Price v West London Investment Building Society Ltd
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE WILLMER,LORD JUSTICE DANCKWERTS,LORD JUSTICE DIPLOCK |
| Judgment Date | 23 March 1964 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1964] EWCA Civ J0323-1 |
| Court | Court of Appeal |
| Date | 23 March 1964 |
[1964] EWCA Civ J0323-1
In The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal
On Appeal From His Honour Judge at West London County Court
Revised
Lord Justice Willmer,
Lord Justice Danckwerts and
Lord Justice Diplock.
Mr. QUENTIN EDWARDS (instructed by Messrs. Firth Johnston & Co.) appeared on behalf of the Appellant.
Mr. A. B. DAWSON (instructed by Messrs. W. P. Davies & Son) appeared on behalf of the Respondents.
We need not trouble you, Mr. Dawson. I ask Lord Justice Danckwerts to deliver the first judgment.
This is an appeal from an Order of His Honour Judge Geoffrey Howard dated the 30th October, 1963 - an appeal arising under the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954. That is an Act which deals with the rights of tenants in certain cases to obtain a new lease. The property in question is 56, Goldhawk Road, Shepherds Bush, and the West London Investment Building Society, Ltd., the Respondents, had acquired the reversion upon that lease prior to the events which occurroa in this case. The tenant was the Appellant, Mr. Glyn Isaac Price. He carried on a business at the premises in question, and he had some other place or places of business; but he did not in fact reside at 56, Goldhawk Road. Apparently he lived at 58, Salyn Road, Stamford Brook. So far as I know, it does not appear that the landlords knew that he lived there.
The landlords were desirous of getting possession of the premises, and so they served upon hin a notice determining his tenancy, dated the 22nd March, 1963, which was in the proper form.
It will now be necessary, I think, to turn to the relevant provisions of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, which occur in Part II. Part II of that Act is concerned with business premises, and the relevant section for the present purposes is section 25, to start with. That provides, by subsection (1), that: "The landlord may terminate a tenancy to which this Part of this Act applies by a notice given to the tenant in the prescribed form specifying the date at which the tenancy is to come to an end (hereinafter referred to as 'the date of termination')."
The landlords in the present case did in fact serve the notice which I have mentioned in the form which is Form 7 to certain Regulations made by the Lord Chancellor pursuant to the provisions of section 66 of the Act, to which I will refer in a moment.
Subsection (5) of section 25 is in these terms: "A notice this section shall not have effect unless it recuiresthe tenant, within twomonths after the giving of the notice, to notify the landlord in writing whether or not, at the date of termination, the tenant will be willing to give up possession of the property comprised in the tenancy."
Subsection (3) of section 29 provides that "No application under subsection (l) of section twenty-four of this Act" – that is an application for a new lease – "shall be entertained unless it is made not less than two nor more than four months after the giving of the landlord's notice under section twenty five of this Act or, as the case may be, after the making of the tenant's request for a new tenancy."
It is to be observed that in all those provisions which I have read the word which is used is "giving". An argument has been made on a different word which appears in the form of notice which I have mentioned as being Form 7. I will deal with that later.
The next section is section 66: "Provisions as to notices. (l) Any from of notice required by this Act to be prescribed shall be prescribed by regulations made by the Lord Chancellor by statutory instrument."
I had better read subsection (2): "Where the form of a notice to be served on persons of any description is to be prescribed for any of the purposes of this Act, the form to be prescribed shall include such an explanation of the relevant provisions of this Act as appears to the Lord Chancellor requisite for informing persons of that description of their rights and obligations under those provisions."
Subsection (4): "Section twenty-three of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927 (which relates to the service of notices) shall apply for the purposes of this Act."
That then takes us to the earlier Landlord and Tenant Act of 1927. Section 23, "Service of notices", is in those terms: "(1) Any notice, request, demand or other instrument under this Act shall be in writing and may be served on the person on whom it is to be served either personally, or by leaving it for him at his last known place of abode in England or Wales, or bysending it through the post in a registered letter addressed to him there, or, in the case of a local or public authority or a statutory or a public utility company, to the secretary or other proper officer at the principal office of such authority or company, and in the case of a notice to a landlord, the person on whom it is to be served shall include any agent of the landlord duly authorised in that behalf."
Now, the events which happened in the present case were these: the landlords despatched on the 22nd March, 1963, a notice in the form which I have mentioned and sent it by registered post addressed to the tenant at 56, Goldhawk Road. It was duly delivered there by the postman and the receipt was signed by a Mrs. Duffy, who was employed by the tenant as a cleaner and as a saleswoman, if not in other respects, and the postman treated her as a person who was entitled to sign the receipt. There is no doubt that it was duly delivered there at the premises on the 23rd March, 1963, and that it was duly signed for by Mrs. Duffy; but it is maintained on behalf of the tenant that she had no authority to sign a receipt for this registered letter.
By some misfortune which really seems to have been due to a muddle in the tenant's office, instead of the document being received by the tenant on the 23rd March, it did not reach him personally until the 29th March, when he happened to find it apparently mixed up with a lot of circulars and the like which were connected with his business.
On the 28th May the Solicitors to the tenant sent a notice to the landlord which would have been in time if the receipt, or, rather, the giving of the notice, was to be taken as having been on the 29th March and not the 23rd. If in fact it was treated as having been given on the 23rd March, 1963, then on the 28th May, more than two months from that date, the counter notice by the tenant would be out of time. On the other hand, if it was to be taken as not given until the 29th March, it would have been in time. Therefore, the dispute has turned largely on at what date it is to be taken that the notice wasgiven. No doubt it was received within office hours on the 23rd March, 1963, at any...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Levett-Dunn and Others v NHS Property Services Ltd
...has his home and sleeps. Yet both counsel acknowledge that there are many decisions construing this term widely. In Price v West London Investment Building Society Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 616 a landlord sent a notice under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 to a tenant of business premises at the de......
-
Beanby Estates Ltd v Egg Stores (Stamford Hill) Ltd
...in that behalf." 7 I interpose to make two points. First of all, the place of abode includes place of business –see Price v. West London Investment Building Society [1964] 1 WLR 616. Secondly, the Recorded Delivery Service Act 1962 effectively extends any statutory provision such as section......
-
CA Webber (Transport) Ltd v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd (formerly Railtract Plc)
...belief." 9 It is not in dispute that the place of abode for the purposes of section 23 includes the place of business (Price v West London Investment Building Society [1964] 1 WLR 616). It is also clear from section 1 of the Recorded Delivery Service Act 1962 that reference to delivery by ......
-
Blunden v Frogmore Investments Ltd
...to "last-known place of abode" (not "or business") but this court has held that a reference to business is imported (see Price v West London Investment Building Society 1964 1 WLR 616). The other point of difference is that s.23(1), unlike s.196(4), makes no exception for cases where a lett......
-
Interpretation Of Statutes
...(1872) 7 Ch. App. 526 per James L.J; R v. Bird ex parte Needes (1898) 2 Q.B. 340 ; Price v. West London Investment Building Society (1964) 2 All ER 318 at 322 and Irving v. Askew (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 208 at 211 per Hannen J. The position now is that whereas Section 63(1) as modified imposes t......