitted. I initially felt, I must confess, that there was nothing really in this point because misfeasance in public office focuses on intentional conduct, knowing abuse of power, whereas negligence obviously focuses on something far less than that.
I heard a number of reasons why this matter should not proceed, in addition to the one that I have mentioned, namely that the substance of the offences was the same. It was suggested that there was no clear evidence that there had in fact been a proper decision reached by the Sussex Police Authority to initiate these disciplinary offences and it was suggested at one stage that they may have acted at the say so of the Complaints Authority. I do not think the evidence supports that.
There were complaints that the Sussex Police Authority had not given a proper reasoned decision as to why they had changed their view. Again, unless there is something specific in the regulations which has not been drawn to my attention, it does not seem to me that, in a discretion of this kind, they needed to give reasons.
It was also said that, having given an indication that there would be no disciplinary action taken, the Police Authority were somehow estopped from going back on that representation. That seems to me to have no realistic prospect of success because, if the disciplinary charges are not in substance the same, then it seems to me that no such representation has been made. There are other problems with that in any event. I do not think it can be said that representations were ever made to the individual officers, as opposed to recommendations made to the PCA.
Be that as it may, when one looks at the substance of the charges as currently formulated, it did seem to me that, in particular in relation to DCI Siggs, there was force in the submission of Mr Langdale that, although in form they appeared to be charges framed in negligence, they could only in reality be seen as charges alleging intentional conduct.
Having indicated that it was this area that caused me most concern, the matter was reconsidered by the Chief Constable and the charges have now been reformulated in a way which is acceptable to all parties. In the case of the claimant French, the original charges were in fact framed in a manner which was consistent with allegations of negligence and there has been no modification of the charges in his case.
I say no more about it, save that I am sure it is a matter of real importance that disciplinary proceedings of this kind should be heard speedily and that these issues are not left hanging over the heads of these officers for any longer than is absolutely necessary. They have had to live with this matter now for some four years. It is a long time in any professional career to have these continual worries. I hope the matter will now go promptly to the disciplinary hearing.
Can I thank all counsel involved?
My Lord, there is, I think, just simply the question of costs that needs to be resolved. There might be an argument for saying that costs should lie with the individual parties, as it were, but I think I must make this point, not just because of arithmetic, in terms of an apportionment of costs. As a result of today's hearing, six—if my arithmetic is right—charges, so far as Mr Siggs is concerned, have fallen by the wayside. There therefore should be an apportionment more in favour of Mr Siggs than just—if I can put it this way—a 50/50 apportionment as between the parties. I think that is all I can sensibly say about it.
MR CHOWLE: My Lord, my submission is that the costs should fall where they lie at present. The application was brought under a number of different heads. This particular head began to carry rather greater weight that was apparent originally. In my submission there should be at this stage no order for costs.
Yes, I do not think there should be any order as to costs in this case, Mr Langdale. There is no obligation strictly for the defendants to turn up today. The fact that they have done so—I will not say unreasonably so, but the fact that they have done so has, I think, assisted in fact in resolving the problem in part. I think it is fair to say that, although there was a general concern you had about the disciplinary proceedings in total, it had not actually been put in terms that these charges might be looked at by the prosecution in order to consider whether they did properly sustain a negligence claim. However, I understand that that was implicit in a sense in your whole attack.
I think in all the circumstances it would not be right for me to require him to bear the costs. It is after all still a permission hearing.
My Lord, of course.
Well, I ought to ask the claimants formally: do you wish me to treat this as a withdrawal of the application or do I formally dismiss it?
I think probably withdraw is appropriate, unless there is any disagreement.
MR GIBBS: I agree.
In all the circumstances I think it should be withdrawn.
[2004] EWHC 3217 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Mr Justice Wilkie
Case No HQ 0101747/36/R/2004
MR R GLANCY QC (instructed by Messrs Pattinson & Brewer, York) appeared on behalf of THE RESPONDENT/CLAIMANT
MR FAULKS QC (instructed by Messrs ……………, Lewes) appeared on behalf OF THE APPLICANT/DEFENDANT
Monday 20 December 2004
This is an application by the defendant to strike out a number of crucial paragraphs in the Particulars of claim of each of five claimants whose cases, though not yet formally consolidated, arise out of the same basic facts.
The applications are pursuant to CPR 3.4 and CPR 24.2. CPR 3.4(2) provides that the court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court (a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim. The note to this particular provision reminds the court that the ECHR Article 6(1), right of access to a court, may require caution on the part of courts in exercising this power to strike out in a case which appears to disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending a claim, particularly where it would be applying the rules in such a way as to exclude an entire category of claims from the courts or confer blanket immunity from civil liability on particular groups. Reference is made to the European Court of Human Rights' decision in Osman and also to the House of Lords' decision in Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [1999] 3 WLR 79, at 85. The note also observes that the force of Osman was weakened by a subsequent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Z v United Kingdom (The Times, 31 May 2001) in which the court affirmed that striking out a claim was not inherently contrary to the right of access to a court.
Subsequently in Kent v Griffiths (CA) [2001] QB 36,...
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