United Trade Action Group Ltd v Transport for London

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeMrs Justice Lang
Judgment Date20 January 2021
Neutral Citation[2021] EWHC 72 (Admin)
Date20 January 2021
Docket NumberCase No: CO/2854/2020 & CO/2995/2020
CourtQueen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)

[2021] EWHC 72 (Admin)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

PLANNING COURT

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Before:

Mrs Justice Lang DBE

Case No: CO/2854/2020 & CO/2995/2020

The Queen on the application of

Between:
(1) United Trade Action Group Limited
(2) Licensed Taxi Drivers Association Limited
Claimants
and
(1) Transport for London
(2) Mayor of London
Defendants

The Queen on the application of

(1) United Trade Action Group Limited
(2) Licensed Taxi Drivers Association Limited
Claimants
and
Transport for London
Defendant

David Matthias QC and Charles Streeten (instructed by Chiltern Law) for the Claimants

Ben Jaffey QC and Celia Rooney (instructed by the Public and Regulatory Law Team, Transport for London) for the Defendants

Hearing dates: 25 & 26 November 2020

Approved Judgment

Mrs Justice Lang
1

In two consolidated claims for judicial review, the Claimants challenge the London Streetspace Plan (“the Plan”) and the “Interim Guidance to Boroughs” (“the Guidance”) and the A10 GLA Roads (Norton Folgate, Bishopsgate and Gracechurch Street, City of London (Temporary Banned Turns and Prohibition of Traffic and Stopping) Order 2020 (the “A10 Order”).

2

The First Claimant (“UTAG”) is a trade body formed to protect the interests of the hackney carriage industry in London. The Second Claimant (“LTDA”) is a long-established trade body representing the interests of hackney carriage drivers. For ease, I shall refer to hackney carriages as “taxis” in this judgment. They are to be distinguished from private hire vehicles, commonly known as “mini-cabs”.

3

The Second Defendant (“the Mayor”) is the directly elected Mayor of London, and exercises powers and duties under the Greater London Authority Act 1999 (“GLAA 1999”). The First Defendant (“TfL”) is a statutory body established by the GLAA 1999, which has responsibility for transport in Greater London.

4

The Mayor issued the Plan on 6 May 2020, in response to the COVID 19 pandemic. The Guidance was published by TfL on 15 May 2020. Broadly, the aim of the Plan and the Guidance is to facilitate walking and cycling by providing more dedicated road space for pedestrians and cyclists, and “suppressing” motor vehicle traffic, other than buses.

5

In his oral and written submissions, Mr Matthias QC treated the Plan and Guidance as one, and challenged both. Mr Jaffey QC interpreted the claim as a challenge to the Guidance. At my request, Mr Jaffey QC took instructions and explained that the Plan consisted solely of the Mayor's public statement on 6 May 2020, which was set out in the Guidance. Whilst section 3 in the claim form in CO/2854/20, only identified the Guidance as the decision under challenge, in the Statement of Facts and Grounds, there were repeated references to the challenge to the Plan. Undoubtedly, the Plan and the Guidance were very closely linked. The Guidance adopted the objectives of the Plan, and its purpose was to provide advice on the implementation of the Plan. In those circumstances, I consider it is appropriate to consider the lawfulness of both the Plan and the Guidance, whilst bearing in mind the distinctions between them. As the Defendants observed, a key distinction is that only TfL issued the Guidance.

6

The A10 Order is a traffic management order (“TMO”) made by TfL on 16 July 2020, under section 14(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (the “RTRA 1984”). It is a temporary measure, due to expire by 15 January 2022 at the latest. It imposes extensive restrictions on motor vehicles, other than buses, along the A10 at Bishopsgate and Gracechurch Street in the City of London, from 7 am to 7 pm on weekdays. There are limited exemptions, but not for taxis.

7

On 23 September 2019 Sir Ross Cranston, sitting a Judge of the High Court, ordered that claim CO/2995/2020, which had been commenced as a statutory challenge, should be treated as if commenced by way of judicial review and consolidated with claim CO/2852/2020. He granted permission on grounds 1 and 4 in both claims, but refused permission on grounds 2, 3 and 5.

8

The Claimants have renewed their application for permission on grounds 2, 3 and 5. Ground 6, which was a procedural challenge, is no longer pursued. On 2 October 2020, I ordered that the renewed application for permission should be listed to be heard on a rolled-up basis at the substantive hearing.

9

I have handed down a separate judgment addressing the challenges made to the admissibility of evidence (“the Admissibility Judgment”). I have ruled that, on Grounds 1 and 2, the Defendants may only rely on evidence which was in existence at the date of the relevant decision. Some of Mr Monck's evidence was inadmissible as it was ex post facto evidence, which came into existence after the decisions were made, and which sought to bolster TfL's case, for example, by giving reasons and justifications for the decisions which were not to be found in the contemporaneous evidence. However, I ruled that some of the ex post facto evidence, for example, traffic studies carried out after the decisions were made, could be relied upon when considering the issue of proportionality on Grounds 3, 4 and 5. Details of other traffic schemes introduced pursuant to the Plan and the Guidance were admissible by agreement between the parties, and were relevant when considering the overall impacts of the Plan and Guidance.

Grounds for judicial review

10

The Claimants' grounds may be summarised as follows

i) Ground 1: In making and promulgating the Plan and Guidance and the A10 Order, the Mayor and TfL failed to distinguish taxis from “general traffic”. In doing so, they failed to have regard to relevant considerations, namely:

a) the distinct status of taxis as a form of public transport, reflected both in law and policy;

b) the role played by taxis in facilitating accessible public transport for those with mobility impairments.

c) in respect of the A10 Order only, the network management duty under section 16 Traffic Management Act 2004 (“ TMA 2004”);

d) in respect of the A10 Order only, the extent to which the objective of facilitating space for pedestrians could still be achieved by permitting taxis (but not other forms of motorised traffic), to drive through the bus gates on Bishopsgate.

ii) Ground 2: In making the Plan and Guidance and the A10 Order, TfL and the Mayor failed to have proper regard to the public sector equality duty, pursuant to section 149 of the Equalities Act 2010 (“the 2010 Act”).

iii) Ground 3: The Plan, the Guidance and the A10 Order were a disproportionate interference, by “control of use”, with the property rights of taxi owners and drivers in breach of Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights (“A1P1”).

iv) Ground 4: The Plan and Guidance and the A10 Order breach the Claimants' legitimate expectation to pass and repass on London's roads, and to use lanes reserved for buses.

v) Ground 5: The treatment of taxis in the Plan and Guidance and the A10 Order is irrational.

11

The Defendants' response to the Claimants' grounds may be summarised as follows.

12

Ground 1: The position of taxis was considered by TfL, and they were distinguished from other vehicles. It is not correct that the Defendants failed to apply their own policy (under which taxis are permitted to use bus lanes, subject to operational and safety issues). The policy has always permitted exceptions. The Claimants' real complaint is that taxis are not being treated in the same manner as buses. But that is a considered decision made for good reason. Taxis have no automatic right to use all bus lanes. Nor should taxis automatically be equated to buses when allocating scarce and highly constrained road space during a pandemic. The great majority of bus lanes remain open to taxis. However, it was necessary to exclude taxis from using Bishopsgate during peak hours as a through route.

13

Ground 2: TfL carried out a comprehensive equality impact assessment (“EqIA”) of the A10 Order. The Streetspace Guidance referred to the importance of considering s.149 of the 2010 Act before taking any transport measures pursuant to the Guidance, and referred to the needs of persons with mobility issues and other disabilities and how they ought to be addressed. As the Guidance was not a decision, an EqIA was not required.

14

Ground 3: It is unarguable that the use of the A10 Bishopsgate by taxis as a through route is a “possession”. The A10 Order is (at most) part of a temporary package of measures controlling the use of a possession – a taxi — on particular streets during peak hours. A temporary emergency restriction on taxis using Bishopsgate as a through route as part of an urgent response to a pandemic is a modest and entirely justifiable interference. The restriction was necessary, because if taxis were permitted to continue to use Bishopsgate as a through route, the objectives of the emergency measures taken in the A10 order would not be achieved.

15

Ground 4: The Claimants contend that they have three substantive legitimate expectations: (i) to “pass and repass” on London's roads, based on past practice; (ii) to use all bus lanes, based on policy; and (iii) to be “regarded as vital”, based on alleged policy. The first and third of those expectations are vague and fall short of a clear, unambiguous statement. The second is wrong in fact. There have always been a number of bus lanes that are not open to taxis. That number has been reduced in recent years, where compatible with appropriate traffic management. But there is no expectation or right for taxis to use all bus lanes. There has never been any representation or promise to that effect, nor could any such policy be applicable in the context of a novel pandemic emergency. Even if there were such a legitimate expectation, an emergency measure in response to a pandemic is a paradigm example...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Greater Manchester Buses South Ltd v Greater Manchester Combined Authority
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
    • 9 March 2022
    ...in Greater Manchester and would also interfere with their physical assets, such as depots and fleets: cf R (United Trade Action Group Limited and others) v Transport for London [2021] EWHC 72 (Admin), at [202] – [205]. Goodwill is a ‘possession’ within the meaning of A1P1: Breyer (and othe......
  • R Mark Keir v Natural England
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
    • 27 April 2021
    ...from policies in two of its documents without dealing with the matter in its reasoning (see R (UTAG) v TFL and Mayor of London [2021] EWHC 72 (Admin) at [106]–[107]). Bat Mitigation Guidelines 75 This document was published in January 2004. Mr. Streeten relied upon Figure 4 at p.39 which r......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT