Samuel Collingwood Smith v Esther Ruth Baker
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Master Sullivan |
| Judgment Date | 18 February 2021 |
| Neutral Citation | [2021] EWHC 348 (QB) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Docket Number | Case No: QB-2020-001013 |
| Date | 18 February 2021 |
[2021] EWHC 348 (QB)
Master Sullivan
Case No: QB-2020-001013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
The Claimant appeared in person
The Defendant appeared in person
Hearing dates:
Approved Judgment
I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
This is the claimant's renewed application to strike out the amended defence and counterclaim and for summary judgment on the claim and counterclaim. I previously gave judgment in writing on 30 September 2020 in which I refused an application for strike out or summary judgment, giving the defendant permission to amend her pleadings and giving some guidance on what was required in those amended pleadings. I gave permission for the claimant to renew his application should the amended pleadings still be deficient.
The defendant provided amended pleadings on 27 November 2020 and on 28 November 2020 Mr Smith renewed his application by email. I heard oral submissions on 14 January 2021. The defendant filed an application to strike out Mr Smith's claim but I did not hear that application due to confusion with an incorrect document being filed in support and the time by which it was accepted onto CE file.
I do not intend to rehearse the facts or background to this matter which is set out in my previous judgment.
The claimant submits that the amended defence and counterclaim have not cured the defects set out in my previous judgment and that therefore they should be struck out. He makes the general point that the amended defence and counterclaim are both very long and hard to follow and it would not be fair to him to have to continue to meet them.
The defendant submits that she has amended the defence and counterclaim and insofar as they still fail to comply with the CPR she should be entitled to further amend. I do not intend to rehearse the detail of the submissions on both sides, ultimately, I have to take a view as to whether the pleadings have been adequately set out or not. There are for example arguments about whether the introductory paragraphs should be struck out as too long; it seems to me that level of detail is not going to be helpful to the parties at this stage and a holistic view should be taken.
I do not accept that the defendant should be given further chances to amend her pleadings where they are still significantly in default. My previous judgment explained the rules and what is required for compliance. The defendant raised what she describes as her “ongoing and proven disabilities” and in addition the effects of medication she is on due to having suffered a TIA. She has not provided the evidence that would be required in order for me to make a decision on whether any adjustments were required as a result of any medical condition or medication taken as a result. I accept that she has psychiatric disorders and that she may suffer from issues with concentration. However, she has had a significant amount of time to draft her pleadings and amend those pleadings and so those difficulties have already been taken into account. I do also take into account that she has had similar issues in previous cases where what is required in pleadings has been explained. In my judgment she has had the opportunity to make good her pleadings, I must now assess them as they stand.
The Amended Defence
All references to the defence hereafter are to the amended defence. In respect of the defence, it seems to me that the pleading has not adequately remedied the defects that I found in my previous judgment. The defendant has failed to set out in respect of the defences of qualified privilege in response to attack the way in which her tweets were relevant to the attack. She has not set out a proper basis for why her tweets were in the public interest. Her pleading is to the effect that she was asked for details about the claimant in response to his blog. That is not sufficient to give rise to a defence of public interest.
In respect of the first publication, the meaning alleged for the first tweet is that “the claimant is unemployed, lives with his mother and is not permitted to utter the word Evanescence.”. That meaning is admitted. The basis of the pleading of truth are as follows.
There is a bare assertion that the claimant lives in his mother's house with no facts or information as to the basis of that knowledge. In respect of employment, it is pleaded that in 2015, the claimant was asking for money for litigation via a GoFundMe page. The defendant pleads that it is well known that there is some form of order related to Evanescence that prevents the claimant from talking about various aspects of the band. There is no pleading that he is in fact restrained from saying the word evanescence.
The defendant denies that he lives with his mother and has provided documents to show he declared tax from income in 2019.
In my judgment there is no real prospect of the defendant's defence of truth succeeding. The factual matters she sets out do not found a basis for the defence of truth. The same considerations apply to tweet (ii).
In respect of tweet (iii), the meaning alleged by the claimant is that the claimant is used to hassling teenage girls and is therefore a habitual paedophile.
The meaning is denied in the defence and an alternative meaning is pleaded at paragraph 16 namely that the claimant has a history of harassing teenage girls and other women that are post pubescent and that he does not “abuse” them, but harasses them. It is specifically denied that this is an allegation that he is a paedophile.
The same pleadings of response to attack and public interest are also pleaded and have the same defects as in respect of the first two tweets.
In respect of truth, it is pleaded in paragraph 17 of the defence that two women alleged that the claimant and Mr Hemming used parliamentary privilege on 17 July 2012 to “continue the harassment and cause them alarm and distress”. No other specific instances of harassment of teenage girls or other women are set out. I note that only Ms DeMarzi's age is given. In my judgment the defendant has no real prospect of a successful defence of truth based on the pleaded matters.
In respect of all three tweets, the issue of serious harm is raised. In respect of tweets (i) and (ii) it is pleaded that the meanings alleged are not capable of causing serious harm and in respect of all the tweets that the claimant has not evidenced any serious harm caused, that as the claimant has said the defendant is discredited, her tweets are unable to cause him serious harm and as he is not named they would not be accessible on a search about him.
It seems to me that the matters set out in paragraph 23 of the defence, whilst pleaded under the heading of serious harm, do not relate to the issues of serious harm properly raised in the defence.
In respect of the first publication therefore, the defence is struck out save that the defendant is entitled to raise (as she has in the defence) and challenge the issue of serious harm in respect of all the tweets and meaning in respect of tweets (iii) and (iv).
In respect of publication 2, the meaning alleged is that the claimant is a benefits fraudster who has claimed benefits whilst failing to declare income. The defendant has denied meaning but not put forward an alternative meaning. The same defences of public interest, qualified privilege in response to attack and truth are repeated. They have the same defects as above. Those defences is therefore struck out. The defendant disputes that the publication caused serious harm on the same grounds as for Publication 1 and she remains entitled to argue the issue of serious harm.
In respect of publication 3, the meaning pleaded is that the claimant lied in his witness statement in Baker v Hemming by denying offering legal assistance to Mr Hemming whilst admitting it on his blog. That means that the claimant has committed perjury. The defendant denies meaning and states the tweet is a question of which two different version of the same story are truth. Again, the claimant pleads truth and qualified privilege, repeating the previous matters.
What the defendant does not do is set out the two statements which she claims are different. In submissions the defendant said she was unable to find the relevant parts of the blogs and they must have been deleted. I do not accept that but in any event, in my judgment, the pleading has the same defects as the set out in my previous judgment and there is no real prospect of proving truth based on what is pleaded. The pleading is therefore struck out but the defendant may continue to dispute meaning. The defendant also disputes that the publication caused serious harm on the same grounds as for Publication 1 and she remains entitled to argue the issue of serious harm.
The defendant does not deal with the fourth publication as it is a pleading against a second defendant who has now settled her part of the claim.
The other claim is for damages and an injunction for harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The first paragraph of the particulars of claim states that each tweet complained of by both defendants amounts to a course of conduct jointly or against each individually. The defendant has not pleaded to that specifically and it seems to me it is something the claimant would have to prove, not having obviously pleaded the facts on which he relies to show a joint course of conduct.
I have struck out the defence in respect of the other tweets, save for technical...
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Samuel Collingwood Smith v Esther Ruth Baker
...and counterclaim. 27 Master Sullivan heard the applications on 14 January 2021 and gave judgment on 18 February 2021: Smith v Baker [2021] EWHC 348 (QB) (“Sullivan 2”). Master Sullivan said (at para 6 of Sullivan 2):- “I do not accept that the defendant should be given further chances to a......